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Notes from the Editor 
Six years after the attacks of 9/11, the practice and discipline of homeland 
defense and security have evolved and matured, moving into an era of self-
evaluation. The essays and articles in Volume III, Issue 3 of Homeland 
Security Affairs reflect this stage, asking questions about how we view 
lessons from the past and directions for the future. 
What have we learned from past experience? Christopher Bellavita poses 
this question with regard to security for special events in “Changing 
Homeland Security: A Strategic Logic of Special Event Security.” Distilling 
the strategic insights of almost twenty-five years of national and 
international special event after-action reports and experience, he offers 
five principles scalable to special events of practically any size, with 
applicability to homeland security as well. These principles are (1) start 
preparing from day one, (2) understand the life cycle of a special event, (3) 
anticipate the threat spectrum, (4) write – and live – the security strategy, 
and (5) shape the security landscape. Dr. Bellavita brings theory and 
practical experience to this strategic discussion. 
Judy Boyd also offers personal experience in answering a different 
question: what does homeland security mean to people living outside the 
Washington D.C. beltway? “Homeland Security Behind the Redwood 
Curtain” shares Boyd’s conversations with the denizens of Humboldt 
County, California. Homeland security has a different connotation for 
people dwelling in the Redwood forests of Northern California. Their 
concerns revolve around local issues and threats to their lifestyles, and they 
rely on the social capital of local bonds, not the security offered by 
government programs. As Boyd argues, it is time to refocus national 
homeland security policy and strategy on the premise that, like politics, “all 
homeland security is local.” Homeland security professionals must draw on 
the kind of social capital exhibited in Humboldt County and elsewhere to 
link citizens to the external assets provided by the federal government. 
In “Generational Hazards,” Patrick Massey points to another way in which 
homeland security professionals need to rethink their approach to the 
future. He argues that we need to create a new, broader homeland security 
rule-set that includes, at its core, both external hazards (natural and 
terrorism-induced) and long-term “generational hazards” that will weaken 
the country in coming decades. Specifically, Massey points to America’s 
fiscal profligacy, global warming, and an inferior mathematics and science 
educational system as dangers that homeland security officials can help to 
mitigate by using their soft power to help position these threats on a par 
with the global war on terrorism. 
Improving our tactical response to terrorism is the focus of three articles: 
using sensors to detect the movement of terrorists, weapons, or dangerous 
materials along urban roadways; establishing an identity management 
system for first responders; and utilizing emergency medical personnel as 
intelligence collectors. 
The research team of Robert Atwell, Lowell Bruce Anderson, Robert Bovey, 
and Sean Barnett detail the results of their work with sensors used to 
detect the movement of terrorists, weapons, or dangerous materials in 
“Application of the Maximum Flow Problem to Sensor Placement on Urban 
Road Networks for Homeland Security.” This article discusses a 
methodology developed at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and 
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security. Using network theory 
to identify a minimum “cut set” (a smallest set of road segments necessary 
to cut to completely block flow through the road network), the authors 
determined how many sensors would be needed and where they should be 
located to protect the New York City metropolitan area. Surprisingly, they 
found that a relatively small number of sensors, if properly placed, would 
protect the entire area and provide an additional level of protection in 
preventing terrorist attacks. 
Concern about secondary terrorist attacks on first responders – through 
infiltration of the incident scene – drives Mark Landahl’s argument that we 
must establish a system (or systems) for managing the identification of 
first responders. In “Identity Crisis: Defining the Problem and Framing a 
Solution for Terrorism Incident Response,” Landahl analyzes past response 
to incidents of domestic terrorism and concludes that one of our largest 
security gaps lies in properly identifying first response personnel on 
incident scenes. Identity, he argues, must be established and authenticated 
to protect responders and prevent infiltration. To this end, Landahl looks 
at two possible solutions: a typed Identity Management Team response 
resource and a comprehensive nationwide identity solution for first 
responders. 
Another kind of first responder is the focus of Michael Petrie’s “The Use of 
EMS Personnel as Intelligence Sensors: Critical Issues and Recommended 
Practices.” Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel, as first 
responders, are often in a position to observe signs of terrorist planning, 
activity, or affiliations. For this reason, Petrie argues, EMS personnel could 
be used as information collectors to support Terrorism Early Warning 
Groups (TEWGs) and other intelligence fusion centers. This is not being 
done now due to strategic concerns about medical confidentiality, EMS 
professional issues, and societal expectations of medical personnel. Taking 
these issues into account, Petrie presents a model EMS information 
collection protocol. While the ability to use EMS personnel as intelligence 
collectors will vary from state to state, based on laws protecting patient 
privacy, Petrie argues that the access these personnel have to information 
regarding potential terrorists could be invaluable to our prevention efforts. 
Finally, Paul Stockton reviews Charles Perrow’s The Next Catastrophe: 
Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist 
Disasters (2007). Based on an in-depth analysis of four especially 
vulnerable components of U.S. infrastructure, Perrow proposes “target 
reduction” as a means of better surviving future catastrophes. This is, says 
Stockton, an important book that goes beyond the existing literature on 
critical infrastructure protection and provides what Stockton calls “a truly 
all-hazards analysis of homeland security.” 
The Editor 
Changing Homeland Security:  




Late one Sunday afternoon two people met in the Utah public safety 
commissioner’s office to talk about Olympic security. One was the commissioner, 
who also served as the Olympic security commander. The other person was me.  
We were five months away from the Opening Ceremony for the 2002 Winter 
Olympics. The commissioner thought it was time for a change, for security 
planning to transition into security operations. While not quite finished, the 
Olympic plan was good enough to start using. The purpose of the Sunday meeting 
was to figure out how to introduce the new strategy to the other members of the 
public safety security coalition. The date was September 9, 2001.  Two days later 
the Olympic Games became a trivial concern.   
 
Within a few weeks, the embryonic interest in calling off the Olympics had 
disappeared. The Games became a symbol of national resolve in the face of 
barbarism. The Olympics would not be cancelled. 
The public safety community began to consider what the new terrorism threat 
meant for Olympic security operations, with the national government leading 
most of those discussions. Olympic security was now too important to remain 
exclusively under local control. The first order of business was to examine the 
Utah Olympic security plan. A variety of federal agencies wanted to make sure 
there were no flaws in it. 
By the time security experts from the national government finished their 
review, very little in the plan had changed. Aviation support was expanded, 
access control procedures were tightened, and a few other elements were slightly 
modified. It was very easy to get money and people – two resources hard to 
obtain before the attacks. 1   
Even before the Games were over, national leaders praised what was called the 
“Utah Model” for organizing and planning a major event and recommended it as 
a best practice for future events.2 This praise was testament to the thousands of 
dedicated people who made Olympic security a success. But at a less 
grandiloquent level, the Utah security organization and plan were in all 
significant respects based on the same model used for just about every major U.S. 
special event since the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984.3 While the scale and 
complexity of the Olympic Games are unique among international events, there 
are not many unique ways to structure security for a major special event.  
Most American communities will never host a large-scale event, but the 
lessons learned from providing security at major events can be scaled to other 
events. The lessons may also help guide homeland security preparedness, 
particularly in states, regions, and cities. As one Utah public safety agency 
director put it, homeland security preparedness “feels like we are preparing for 
the Olympics all over again, we just don’t know when they are coming.”4 
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WHAT IS A SPECIAL EVENT? 
Many communities in the United States host sporting events, concerts, festivals, 
and other gatherings that have the potential to attract large crowds and 
dignitaries. These activities are called "special events."5 The events can also 
attract criminals and terrorists. 
Security has been an integral part of major special events since the 1972 attack 
at the Munich Olympic Games. In 1980, the United States hosted the XIII Winter 
Olympics in Lake Placid, New York. Since then, the nation has hosted three 
Olympic Games, a World Cup, and several dozen other major international 
sporting and political events. Each of those events received a level of security 
designed to ensure there would be no repeat of the 1972 Munich attack.  
Attention to event security increased significantly after September 11, 2001.6 
For many years, the details of major event security activities were known only 
within a comparatively small community.7 The "secrecy" resulted from lack of 
interest, more than from any concerted effort to keep details hidden. At least one 
– and often several – after-action reports followed every Olympic or equivalently 
unique event in the United States since 1980. Almost without exception public 
safety planners responsible for the next major event ignored those reports.8 
Before the coordinated terror attacks in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York, 
reinventing the security-planning wheel – while not desired – was accepted as a 
somewhat minor inefficiency. The contemporary challenge is to better share 
public safety’s collective knowledge to ensure special events remain entertaining 
and safe. 
This article distills the strategic insights of almost twenty-five years of national 
and international special event after-action reports and experience.9 The article is 
written primarily from the perspective of security issues that arise in a major 
event like an Olympic Games or a gathering of world leaders. My belief is the 
strategic10 issues and suggestions highlighted here are scalable to special events 
of practically any size.  
There is an aphorism in the Olympic security community: "All Olympics are 
different. All Olympics are the same." It means, on the one hand, that special 
events are not paint-by-number enterprises. Each event has its unique security 
challenges. But the aphorism also means that all Olympic Games – and by 
extension other special events – have enough security features in common to 
permit strategic principles derived from prior events to be used as heuristics for 
future events. The goal of this article is to describe those principles. 
The principles are: 
1. Start preparing from Day One 
2. Understand the life cycle of a special event 
3. Anticipate the threat spectrum 
4. Write – and live – the security strategy 
5. Shape the security landscape 
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1. START PREPARING FROM DAY ONE 
When should event security planning start? Answering this question is 
leadership’s first strategic decision. From one perspective, you can never start 
early enough. From an opposite view, one can spend entirely too much time 
planning.  
C. Northcote Parkinson’s Law says, “Work expands so as to fill the time 
available for its completion.” Security planning for an Olympic Games typically 
begins six to seven years before opening ceremonies. Planning for the 2004 
Democratic National Convention began the same month Boston was awarded the 
event, twenty months before the convention started.11 Planning for a parade could 
begin a few days before the parade starts.   
Theoretically, the length of time planning should take is a function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, resources, the size and complexity of the event, and a security 
community’s experience with special events. But what does that theory mean in 
practice? 
An FBI leader in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics security operation suggested the 
case for starting early: 
The problem you run into with an event like this is that you can’t wait 
until there’s an articulated threat to commit [resources]…. So even if 
there’s no threat or no inference of a threat, you’ve got to go through all 
the same steps and planning and putting people in place that you would if 
there were a threat.12 
The lead security official for the State of Georgia argued for a shorter planning 
cycle. When asked if he had it to do over again would he have spent years 
planning for the 1996 Olympics, the official said: 
I would never have told the chiefs [of the public safety departments] 
anything [about the Olympics] until about six months ahead and then I’d 
tell them all to rearrange their schedules [and that] I wanted a head 
count. Then I would have gotten the operational people in, and we would 
have gone over their head counts, and then I would have told them, “All 
right, this is your responsibility, this is your venue. I want you to make it 
safe like you would a sporting event” and maybe add a couple of people to 
it. And I would have had the operational people identify one operational 
person for every venue they had, and I would have said, “Now run that 
son of a bitch and call me when you get a problem, but don’t call me till 
you have problems.”13 
The official was later removed from the planning activity and banished into an 
operational role that took him out of the state. His perspective on planning was 
so unconventional that it disturbed national and state security officials enough to 
pressure the state’s governor to replace him.   
This anecdote also illustrates the role that stakeholder expectations have on 
shaping the planning process. Some communities are content planning security 
for events the way they always have. Other communities cannot seem to do 
enough planning.   
A useful rule of thumb for security planning is to start thinking about core 
elements of a security plan (i.e., situation or threat, mission, concept of 
BELLAVITA, SPECIAL EVENT SECURITY 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS VOL. III, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2007) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
4 
operation, organization, and resources) immediately after the event is 
announced. This is the Day One Strategy. It can be initiated simply – for example 
by having a lunch discussion with key public safety partners.14 Based on the 
resulting analysis, decide whether the complexity of the event requires 
extraordinary planning activity, or whether security planning can be incorporated 
into existing agency functions. 
2. UNDERSTAND THE LIFE CYCLE OF SPECIAL EVENT 
SECURITY 
Viewing special events through a life cycle framework helps a leader time 
strategic interventions. The life cycle perspective suggests when to influence the 
complexity generated by multiple actors with varied agendas trying to achieve 
approximately the same global objective: a safe and secure event. 
Learn from the Past  
It is unusual for major event security to start by identifying what can be learned 
from the past.  People give lip service to the desire not to reinvent the wheel, but 
when one looks empirically at how security planning begins, there is little 
evidence that planners or leaders incorporate lessons learned from one 
jurisdiction into their own.15 
 For some events, like a local fair or an annual special event, institutional 
memory is frequently a sufficient source of research. If a community has the 
same major event each year – such as the Kentucky Derby or Indianapolis 500 – 
lessons from the past are handed down from generation to generation. Major 
events that travel around the country – the Superbowl, the World Series – have 
institutionalized the lessons of experience.  Those who host unique or infrequent 
events can also learn from the past. 
 There is a wealth of information in the United States, going back to the Lake 
Placid Olympics in 1980, about how to provide security for a special event, about 
what worked, and about what did not.16 Typically, the people who are aware of 
these reports and who read them are either not around when it comes time to 
plan the event, forget what they read, or are not in an organizational position to 
implement the recommendations of the reports.17 Motivated agencies do not have 
to surrender to obstructions that prevent learning from the past. Seeking access 
to the accumulated knowledge of public safety agencies with event experience 
should be the first step for a public safety community responsible for securing an 
event. Completing this stage properly helps leaders begin to identify potential 
threats and strategies for countering the threats. (Those two activities are further 
discussed later in this article.) 
Organize To Learn  
Depending on the size of the event, existing institutional structures may be 
suitable for developing security plans. Larger events will require more complex 
organizational arrangements. Since the late 1990s, agencies have used variations 
of the Incident Management System as an event security organizing structure.18   
Major event security generates a unique – and temporary – organizational 
form. The organization starts with a few people; for the Salt Lake Games it was 
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five. As the event draws nearer, the organization grows. Eighteen months before 
the 2002 Olympic Games Opening Ceremony, the security group had 150 people 
in it.  When an event starts, the organization expands almost exponentially. At its 
peak, Salt Lake’s Olympic security operations involved more than 11,000 public 
safety people. A few weeks after the Games were over, the security organization – 
like a circus leaving town – vanished. 
“Form follows function” is one normative guideline for structuring event 
security. It means the way you are organized should be related directly to what 
you are trying to accomplish and, as a corollary, to the resources you have 
available to accomplish the security mission. “Form follows mistake” tends to be 
the way events are actually organized.19   
An effective security organization is a dynamic entity that is always 
organizing, and never fully organized.20 It is an organization that actively learns 
from what is and what is not working, and changes accordingly. Security 
personnel set up an initial structure for planning and operations. Any deficiencies 
in the security structure – whether revealed during the planning phase or during 
operations – can and should lead to structural revisions. Any successes should be 
replicated where possible in other parts of the organization. 
Effective special event security organizations are clear about the mission, the 
basic principles that govern security operations, the strategy for accomplishing 
the mission, and the procedures used to plan and execute the security operation.  
However, it is not unusual for that clarity to be revealed retrospectively, only after 
the event is over.  
Develop the Security Plan  
Once the strategies and structures are activated, the detailed and time-consuming 
work of developing the security plan begins. This stage involves identifying the 
person or people who will develop the security plan; writing, reviewing and 
modifying various drafts; and integrating the assorted pieces of the overall plan.  
Getting ready for a simple event could be one person’s additional assignment.  
More complicated events will require specifically assigned people and resources.  
(The elements that should be included in a comprehensive event security plan are 
more than adequately described in other documents.) 21  
In my experience, an event security plan is never finished until the event is 
finished. The plan continues to grow in comprehensiveness and usefulness. My 
rule of thumb is to aim for 20% completion of the plan during the first quartile of 
time available for planning (whether calculated in years, months or days), 40% by 
the end of the second quartile, 60% completed by the end of the third quartile, 
and 80% or better as the event arrives. 
Obtain Security Resources  
This stage is usually the most troublesome part of getting ready for a special 
event. Special events place demands on public safety agencies whose resources 
are already stretched.   
 Because one cannot protect everything, an ideal security plan is based – in 
theory – on managing risks. Relevant threats and vulnerabilities are identified 
through the planning process. The steps that can be taken to reduce the risks to 
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an acceptable level are determined. Then resources are obtained by the public 
safety community and used to reduce the risks.  
The reality of event security is not as pure as the standard risk management 
model assumes. In all but the most major events, there are few additional 
resources made available by anyone to help secure an event.22 Since most 
agencies do not have people standing around looking for work, agencies typically 
have to meet the event’s security requirements by reconfiguring existing 
resources. 
On rare occasions, the event organizers will contribute people, equipment, or 
money to a security operation. During the 2002 Olympic Games, security costs 
were covered, in part, by allocating to the public safety budget a portion of each 
spectator ticket sold. This user-pay model could become a significant source of 
future event security financing.23 
Transition to Operation  
One of the difficult questions in event security is: when does planning stop and 
operations begin? A rule of thumb is that planning should be conducted – as 
much as possible – by the same people within the same structures that will be 
employed during operations. Transition then becomes organic, and the people 
who developed the plan are responsible for making it work. For complex events, 
operations often have to be handed over to multiple agencies and to people who 
have not been involved intimately with planning. Training, exercises, and the 
deployment of resources are three activities that signal – and facilitate – the 
transition phase of the security operation. 
Conduct Operations  
From a security perspective, perhaps the best thing about special events is they 
start on a specified day and time. They also have a known end date. This is what 
distinguishes event security from many other extended public safety operations.  
Time turns out to be more of an ally in event planning than an enemy. 
Once the event starts, public safety does what it does best: makes things 
happen. Having a security plan brings together trained people with the resources 
they need to carry out the event security mission. Surprise, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity are part of the real-world composition of all events.  The ability to 
improvise intelligently around the security plan is the mark of a professional 
public safety community. This ability is enhanced by the effectiveness of the 
initial planning strategy and organization. It is honed by the training and 
exercises appropriate to the magnitude of the event. 
In every operation, regardless of complexity and duration, learning occurs.  
Translating procedures from paper to practice rarely happens without some 
degree of error. It takes time (a few hours to a few days) to develop a smooth 
security operation. (Specific ideas about how to make the transition from security 
theory to security practice are described elsewhere.)24 
Recover From the Event  
The last stage of the event cycle is closing up shop. There are specific activities 
that mark the end of the security operation – from returning borrowed assets, 
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finalizing overtime, and completing written reports, to recognizing and rewarding 
the contributions of key people and agencies in the security effort. Not the least of 
these activities is putting in writing what worked and what did not work – 
otherwise known as the after-action report (AAR).   
As suggested at the start of this life cycle discussion, cultural, organizational, 
political, and other barriers explain why security providers for one event tend not 
to benefit from the experiences of their public safety counterparts in other cities 
and nations. Experience and surveys indicate few people read, understand, or act 
on information provided in major event after-action reports. But hope persists.25   
3. ANTICIPATE THE THREAT SPECTRUM 
When something significant goes wrong at a special event, there can be lasting 
economic, political, and social consequences. Decades after the 1972 terrorist 
attack on Israeli athletes, the name “Munich” can still conjure the grainy video 
image of the hooded terrorist standing on the balcony at the Olympic Village.  
Fortunately, most special events occur without security problems. Occasionally 
there are incidents, caused by a natural or unintentional hazard such as a 
hurricane, a lightning storm, or a chemical spill. Problems can also be created by 
criminal activity, including gang violence and terrorism. Special event security is 
intended to reduce the risk that something undesirable, from a public safety 
perspective, will happen. 
A basic risk-assessment formula describes risk as a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequences. But, as the Atlanta FBI agent cited earlier said, 
developing a security plan cannot wait until the intelligence is in. There was no 
intelligence before the 1996 Centennial Park bombing. In the absence of specific 
threat information, one can look for guidance from the past about what incidents 
occurred in previous events. 
Christopher Johnson looked at the source and intent of significant incidents 
affecting Olympic Games since Munich in 1972.26 The results of his analysis are 
displayed in Figure 1. 
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Prior to the 2002 Olympic Games, security planners developed a list of incidents, 
by frequency, reported for major events in the United States and several other 
nations27 since 1972 (Table 1). The list was used as an initial estimate of the types 
of threats to plan for – to be updated as specific intelligence was obtained. The 
list was used also to contribute to initial design efforts for Athens 2004 and Turin 
2006 security planning.28 Absent event-specific intelligence, the information in 
Figure 1 and Table 1 (shown below) can be used to help anticipate the types of 
threats to be considered in security preparations. 
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Table 1: Security Related Incidents at Major Events - From Most to Least Probable 
 
4. WRITE – AND LIVE – THE STRATEGY 
Typically, there is little guidance about what the public safety mission is for a 
large-scale event. For example, here, in its entirety, is the security portion of a 
contract between the International Olympic Committee (the group that awards a 
city the rights to hold the Olympics) and a recent host Olympic city: 
Responsibility for all aspects of security is a matter to be dealt with by the 
appropriate authorities of the Host Country. The City and the NOC 
[National Olympic Committee] undertake that all appropriate and 
necessary security measures shall be taken accordingly.29 
That is all. With little formal guidance – even for an event as large and complex 
as an Olympics – public safety officials often have to craft their own mission.  
Effectively, they have three choices in determining what constitutes “all 
appropriate and necessary security measures”:  
(1) They can treat the event as something similar to what they do all the time and 
modify their standard behaviors. This is appropriate when the event is routine or 
comparatively small.  
Security-Related Incidents in Order of Probability 
 
1. Hoaxes and threats – such as bomb threats 
2. Minor medical injuries 
3. Intellectual property rights violations 
4. Minor criminal activity – pick pockets, frauds, pranks 
5. Vehicle and pedestrian movement problems 
6. Fire code violations 
7. Weather related problems 
8. Public health concerns 
9. Demonstrations, some potentially violent 
10. Attacks on cyber systems 
11. Attempts to extort sponsors 
12. Natural disasters 
13. Bombings, committed by lone individual rather than by a group 
14. Attacks on vital infrastructure 
15. Terrorist attack  
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(2) They can look at the event as something beyond their capability and seek to 
transfer security responsibility to another entity. This is appropriate when, for 
example, world leaders hold a politically charged conference in a small 
community.   
(3) Or they can realize there is something unique about what they are responsible 
for and ask themselves what to do about it. The first step in answering that 
question is to develop a strategy – a guide to constructing a desired future. 
Based on what has worked for past events, an effective strategy will:  
1. Unite the security community, especially the senior team, around a 
coherent and defensible vision.   
2. Provide a clear narrative about the role security serves within the larger 
context of the event and the community where the event will be held.  
Because there is more to a special event than security, the security story 
has to show the value public safety adds to the entire event. 
3. Establish – and enforce as necessary – security priorities.  Most everything 
public safety does is important, but some security activities are more 
important than others. Identifying what is important to public safety – and 
informing stakeholders – helps in the inevitable negotiations that happen 
during event preparations. 
4. Provide guidance based on the priorities. This is akin to a “commander’s 
intent.” The guidance gives individuals and work units within the security 
organization a basis for making independent decisions. The best strategic 
plans do not identify every contingency. They instead allow individual 
units to make informed decisions aligned with the strategic vision.  The 
security planners for the Sydney 2000 Games called this guidance the 
“preferred security position.” 30 
5. Consistently emphasize strategic over operational and tactical concerns. 
The word “strategy” comes from a Greek term that means, “What generals 
do.” Contemporary generals rarely get in the middle of a battle. Event 
security strategy should stay at the 30,000-foot level and avoid becoming 
tangled in ground cover. 
6. Be put in writing. A surprising number – surprising to me anyway – of 
event security strategies are not written down. They appear to be 
transmitted primarily through the oral tradition, meaning someone has to 
ask what the strategy is. 
5. SHAPE THE SECURITY LANDSCAPE 
Shaping the security landscape means attending to issues around which conflict 
occurs during planning and operations. There are few textbook resolutions for 
these issues.  How they are handled will always be context specific. In my 
experience, they are the enduring strategic issues of special event security. They 
are what make all events “the same.” How these issues are addressed often makes 
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the difference between conducting a professionally mature security operation or 
an amateur one. 
Control: Who is in Charge? (Of What?) 
The issue of who is in charge comes up frequently. During the preparation for one 
of this country’s Olympic Games, the vice-president of the United States asked 
the leaders of the public safety community, “Who’s in charge?” The leaders 
stammered opaquely. 31 For the 2004 Democratic Convention, the official view 
was the Secret Service was in charge.32  
“Who is in charge” is only part of a sentence. The complete question should be 
who is in charge of what? For most events, the specific answer to that question is 
relatively simple. The answers are found in laws, regulations, and other 
agreements that determine public safety authorities and responsibilities during 
normal times. Rarely do those authorities change during a major event, even in 
the case of concurrent jurisdiction. 
Many events display the properties of complex adaptive systems.33 There are 
numerous stakeholders, each positioning themselves to achieve their own 
interests, and at the same time adapting to the actions of other stakeholders. In 
such a complex system, little of significance is controlled by one group. Instead of 
asking control questions, the conversation is more constructively directed to 
clarify who does what, and under what situations. In a well-run security 
operation, the acronym C2 means “coordination and cooperation” more than 
“command and control.”34 
Public Safety Cultures 
Complex special events bring together representatives from almost all the public 
safety disciplines. The reality of different professional cultures having to 
collaborate and coordinate preparedness activities is a source of conflict. The mix 
of professional, organizational, and regional cultures can trigger an 
ethnocentrism that leads to trouble. The impact of culture on event preparedness 
is not unique to special events in the United States.35  
The 2002 Olympics brought together almost 100 state, local, federal, and 
private sector organizations with a stake in security. They represented more than 
a dozen disciplines.36 On paper (and in public) everyone worked well together.   
But – as in domestic homeland security – most days are spent preparing to 
stop bad guys, and not in an actual battle. There is something about preparing for 
an event that can activate some of the worst ripples across our culture.37  
For example, on a bad day getting ready for the 2002 Games, cops were 
perceived by other disciplines as prima donnas. Firefighters were seen as lazy. 
Public works was fragmented. Emergency management agencies suffered from an 
organizational inferiority complex. Private and corporate security personnel were 
viewed as rent-a-cops. Emergency medical groups were looking for someone to 
tell them what to do. Public health agencies only seemed able to hold meetings. 
Infrastructure owners did not want to tell anyone about their vulnerabilities. 
Everyone was afraid the cops would get more than any other group. All the 
disciplines were overly sensitive and picked up quickly on any possible slight.  
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The two-dozen federal agencies that had some stake in Olympic security spent 
three years in a Byzantine interagency gang war – polite on the surface, 
intricately vicious in the back rooms. The National Guard and the active duty 
military component disagreed about almost everything. The Secret Service was 
reluctant to share anything. The FBI worried another agency would invade its 
turf.  FEMA was fretful it would not get invited to meetings called by the FBI or 
Secret Service. The U.S. Attorney kept sticking his nose into everyone’s business. 
Many federal law enforcement agents brought in to help plan the Games 
looked at Utah public safety as – with some exceptions – a collection of well 
meaning, but naive hicks. In turn, federal agents were seen as arrogant and inept. 
Rural agencies didn’t trust their urban counterparts. Sheriffs didn’t trust 
police. Neither trusted the state. No one trusted Washington. And Washington 
returned the favor.   
But that was on a bad day. During the operational period of the Games, almost 
all of the bickering was put aside to get the job done. When public safety 
professionals have a vital and immediate mission to do, it takes priority over 
everything else – including culture. 
Inclusion vs. Exclusion 
Finding the balance between including and excluding stakeholders is difficult. In 
the post-September 11th environment, many public safety-related disciplines, 
and the private sector, want to be a part of security planning for events. There are 
pro and con arguments for who to include in the overall security planning 
command structure.   
If the security strategy leaves public safety disciplines out of the command or 
operations structure – public attorneys for example – they can feel excluded and 
(depending on how it is handled) professionally belittled. There is also the risk of 
losing access to needed or useful security resources. If the strategy includes 
within the security structure everyone who has a plausible claim to some public 
safety interest, the organization can quickly become bogged down in meetings, 
conflicts, and resource battles.38   
One solution that has worked for some events is to hold periodic meetings 
open to representatives of all stakeholders.  These gatherings provide people with 
a chance to learn what is going on. It allows them to provide input into the 
planning process, as appropriate. It also provides some sense of involvement. The 
strategy works because many agencies are primarily concerned with insuring 
their interests are protected, rather than looking for new committees to join or 
more work to do. Handled clumsily, however, this strategy can also convey a 
sense that an inner circle is feeding crumbs of information to second tier 
members of the stakeholder community. 
Problem People 
Like beauty, a problem person is in the eye of the beholder. In a multi-agency 
environment, one does not always get to select who works on the security project. 
It is not unusual for some people involved in an event to put personalities, 
personal agendas, and ego ahead of the security mission – especially during the 
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planning phase of the activity. Sometimes assigned people do not have the skills, 
maturity, or commitment the job requires.   
Getting rid of problem people is not easy. One may have no choice but to work 
with them. Ultimately their presence interferes with creating collaborative 
environments. A senior security planner for the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney 
commented, after the Games were over, that the real terrorists were inside his 
own organization. The lesson: when possible, find a way to quickly remove people 
from the project who can disrupt collaboration.  This does not mean getting rid of 
people who create conflict. It does mean replacing or marginalizing people who 
produce difficulties that are not productive for the mission.   
Building Trust 
Trust is the glue that holds special event security coalitions together. How does 
one build trust with people and agencies one does not normally work with? Or 
worse, how does one build trust among agencies that historically do not get 
along? (In one major event, the chief security planners for two primary agencies 
had been personal enemies since junior high school.)   
It turns out spending time going to tedious meetings, repetitive exercises, and 
event conferences plays a critical part in building trust among the people who 
have to make the security operation work. Doing things with people, and doing 
things often, can create a reservoir of instrumental comity that is sometimes 
called social capital. The capital generates trust that is used during event 
operations. It would be good to report that the trust lasts after the event is over. 
Experience on this point is mixed.39 
Risks vs. Resources 
A major source of conflict in special events is whether to plan primarily from a 
foundation of risks or resources. The first time the private sector director of 
operations for a major event met the chief public safety planner, the director 
suggested that public safety should develop its plan with an eye toward using the 
(very limited) resources that were already available. The public safety planner 
disagreed.  He said it was his due diligence responsibility to make sure potential 
threats were identified and vulnerabilities reduced. If additional resources were 
needed to do that, they would be found. The relationship between the two men 
went downhill from that point.   
Resource-based logic starts with the view that there is a known, and generally 
constrained, budget for security. It asks what level of security can be provided for 
the available resources. 
Risk-based logic asks: What is the threat? What are the vulnerabilities? How 
do we reduce those vulnerabilities? It then assumes that decision makers will 
obtain the resources needed to reduce vulnerabilities and risk to a level that is 
politically and professionally acceptable.40   
Need to Share Resources 
Typically, no single agency has enough resources to do what is required during a 
complex event – and still meet its normal responsibilities. The fact that agencies 
need to share provides an opportunity for collaboration. It also creates conflicts 
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over who gets to decide how resources are used. Because most public safety 
leaders tend to be pragmatists, and the mission generally comes first, the 
conflicts usually are worked out well enough – or at least put on hold – to get the 
job done. In my experience, regardless of what is written in a formal agreement, 
the agency that owns the resources always has the final say in how they will be 
used.41 
What You are Already Doing and What You Already Have 
There is a tendency to view a major event as a unique activity requiring new 
strategies, structures, and technologies. That perspective is a path to confusion, 
unfulfilled expectations, and madness. In one major event, the law enforcement 
commander and a vendor used the event to fund the multi-year development of a 
complicated personnel-scheduling program. The program graphically portrayed 
the movement of hundreds of police officers at their posts during a 24-hour 
period. The program did two things well: it provided a canned presentation of 
how it might work, which was used whenever dignitaries visited the Olympic 
operation, and it served as the basis for requesting additional development 
money.    
Successful security operations are built on what already is in place. Who is in 
charge of what today? How do personnel and agencies communicate today? What 
technology do we use today? Answers to questions like that should drive the 
foundation of planning and event operations. Compare the answers against an 
assessment of what is needed to accomplish the public safety mission at an 
acceptable level of risk. Then seek additional resources to augment the gap. When 
it comes to arrest procedures, communications, dispatch, fire safety, public 
works, EMS protocols, or other critical procedures, limit the new. Build on what 
is already there.   
Have a Story But Modify it As Needed 
It helps planners and public safety officials if there is a simple and consistent 
story to tell to the media and people on the periphery of security activities. The 
story, or narrative, should describe the essential character of the security 
operation. For example, in one major event, the narrative was: “We anticipate 
this will be an event everyone will enjoy. We are going to prevent disruptions to 
the event.  We will respond rapidly to any incidents that do happen.” The central 
story served as a conceptual organizing device for public safety officials. It was 
the core message – the sound bite – officials emphasized during the planning 
stages of the event.   
Every story has a finite lifespan. Typically there are messages that are 
appropriate during the main phases of security planning: initial organizing, 
planning, transition, and moving into operations. Effective event planning 
includes a strategic communication element that can determine when the 
security message needs to change. 
Timing Victories 
The process of getting ready for a major event mirrors the issue attention cycle.42  
In the early days of planning, only a few people are involved. Then comes the 
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period of alarmed discovery: the event is approaching and everyone needs to rush 
to get ready. In this phase, lots of people work on the event, sometimes with an 
enthusiasm that borders on panic. Next comes the “cost of progress” phase. There 
is a realization that there are not enough resources or enough time to do 
everything desired. That leads to a resolve to do “good enough,” seeking a balance 
between what is available and what is acceptable.43   
Strategic leaders can get the most accomplished, and the most resources 
allocated, between the alarmed discovery and cost of progress phases of the cycle.  
Other Duties As Assigned Creates Burnout 
For most events, including major ones like an Olympics, the bulk of the planning 
work is done by a relatively small group of people. Even though over 11,000 
people were involved in the 2002 Olympic Security operations, fewer than two-
dozen people did most of the planning. For many small to medium events, it is 
not unusual for security planning to be the responsibility primarily of a single 
person. It is also rare for event planners to be relieved of their other duties. 
Planning becomes one of those “other duties as assigned” activities. 
If the security operation is treated seriously, people responsible for security 
planning are among the best people in the agency. They are given the planning 
responsibility because they have already demonstrated their competence. As a 
result, these already overworked people can burn out long before the event 
arrives.   
Single Points of Failure 
Information or skills critical to security’s success should not reside solely in one 
person or agency. Agencies using one planner should be aware that 
overburdening a security planner makes that planner a potential single source of 
failure for the entire operation. It makes sense, for several reasons, to have at 
least two planners who each know what the other knows. If something happens – 
which it often does – causing an agency or key individual to no longer be 
involved, the remaining person or agency does not have to start from the 
beginning. As illustrated next, relying too much on a specific technology can also 
create a single point of failure. 
New Technology 
One hour before the first event at a 1994 World Cup venue, a temporary bridge 
collapsed. Public safety personnel from four agencies rushed to the scene to see if 
anyone was trapped in the debris. At the start of their shifts they had been issued 
new radios to allow them to talk with each other. Many of the officers discovered, 
as they responded to the scene, that they did not truly understand how to use the 
new radios. Conceptually similar scenes have been repeated in event after event. 
New technology is a source of both promise and anguish at major events. The 
more international attention the event receives, the greater the likelihood public 
safety leaders will be tempted by the marketing messages of vendors. The 
experiential evidence about the usefulness of innovative technology (or 
technology that is new to a jurisdiction) at major events is fairly one-sided. The 
technology rarely performs as promised or as designed. Sometimes the fault rests 
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with the technology.  Other times – as in the radio example – the problem is user 
error. When existing technology can get the job done, it should be used. It makes 
little sense to train people for a system they will use for, say, one month, if they 
already have something that will work.   
Communication Will Be a Problem 
A few minutes before 1:00 AM on July 27, 1996 a security guard noticed an 
unattended backpack under a bench in Atlanta’s Centennial Park. He informed a 
police officer, who started moving people away from the object. Several minutes 
later, a man dialed 911 and said, “There is a bomb in Centennial Park. You have 
thirty minutes.” At 1:20 AM, a police officer reported an explosion at the Park.  
Two people died as a result of the explosion; over 110 people were injured. 
The problems associated with efforts to get the information about the bomb 
threat to the right people are legend in the special event security community.44 
Even if communication had worked perfectly, here is what would have had to 
happen within the communication protocols created for the Games: (1) The 
Atlanta dispatcher who received the 911 call would notify (2) the Atlanta 
Agency Command Center (ACC). The person who took the call at the ACC 
would notify (3) the state representative in the ACC (because Centennial Park 
was a state controlled venue). The state representative would notify (4) the State 
Olympic Command Center. The person who took the call in the state center 
would notify (5) the Centennial Park venue commander who would then notify 
(6) his officers. 
If, in a hypothetically “perfect” world, each communication took only three 
minutes, the message about the bomb threat would take almost twenty minutes 
to get to the officers who needed to act on the information. Nine of those police 
officers – unaware of the call – were moving people away from the unattended 
backpack. All were hit by shrapnel when the bomb exploded, twenty minutes 
after the bomb threat.45 
The Atlanta Olympic communication protocol was the result of political, 
organizational, and technological factors of that particular event. While there is 
much to critique about that incident, the focus here is on communication. The 911 
call was made from a payphone outside Centennial Park. Yet the call had to be 
routed all over the city to transmit a message to someone less than 100 yards 
away.   
A lesson from almost every training exercise is “communication was a 
problem.” The same lesson emerges from major event experience. Even with 
efficient protocols, communication difficulties are certain to occur during a 
special event. And the more agencies involved, the greater the likelihood of 
problems.   
Utah had six years to plan its Olympic communication system. Yet still they 
encountered obstacles, with both the technology and sociology of 
communication. Major events require communication among agencies that are 
not used to working with each other. It takes time to learn how to communicate 
effectively.   
During the seventeen days of the Games, the communication network 
processed 8.5 million calls, almost 350 calls every minute of the operational 
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period. Most of the time the system worked well. But even with six years of 
planning, Department of Defense and Secret Service radios interfered with each 
other. The Olympic Organizing Committee sold some of its frequency to an 
international ski team and the frequency interfered with public safety 
communications. Encrypted radios had a difficult time communicating with non-
encrypted radios. Some agencies used coded voice communications; others used 
plain English. Some disciplines used radios for succinct communications; others 
used the radio to chat. Those are just a few of the radio communication 
problems. There were analogous technological and human factors difficulties 
with video, telephone, internet, and other modes of communication. Overall, 
communication was one of the success stories of the 2002 Olympics. But still 
there were problems.46  
Paradoxically, events can also generate more information than agencies are 
used to receiving. In such an environment it can be difficult to discern what is 
signal and what is noise.  After-action reports recommend installing, testing, and 
practicing with communication equipment and protocols as early and as 
frequently as possible. Nonetheless, strategic leaders should plan for the 
inevitability of communication problems and ensure redundancies exist to allow 
the transmission of critical information.  
Plan on Everything Changing  
As one after action-report delicately phrased this issue, “Commitments [made]… 
to public safety agencies were not always dependable.” This applies to people, 
procedures, resources, and promises. One may have an image that for a major 
event, at some point the plan is completed, and then operations begin. But special 
event planning is never finished. There may be documents and charts and 
PowerPoint presentations that describe “The Plan,” but for many events there are 
significant differences between what is in the plan and what is on the ground. 
Venues, schedules, personnel, and other features of the event change daily. Some 
of these changes have significant impacts on security. The changes can be a 
source of conflict. Strategic leaders should not assume things will happen the way 
they are told they will happen. For the important things, public safety should 
prepare to do for itself what others say they will do for them. 
CONCLUSION: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT EVENT 
Major special events create complex systems. In such systems actors 
continuously adapt to each other and to the unpredictable vitality of ambiguous 
and turbulent environments.47 As a result, success measures for event security 
are characterized less by reference to such terms as efficiency, stability, standard 
operating procedures, and control, and more by such words as effectiveness, 
resilience, rules of thumb, and cooperation.48 In this respect, having to prepare 
for special events appears similar to the environment faced by homeland security 
leaders. 
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From a public safety perspective, two guidelines emerge as the primary strategic 
lessons from previous events: (1) Be steadfast on the issues that are important to 
public safety and (2) Be flexible about everything else. 
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areas such as the Olympic Village. 
7. Apply strict and consistent zone controls within each venue and site, aimed primarily at 
the protection of the Olympic Family and VIP’s. 
8. Impose strict and consistent controls on the entry of vehicles and commercial materials 
into all Olympic venues and sites.  
31 Buntin, “Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Games,” 11 and 12.  The case 
study, written a few years after the event, suggests a more articulate answer was provided to the 
vice-president.  The story told by participants at the meeting once they returned to Atlanta 
supports the “stammering” assertion.  For another view of this meeting, see Mitt Romney’s May 
2004 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, available 
at http://www.iwar.org.uk/homesec/resources/olympic-security/romney.htm.  Contrary to 
Buntin’s report, Romney believed the meeting with Vice President Gore took place in Atlanta, not 
Washington, D.C. Romney uses the story to support his notion that for a major event under high 
threat conditions “you want someone who can tell you that they are responsible for the overall 
effort.”  For an FBI view of how security authority was shared in the 2002 Olympics, see “Inside 
the FBI: 2002 Olympics,” washingtonpost.com, January 17, 2002, 
http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/fbi0117.htm.  
32 “There was no argument about who was in charge,” says Carlo Boccia, director of the Mayor’s 
Office of Homeland Security, “because that was designated—the Secret Service was in charge.” In 
practice, the USSS appears to have been “in charge” in only one of eight security zones. Scott, 
“Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention (A),” 9. 
33 For a helpful review of complexity theory and its application to how organizations function, see 
Philip Anderson, “Complexity Theory and Organization Science,” Organization Science, Special 
Issue: Application of Complexity Theory to Organization Science 10, no. 3, (May - Jun., 1999): 
216-232. 
34 In my view, this is a primary lesson from the Democratic National Convention experience.  See 
Scott, “Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention,” 3-4. 
35 For an Australian example, see the Sydney Olympic comment, in the “Problem People” section 
that follows.  Planners from Barcelona, Turin, and Athens reported similar stories to me about 
conflicts rooted in professional and jurisdictional cultures.  Where state and local agencies in the 
United States may disparage Washington D.C. agencies, police officers in Turin spoke the same 
way about officials from Rome, as in “Watch out, here come the know-it-all Romans” (a phrase 
that probably sounds better in Italian). 
36 The disciplines included fire, police, emergency medical, emergency management, public 
works, public health, physicians, military, private sector, intelligence analysts, EOD, aviation, and 
other scientific disciplines (chemists, structural engineers, electronic specialists, communications 
specialists). 
37 Ester Scott reports a somewhat different outcome in Boston.  “We jokingly refer to the 
Democratic National Convention here among the law enforcement community … as the summer 
of love,” one person reported.  “Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention,” 
4. 
38 There were sixty agencies on the Atlanta Olympics security governing body.  As one participant 
noted, “[Once] you get beyond about five or six or seven people, it’s not a policy-making group 
anymore. It’s a convention….” Buntin, “Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic 
Games,” 11.  The proliferation problem persists a decade later, but now with command centers.  
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There were twenty-nine “command centers” for the Democratic National Convention. Scott. 
“Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention,” 3. 
39 After the 2002 Salt Lake Olympics, the federal agency representatives who used to call their 
state and local counterparts two and three times a day, stopped calling.  Everyone had other work 
to do – other projects to work on.  The city’s police and fire chief – who shared space in the same 
building – meant to have lunch together, but never quite got around to it. One needs a reason to 
spend time outside one’s culture.  For projections about the impact on interagency relations of the 
DNC event, see Scott. “Security Planning for the 2004 Democratic National Convention,” 4.  
40 For how this issue was handled in Boston, see all three parts of Scott’s “Security Planning for 
the 2004 Democratic National Convention.”  
41 For example, even though the Department of Defense might support an event with aircraft or 
explosive ordnance disposal people and equipment, DoD must always agree how those resources 
will be used.  The same goes for a county or city that might provide its police officers to assist with 
crowd control.  Those officers almost always remain under the control of the owning agency’s 
command staff and operational procedures.  Even in a sharing environment, those with the “gold” 
– i.e., resources – tend not to relinquish control. 
42 Anthony Downs, “Up and Down With Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle’," The Public Interest 
28 (Summer 1972): 38-50. 
43 A more cynical model about the phases of a special event (borrowed from the project 
management world) echoes the issue-attention cycle: 1. Enthusiasm, 2. Disillusionment, 3. Panic, 
4. Search for the guilty, 5. Blame the innocent, 6. Reward the uninvolved.   
44 “FBI defends Olympics bomb probe; 911 transcript shows delay,” August 9, 1996, 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9608/09/olympics.bomb.911/. Johnson, Contingency Planning for 
2012 Olympic Venues, 2-3; and Buntin, “Security Preparations for the 1996 Centennial Olympic 
Games,” 7- 15. For additional information about this incident, see the numerous historical links 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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45 Joan Kirchner, “How Olympic Bomb Was Found,” July 27, 1996, 
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Humboldt County, California, is about as far removed from Washington, D.C., as a 
person can get in the continental United States. Located 200 miles north of San 
Francisco, Humboldt County is literally and figuratively separated from the rest of the 
country by thousands of acres of giant redwood trees that the locals call “the Redwood 
Curtain.”  I traveled to this remote part of America shortly after the five-year 
anniversary of September 11th to seek perspective on my life and profession as a 
homeland security official. Walking at the feet of these giants, I was humbled by their 
sense of grace, majesty, and timelessness. The front-page newspaper stories from 
yesterday, last year, or even the past decade seemed somehow less urgent when 
surrounded by living creatures that measure time not in days and years, but rather in 
centuries. The mid-day sun barely penetrated the leafy canopy, creating a surreal 
twilight that played tricks with the eye and the mind.  
This sense of timelessness and remoteness penetrated my psyche and made me 
wonder about the mind and spirit of other humans who pass through the forest on a 
daily basis. If the rays of the sun struggle unsuccessfully, for the most part, to penetrate 
to the forest floor in this part of America, how can politicians and policymakers 2,000 
miles away expect their words and actions to connect? After my discussions with the 
locals, I soon realized that homeland security behind the Redwood Curtain has a 
different connotation than it does to those within the Washington beltway. Six years 
after the September 11th attacks, I believe it is time to refocus national homeland 
security policy on the premise that, like politics, “all homeland security is local.” Citizens 
of this country, for the most part, are focused on local issues and bond through local 
connections – what has been referred to as “social capital.” It is this capital that 
homeland security professionals must draw on to link citizens to the external assets 
provided by the federal government. The importance of local connections was evident in 
the conversations I had that weekend with a few of the residents of Humboldt County. 
 
 “I remember on 9/11 hearing that the Twin Towers had been hit and I had no idea 
where they [the towers] were,” admitted John as we shared drinks on the front porch of 
the Riverwood Inn, one of the last highway taverns on old Highway 101. 1  
“When I found out they weren’t anywhere around here, I didn’t care that much any 
more because I knew I was safe here. Ain’t no terrorist coming here to Humboldt 
County.  If they did, they would get the s#!t beat out of them.” 
I had noticed John and his sister Lori earlier that evening while I was sitting on the 
porch talking to William, a man in his late fifties with shoulder length bleached blond 
hair and a deeply lined and weathered face. At the time, I didn’t know they were brother 
and sister. They caught my eye because every fifteen minutes or so, they jumped into a 
shiny black Jeep Wrangler that had no top on it and were gone for about ten minutes. 
Each time they returned to the same parking spot in front of the Inn, hopped out and 
grabbed the Coors Light bottles they had left on the porch railing. I hoped to talk to 
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them at some point that evening but at the moment, I was in the middle of a 





Riverwood Inn, Phillipsville, CA 
   
William was struggling to answer my question: “What do you expect of your government 
regarding homeland security?” He admitted that no one from the government had ever 
asked him for his opinion and he really wanted to give me an answer. He went to the bar 
to buy us another round of drinks and give himself time to think. While he was inside, I 
watched John and Lori leave again. 
“It might take me all night to find the right words,” he said when he came back with 
our drinks, “but I’ll have something for you. This is tough because I don’t usually expect 
anything from government.” 
William explained that after he had served his obligatory tour in the Army during the 
Vietnam War, he had wandered around America, trying to find a place to fit in. He loved 
America, which is why he voluntarily enlisted, rather than waiting to be drafted or 
moving to Canada, as many of his friends did. He repeated several times that night that 
he was thankful he never had to actually go to Vietnam or fire a shot at anyone in 
combat. He was trained as a field artillery soldier and it always bothered him how 
impersonal his job was—he would pull a lever to fire a rocket that would hit a target 
twelve miles away. When he left the Army, William wandered around the country, 
completely disengaged from society. He didn’t pay taxes, vote, or have a permanent 
address. Eventually he reached Humboldt County and stayed put. He began to 
reconnect with society again, albeit at arms length.  
“My momma will turn ninety next month,” William said. “She wishes I was near her 
in New Jersey but she realizes that this is where I fit in best.” William then admitted 
what bothered him the most at this point in his wandering lifestyle.  
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“I just wish I could do better by my grandkids.”  
He looked out into the darkness as he took a long sip from his drink, then put it 
firmly down on the porch railing and turned toward me. 
“You wouldn’t believe how they talk to their mama,” he said angrily. “They have no 
manners!  How are they going to be when they get older and out on their own?” 
We discussed some of the burdens on our hearts and minds and eventually developed 
a plan of action. Despite the very different worlds we live in, William and I each have a 
circle of people that we can influence to bring about change. We called it our “circle of 
influence” and dreamt aloud about the change we sought—my goal of developing and 
implementing effective homeland security policy and William’s desire to see his 
grandchildren grow up to be good citizens.    
William stood up to leave.  
“About your question on what do I expect from my government, I’ll get an answer to 
you tomorrow morning.” I said I would be at the Inn until about lunch time.  He shook 
my hand and then leaned over and kissed me on the top of my head.   
“Good-bye,” he said quietly and then he left the porch. 
I watched him walk across the street to his beat-up red compact car and drive off into 
the forest.  
 
I propped my feet up on the log in front of the porch and reflected on my conversation 
with William as I sipped my margarita. Once again, the shiny black Jeep Wrangler 
whipped into the open parking spot in front of the Inn.  
“Hey,” I shouted to the guy in the passenger seat, “What’s going on around here that’s 
so exciting that you keep leaving and coming back?”  
The guy laughed and walked over to the porch railing to chat. 
“My sister just bought this Jeep today and she’s looking for any excuse she can to 
drive it. First we went to Myer’s Flat [a small hamlet a few miles to the north], and then 
we went to the store, and this last time we went to Aunt Lucy’s. You know Aunt Lucy, 
right?”   
He was joking; in a community as small as this, it was obvious that I was not from 
around there. His sister wandered over to join us. I asked her what life was like here in 
Humboldt County. I pointed to her sweatshirt, which said, “Humboldt” in tattoo script 
letters, and commented “this must be a great place if people around here advertise it on 
their clothes” Then I nodded my head toward another girl in her early twenties, leaning 
against the railing and wearing a fleece pullover that also said “Humboldt.” 
“I suppose so,” she replied slowly and then leaned forward as if to confide a secret. 
“My mother gave it to me and so I have to wear it.” 
She leaned against the railing and grabbed one of the open beer bottles. 
“It is sort of a cool place,” she acknowledged. “You’ve heard of Humboldt County, 
right?”  
I shook my head no. My destination was Humboldt State Park and I hadn’t realized 
there was a county by the same name. “You don’t know about Humboldt County?” she 
said incredulously.  “You know, pot capital of America?  It’s in stories and songs…”   
I shook my head to indicate that I was clueless.   
“I’ll be right back—let me get a fresh beer.” A few moments later, she settled into the 
chair next to where William had been sitting.  
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“Where are you from that you don’t know about this place?” she asked, her tone 
indicating that I must be from the sticks. 
I explained that I was from Washington, D.C., worked for the Department of 
Homeland Security, and had come to California to study homeland security. 
“Then I better not tell you about the warrant out for my arrest!” John had come back 
on the porch and laughed at his own joke. I explained that my job was to help find 
terrorists, not catch bail jumpers. “I’m just kidding” he replied. 
I turned the conversation back to our surroundings. “What’s so special about 
Humboldt County?” I asked Lori again. 
“Just about everyone in Humboldt County grows pot,” Lori explained. “It’s about the 
only thing that you can do, other than logging, to make money.”   
“See that bright new Ford 350 truck parked here in front of the Inn?” John asked, 
pointing at a huge gray truck that was just twenty feet away. “That’s a $40,000 truck, 
easy. You have to pull down some serious cash to able to afford a tricked out rig like 
that.  Now, I’m not saying that the guy who owns it is into drugs. But just walk through 
the parking lot of the high school and compare the cars the teachers drive and what the 
students are driving. You’ll see a lot of the kids with trucks like that and you gotta ask 
yourself, ‘How can those kids afford a truck like that?’  I’ll tell you—only by growing 
pot.” 
“I was in the forest today and even with the sun shining, it was pretty dark in there—it 
hardly seems like there would be enough light to grown pot outside,” I asked, naively. 
“They grow it inside,” John said, matter-of-factly. A big truck went by and there was a 
huge fifty gallon tank in the back with a hose attached. John pointed to it and said, “I 
work in construction and the boss’ trucks have those gas cans in the back. Around here, 
you’ll see lots of the kid’s trucks with those in the back but it isn’t because they’re 
working in no construction. They fill those canisters with gasoline to power the 
generators that provide light for their pot to grow.” 
Two ATVs pulled up in front of the Inn. A young guy jumped off of one with a beer 
can in his hand and shoes on his feet. He tried to walk onto the porch but was 
intercepted by Kathy, the bartender. “If you want to stay here you need to get rid of that 
can,” Kathy ordered from the doorway, hands on her hips. It was clear who the law was 
around here. 
“Matt is only twenty years old,” John whispered to me.   
Matt grumbled but poured out the beer. He soon left because he preferred drinking to 
conversation and Kathy was keeping an eye on him. Kathy was considered the best 
bartender around—a friendly ear for those who wanted to ramble, a wise sage for those 
in need of advice, and a good judge of the human condition. As William had put it 
earlier that evening, “She’s the best because she knows when I’m too drunk to drive and 
then just gives me orange juice to drink, knowing I won’t know the difference at that 
point!”    
As the chatter continued, I was surprised to see a familiar beat-up red car pull up in 
front and William jump out. He came onto the porch where I was sitting and handed me 
a battered case containing a compact disk, the kind you can burn songs onto using your 
home computer.   
“I know that it’s illegal to copy music and all that but I want you to have this CD. I 
can’t find the right words to say what I want but listen to track eight. It’s by this guy 
named Jack Johnson and he gets it right.”   
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I was stunned. I took the CD he offered and said thank you. He kissed me on the top 
of my head again and as he walked away, held up his hand with his thumb and index 
finger touching to create a circle.   
“Circles of influence!” he shouted with a smile. “Circles of influence!” He then got in 
his car and drove off into the dark of the forest. 
   
“What was that about?” John asked, a bit confused by what had just happened.  I 
explained how earlier that evening I had asked William what he expected from the 
government regarding homeland security and this was, apparently, William’s response.   
“I’ll tell you what I want—no more corrupt cops,” said John. “It’s sickening how all 
this pot is being grown here in the county and the cops do nothing about it. It just isn’t 
right. I had my problems for awhile, getting hooked on meth, arrested a couple of times 
for petty theft while on drugs…but I’ve been clean for eight months now and I’m 
working hard to pay my taxes and child support. But where’s the incentive to work hard 
if you can make such easy money by growing drugs? And the growers just pay off the 
cops to look the other way.”   
John held up his beer bottle. “This used to be illegal in this country but now it isn’t.  
How did that happen?  Why isn’t pot legal?  If it was, it would put this whole county out 
of business.” 
As we talked, I learned that John was thirty-four years old and struggling to get his 
life back on track after a bad detour due to drugs. His sister was twenty-four and she 
planned to move to Sacramento in a few weeks. John mentioned that the new Jeep was 
actually Lori’s second car, causing me to wonder how she could afford to own two cars at 
her age. Maybe the conversation about growing pot was based on more than just 
observations about the neighbors.  John and Lori had eight other siblings of various 
ages, all from the same father but two different mothers. Seated behind us, occasionally 
joining in the conversation was their mother’s cousin, Betty. It was hard to tell how old 
Betty was with her lined and weathered face and voice husky from smoking. She could 
have been anywhere between her late thirties and early fifties. Betty chain smoked 
cigarettes and drank Miller Genuine Draft from a bottle while we talked about life in 
Humboldt County.   
“No terrorist would ever want to come up here—they wouldn’t be welcome,” said 
Betty after a long drag on her cigarette. “All people want to do around here is be able to 
hunt and fish and be left alone.” 
“Yeah!” exclaimed John, “Ain’t no f&!#n’ terrorist coming here to Humboldt County.  
If they did, they’d get the s#!t beat out of them.” 
 
The next day I had to drive back to San Francisco and catch a plane to Washington.  I 
found the owner of the Riverwood Inn, Loreen, on the porch with her new puppy from 
the local animal rescue. I thanked her for her hospitality and told her how my 
conversations of the previous night had taught me that there was far more to Humboldt 
County than the towering redwoods all around us. 
“Life is more rugged here behind the Redwood Curtain,” said Loreen seriously, “It’s 
tough to survive up here. There is a definite ‘live-and-let-live’ mentality. But I wouldn’t 
trade it for anywhere else.  Lots of people I know gave up high-paying, high-power jobs 
to come live here.  Even though there may be less people than in the city, there is much 
more of a sense of connectedness. 
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“And they all seem to gravitate to your Inn,” I observed.  
Loreen nodded. “The Riverwood is sort of the pulse of this community. My place is 
used for weddings and funerals.  Actually, whenever anything happens, everyone seems 
to wander to the Riverwood to be together somehow. Another part of our small 
communities up here are the local Volunteer Fire Departments.  They are, in most cases, 
the link that holds everyone together, yet they are constantly struggling for funding for 
the barest of essentials.  Our fire department used to be in a shed when I first came here 
in 1995.  After years of flipping burgers at local events, cake sales and raffles, we finally 
built a great new firehouse, but we can’t afford a generator or heat.  They have to pay 
huge amounts for liability insurance so that’s where all the money we raise goes.  That 
means that the Riverwood remains the community center because I have a 30,000 
kilowatt generator, a fireplace that provides heat all winter, food, and of course, booze.”  
I asked her if she agreed with John that the biggest problem in her community was 
drugs. 
“Pot is certainly the backbone of the economy in Southern Humboldt, but not 
necessarily all over Humboldt.  The really bad drug is meth because it’s a problem 
everywhere in the county.  I was born in Eureka and in the past ten years the drug 
problem has become epidemic.  I think it’s because of the decision to place the Pelican 
Bay State Prison north of us.  Most of the main gang leaders are housed there and they 
run their operations from the prison.  They have access to anything they want so their 
members are moving into our area to be near the leaders.  They run from the Bay Area 
up to our county, back and forth, and bring their city crime and crap with them.  It has 
become a problem to our south as well, in Mendocino County.  Just last week they 
busted a pot grower with 150,000 plants up near Trinity County.  This was the first grow 
discovered in our area that was from a Mexican cartel.  The local [pot] growers don’t like 
that competition and no one likes the gangs coming up and infiltrating our way of life. 
To us, those gangs are OUR terrorists.” 
I asked her the same question that I asked William the night before: “What do you 
expect of your government regarding homeland security?” She thought about it for a 
moment and then replied. 
“Like I said, life is rugged up here so we have to take care of ourselves and each other. 
Most everyone here has a generator at home because we lose power all winter.  No one 
comes home with less than a half empty gas tank during the winter; we always top off 
before coming up the hills.  Our pantry is stocked with canned food.  Next weekend 
we’re putting on the annual celebration in downtown Phillipsville, all two blocks of it, to 
benefit our fire department.  I’ll do the auction, my bartenders will be working, we have 
a fireman’s muster with other local fire departments, the bikers will be there with a 
poker run and bike games (we’re bikers here you know – the fire chief and his wife both 
have Harley’s) and there will be kid games and horseshoes.  The point I am trying to 
make is that this is a small fabric of the larger community here.  Every little 
town…Miranda, Myers Flat, Weott, Phillipsville, Briceland, Shelter Cove, Pepperwood, 
Whitethorn…they all have volunteer fire departments that struggle every day to keep 
operating. There is only so much we can do as a small community.  Homeland Security 
could really help by providing them with radios, generators, equipment in case there is 
an attack.  Cell phones don’t work here but radios do.” 
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“Hey, I’ve got to run,” Loreen said, “I’m going up to Rio Dell to do a small benefit 
auction for a little boy who has cancer.  Keep in touch!” she said with a friendly wave 
good-bye.   
 
Rugged is an appropriate adjective to describe this county. It must be at least a hundred-
mile round trip to visit the nearest Wal-Mart. Few people seemed connected to the 
outside world by electronic devices; no one was walking around talking on cell phones 
or emailing on Blackberry devices. There were no pagers going off. The federal and state 
government seemed light-years away when driving amongst the giant redwoods.  
Despite the Redwood Curtain that separates the people of Humboldt County from much 
of the nation and the “live and let live” mentality, I had seen ample evidence of the social 
connections between these rugged individualists.  The challenge for homeland security 
officials at all levels of government therefore is to find an appropriate way to connect to 
these citizens.   
William, John and Lisa, Betty and Loreen are part of the complex mosaic called 
American society. They demonstrate that a one-size-fits-all approach to homeland 
security is a short-sighted approach to policy-making. Consider William, the 
disillusioned Vietnam War veteran who, when asked what he expects from his 
government, responds with the words of Jack Johnson on track eight of the album, In 
Between Dreams (2005): 
It's such a tired game 
Will it ever stop? 
How will this all play out? 
Out of sight, out of mind 
By now we should know 
How to communicate  
Instead of coming to blows  
We're on a roll. 
By now we say it's a war for peace 
It's the same old game 
But do we really want to play? 
We could say it's us against them 
We can try but nobody wins 
Are we using what we've learned? 
In the true sense of the word 
Are we losing what we were? 
It's such a tired game 
Will it ever stop? 
Is not for me to say. 
 
William lives on the fringes of American society and has essentially given up on 
expecting much from the government. The most pressing issue in his life is not the War 
on Terror; rather it is trying to influence the moral character of his grandchildren.   
Another person who finds it comforting to live within the protection of the forest is 
Betty. Her sentiments about just wanting to be left alone by the government may 
resonate with a number of Americans who are more concerned with maintaining privacy 
in their homes than with homeland security. Betty sees no need for government 
protection because any threat to her will be taken care of locally, preferably by the 
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malfeasant “get[ting] the s#!t beaten out of them” by someone like John. John and Lori, 
the siblings, are more hopeful about the future than Betty or William and yet are jaded 
about the usefulness of government to help them; the flourishing drug industry in 
Humboldt County is what threatens their security. John has succumbed to the powerful 
addiction of drugs once and can hear the siren song of quick fortune that marijuana 
cultivation offers. 
The general impression I was left with, after my conversations on the front porch of 
the Riverwood Inn, was that the locals do not expect much from their government; the 
biggest threat to their lives is drugs and not terrorists; and they want to maintain their 
frontier-like attitude of fierce independence. While it is unlikely that al-Qaeda will target 
the Avenue of Giants, there are other 21st century threats beyond drugs that, if realized, 
will make it difficult for the community to maintain its independence without 
government assistance or significant individual advance preparations. 
For example, should an influenza pandemic occur again in the United States, an 
outlander like myself traveling through the forest could easily bring the virus into their 
midst and their remoteness from medical care will increase the lethality of the disease. A 
substantial earthquake anywhere on the West Coast could disrupt the power grid or 
transportation sector, cutting them off from energy and food re-supply for days or 
weeks. Or, a series of suicide bomber attacks on planes, public venues, or tourist 
attractions anywhere in America could significantly dampen the tourism industry and 
depress a regional economy that depends in part on visitors with money to spend on 
food and lodging. Therefore, it is critical that homeland security officials not only find 
ways to connect with all citizens of America, but also develop policies that are tailored to 
the way homeland security affects citizens at the local level. 
John and Lori offer us insight into how to develop localized homeland security 
strategies. Both strongly identify with being a part of their local community and have a 
strong sense of what Robert Putnam, in Bowling Alone, describes as bonding social 
capital. The concept of social capital refers to the connections among individuals 
through social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
from those networks.2   There are two general types of social capital: bonding and 
bridging. Bonding social capital helps create solidarity and is often found in tight-knit 
communities like Humboldt County. Bridging social capital is useful for generating 
broader identities and linking the narrowly defined group with external assets. The 
implications of social capital theory for homeland security are simple: the more people 
feel connected, the more social capital exists that can be leveraged to link citizens to 
external assets, such as those maintained by governments.3  While researchers may not 
entirely agree with Putnam’s observations and findings, there is general agreement that 
the concept of social capital, especially bridging social capital, is a fundamental part of 
building a culture of preparedness. The key is the development of connections and trust.  
Once in place, this social capital can be mobilized for a number of community activities, 
including cross-hazards preparedness, prevention, and response activities. Homeland 
security officials need to know how to develop and leverage both bonding and bridging 
social capital.   
In remote or small communities like those found in Humboldt County, people and 
places like Loreen and her Riverwood Inn are critical because they breed both bonding 
and bridging social capital. Assets like these should be tapped into using a relational 
organizing strategy.  Relational organizational strategy has been successfully used across 
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the nation for more than six decades by the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to 
encourage citizens of poor and neglected communities to organize and exert power on 
behalf of themselves.4  Unlike the activist organization that develops an agenda and then 
tries to attract support, relational organizing is essentially about one-on-one 
conversations to build relationships in a community and then let the local concerns 
emerge. This strategy does not preclude working with existing organizational structures 
such as parent-teacher associations, town councils, or the federal Citizen Corps 
program. Rather, as described by an experienced IAF worker in the Washington area, “it 
adds a dimension that can transform the culture of bureaucracy. Instead of a 
bureaucratic culture dominated by fixed activities that endlessly repeat, a relational 
culture is flexible, dynamic, and responsive to growing or changing needs.”5   
The power of using the relational organizing strategy is illustrated by the case study 
of Valley Interfaith, discussed in the book, Better Together. Through a coalition of 
church and school groups, residents near Pharr, Texas, were able to make positive 
changes in their neighborhood, ranging from the installation of a stop sign at a 
dangerous intersection to obtaining basic services like paved streets. When a 
community’s actions develop from the concerns of its member leaders, the people are 
strongly connected to the cause because it is their cause.6  The most pressing local issue 
for the residents of Humboldt County appears to be drugs.  Using a relational organizing 
strategy, natural leaders like Loreen should be encouraged to increase social capital in 
the local community and connect citizens with government resources to mitigate the 
effects of drugs on the county. As social capital increases, the theory holds that 
reciprocity and trustworthiness between the narrow community and broader 
community will likewise increase. The bottom line is about developing an effective 
national homeland security strategy and, in particular, trying to develop a culture of 
preparedness. Homeland security officials at all levels of government need to prepare 
citizens to trust the guidance of their government in a time of crisis. Without this trust, 
the efficacy of any homeland security plan of action will be greatly diminished. 
I will never forget the image of a hopeful William raising his hand, with his fingers 
forming a circle, and shouting “circles of influence!” before he disappeared into the dark 
forest.  William is not likely to directly contribute to the capture of Osama bin Laden in 
his lifetime.  However, he may be able to instill in his grandchildren civic virtue and 
respect for others. John will probably never have to thrash an unsuspecting terrorist 
who wanders into Humboldt County, but he may be able to keep away from drugs and 
prevent others from doing so as well. To date, government policy related to homeland 
security has focused primarily on countering terrorism, with its most visible action 
being the fighting in Iraq.  This is too abstract to cause many Americans to change 
anything about their lifestyles. On the whole, the current message about terrorists at our 
doorstep is not a compelling enough message to spur wide-scale citizen involvement in 
developing a culture of homeland security preparedness for those who live outside of 
major metropolitan areas like Washington or New York. To pierce through the Redwood 
Curtain, homeland security must become a local concern in order to start building the 
social capital that is required for a true culture of preparedness.    
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Avenue of the Giants, Humboldt Redwoods State Park 
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Generational Hazards 
 
How the embrace of the latest component of America’s all-hazards disaster philosophy 
can reshape the mission of homeland security and help save our Republic from its most 
insidious threat…ourselves 
 
Patrick J. Massey 
 
ROMA VITAE 
Rome. For nearly a thousand years it was the hub of a dynamic, sprawling, highly 
organized, multi-continent empire. To those on the periphery of this empire (and 
to most within it), Rome seemed eternal and utterly indestructible. Yet, it 
collapsed. Why? While historians provide us with innumerable theories regarding 
the reasons for Rome’s decline and ultimate fall, all of these can be lumped into 
one of two categories: “external factors (Rome was killed by outsiders) and 
internal factors (Rome killed itself).”1   
For centuries Rome was besieged by barbarians (for many of us, our ancestors) 
along its frontier. Ultimately, and for a variety of reasons, the state’s ability to 
defend itself was overwhelmed. Internally, the empire faced a series of self-
inflicted crises, chief amongst them being economic stagnation brought about by 
massive government spending and borrowing, along with social turmoil, 
corruption, and environmental degradation in the form of deforestation and soil 
loss.2 One does not need to be a social scientist to see the many parallels between 
the external and internal threats faced by Rome and those faced by the United 
States today. Of course America is not Rome, but there are remarkable 
similarities between our two empires: our soft-power and global cultural appeal, 
our hard-power of military might, a republican government, similar spatial 
extent, the multi-ethnic nature of our society, and the general feeling of 
exceptionalism that pervades our national psyche.   
So what can the fall of Rome teach us? Are there any lessons for today’s 
homeland security officials in the threat matrix faced by ancient Rome? Perhaps 
the overarching lesson is that to prosper, great societies must acknowledge and 
manage both external and internal threats. To simply focus on one while ignoring 
the other is a recipe for disaster. Today, the homeland security official is focused 
squarely on the near-term external threats facing America – the natural, 
technological, and terrorism-induced hazards that define our discipline’s present-
day rule-set. The purpose of this essay is to argue that we need to create a new, 
broader homeland security rule-set: one that includes at its core both external 
hazards as well as the internal, self-generated, long-term “generational hazards” 
that also threaten our nation’s future. In short, we must not only save America 
from the barbarians, but we must also save it from ourselves. 
THE ENEMY WITHIN 
The primary goal of homeland security is to protect America from emergency-
related threats, especially those that have the potential to be immediately 
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catastrophic.3 These threats, the focus of the homeland security discipline, are 
inherently external in nature; or more precisely, they are threats that are done to 
us. Earthquakes, terrorist bombings, hurricane-induced flooding – each of these 
threat hazards are afflicted upon us by outside forces. While we can protect 
against, prepare for, and mitigate these hazards, we are, ultimately, passive 
victims of their wrath. These external hazards are the traditional “all-hazards” of 
natural, technological, and terrorist threats that are the sine qua non of the 
homeland security discipline. 
However, like Rome, many of the most insidious threats facing our country are 
not immediate but long-term, and are not external, but internal. In other words, 
our nation is not only threatened by hazards that are done to us, but is also 
vulnerable to a number of threats that we are doing to ourselves. I consider these 
internal, self-generated threats “generational hazards” because, unlike a terrorist 
attack or a hurricane in which the effects are immediate, generational hazards are 
created by present generations but take many decades to metastasize before 
finally reaching a disastrous end-state that impacts future generations.  
What are these internal generational hazards? While any list of long-term 
internally-spawned threats to our country is subjective, there is a growing body of 
evidence, based on current data and likely trends, which points to four major 
generational hazards that pose a potentially catastrophic risk to America’s future 
economic and social stability. These are: (1) the enormous and growing 
indebtedness of America’s federal treasury, (2) global warming, (3) an inferior 
mathematics and science educational system, and (4) decaying physical 
infrastructure. In addition, a strong case can be made for the inclusion of several 
other long-range threats in the generational hazards category: the mass-
privatization of government services (leading to the increase of decision-making 
authority amongst those with minimal allegiance to the public good); over-
reliance on foreign energy sources (with the concomitant national security 
problems that entails); and the dual demographic pressures of collapsing birth-
rates among native-born Americans, leading to a rapidly aging population and 
significant population increases fueled by massive immigration to the United 
States from predominately developing countries. Figure 1 below summarizes the 
relationship between the current all-hazards threats and the long-term 
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       Figure 1. Catastrophic Threats to the United States 
 
THE GENERATIONAL HAZARDS 
By no means inclusive of all the long-term internal threats to our nation’s future, 
the threats discussed below represent (in order of criticality) the four most 
pressing generational hazards facing the United States. 
1.  The Soaring Federal Fiscal and Current-Account Debts 
America’s national debt is slated to grow more than $3 trillion, to $11.2 trillion, 
between now and 2010. The annual interest payments on our national debt in 
2010 will cost $561 billion, about the same as we spend on national defense each 
year. And this massive debt has been accrued before the baby-boom generation 
begins to retire and starts collecting Social Security payments in 2008 and 
Medicare benefits in 2011. Added to this is America’s deepening dependence on 
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foreign capital to fund our deficit spending. This massive trade deficit – $800 
billion per annum – led Dr. Fred Bergsten, the director of the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics to state that “the huge and growing international 
trade and current account imbalances, centered on U.S. external deficits and net 
debtor position, represent the single greatest threat to the continued prosperity 
and stability of the United States and world economies.”4   
However, the current total national debt figure reflects only what the federal 
treasury currently owes on money already borrowed; it does not include what the 
federal government has promised to pay Americans in entitlement benefits in 
future years. Factoring in future entitlement obligations like federal pensions, 
Medicare, and Social Security, our national debt soars to over $59 trillion dollars. 
If we wanted to put aside enough money today to cover these promises it would 
cost each American household $516,000. If present trends continue, within just 
twenty years 100 percent of the federal budget will go to fund only three things: 
net interest on the national debt, Social Security, and Medicare/Medicaid 
payments. That means no money for an army or navy, no money for a 
Department of Justice, or national parks, or homeland security, or any of the 
thousands of other federal discretionary programs.5   
Of course, such fiscal recklessness plays directly into the hands of our enemies, 
as Osama Bin Laden was quick to point out in his November 2004 video 
statement released by Al-Jazeera: "As for the (U.S.) economic deficit, it has 
reached record astronomical numbers estimated to total more than a trillion 
dollars [the U.S. National Debt in 2004 was actually close to $7 trillion]…we are 
continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah 
willing, and nothing is too great for Allah."6 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, director of the Congressional Budget Office has been 
quoted as being “terrified” about the budget deficit in the coming decades.7 
Robert Rubin, the former U.S. Treasury Secretary, says we are confronting a 
“serious day of reckoning” and warns that America is not immune to a third-
world-style economic crisis.8 But it is David Walker, the current comptroller 
general of the United States who cast the most dire warning about America’s 
fiscal profligacy when he stated, during Congressional testimony, that 
“continuing on our current fiscal path will gradually erode, if not suddenly 
damage our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately even our domestic 
tranquility and our national security.”(emphasis added)9 
2.  Global Warming 
Global warming is an agreed-upon fact.10 At 380 parts per million (ppm) the 
amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) currently in the atmosphere now far exceeds the 
limits ever experienced since our modern human ancestors first roamed the earth 
several hundred thousand years ago. And this matters because the amount of CO2 
in the atmosphere is directly related to the planet’s average temperature. Barring 
a miraculous change in public policy, we are on a glide-path to see CO2 
concentrations reach about 430 ppm by the early 2020s. At this stage the effects 
of global warming will unquestionably be felt as extreme weather events 
noticeably intensify. Severe droughts, more intense rains, and stronger and more 
frequent hurricanes will all impact our continent. Without significant reductions 
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in CO2 emissions, atmospheric concentrations will exceed 550 ppm by mid-
century. At this stage, many scientists believe the melting of the Greenland ice-
sheet is a real possibility which would create a twenty-foot rise in sea-level 
elevations.11 Further increases of CO2 could accelerate the melting of the West 
Antarctic ice-sheet, creating even more dramatic sea-level increases.  
Even discounting the direct negative economic impacts of global warming to 
the built environment, especially along America’s densely populated coasts, an 
even greater impact to our country may come in the form of human migratory 
pressures as people flee climate change-impacted regions across the globe. From 
southern and central Asia, through the Levant and Middle-East, south to the 
Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa, and across large swaths of Latin America, areas of 
the planet already under great stress due to natural resource limitations may be 
unable to cope with sudden changes to the environment upon which they are 
directly dependent for their daily survival. This may fuel a negative feedback loop 
in these regions; disruptions to natural resource extraction brought about by 
climate change may exacerbate ethnic/tribal strife and civil wars which in turn 
may make human existence in these regions not just tenuous but impossible. 
Faced with such circumstances, it is not unreasonable to envision massive human 
migrations from these stressed regions to the United States and other advanced 
nations. Such migratory pressures may, one day, make us nostalgic for our 
current border security challenges. 
3.  Failing Math, Science, and Engineering Education 
In 2001, Senators Hart and Rudman convened a group of national security 
experts and professionals to outline the gravest near- and long-term threats to 
America’s national security. Near the top of the list were the gross inadequacies 
in our country’s science and engineering (S&E) and mathematics education.12 
America was once a leader in S&E education; not any more. Today, over 78 
percent of S&E doctoral degrees awarded annually are earned outside of the 
United States. And of those that were earned in U.S. universities, 57 percent were 
awarded to foreign-born scholars.13 
The Hart-Rudman Commission states that “the capacity of America’s 
educational system to create a 21st century workforce…is a national security issue 
of the first order.  As things stand, this country is forfeiting this capacity.”14 The 
National Science Foundation is equally glum: “Unless more domestic college-age 
students choose to pursue degrees in critical science and engineering fields, there 
is likely to be a major shortage in the high-tech talent required by the U.S. 
defense industry, key federal research and national defense agencies, and the 
national laboratories.”15 In short, the nation is on the verge of a downward spiral 
in which current shortages will lead to even more acute future shortages of 
engineers, scientists, and competent teachers. The Commission concludes:   
 
The inadequacies of our (scientific) systems of research and education 
pose a greater threat to U.S. national security over the next quarter 
century than any potential conventional war that we might imagine 
(emphasis added). American national leadership must understand these 
deficiencies as threats to national security.  If America does not stop and 
reverse negative education trends – the general teacher shortage, and the 
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downward spiral in science and math education and performance – it will 
be unable to maintain its position of global leadership over the next 
quarter century.  The word ‘crisis’ is much overused, but it is entirely 
appropriate here.16 
4.  Decaying Physical Infrastructure 
“Over the past two decades, we have stopped thinking about elements of our 
physical infrastructure as national security assets. In fact, increasingly, it seems 
that we have stopped thinking about infrastructure altogether.”17 So says Stephen 
Flynn in his book Edge of Disaster. America’s infrastructure – roads, ports, 
electric grid, dams, flood control systems, water and wastewater systems – used 
to be the envy of the world. No longer. For example, in just one category alone, 
water supply infrastructure, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
that “current funding from all levels of government and current revenues 
generated from ratepayers will not be sufficient to meet the nation’s future 
demand for water infrastructure.”18 This shortfall amounts to about $11 billion 
annually, and because of it our nation runs the risk, over the next twenty years, of 
“reversing the public health, environmental, and economic gains of the past three 
decades” since the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act.19  
But such bad news is not confined to our water systems. One in three urban 
bridges is “structurally deficient,” meaning it is closed or restricted to light 
vehicles because of deteriorated structural components. More than 3,500 dams in 
the United States are unsafe and in need of major rehabilitation in order to 
continue to provide water supply, irrigation, flood control or hydro-power 
services. Car and truck travel on our nation’s roads has doubled in the past thirty 
years and is estimated to increase by two-thirds more in the next twenty years, 
yet capital outlays would have to increase 42 percent to reach the $92 billion level 
necessary just to maintain our current road system. In another sort of negative 
feedback loop, if America’s infrastructure is allowed to deteriorate further this 
will only act to retard future productivity and economic growth, leaving less 
money available to repair/replace infrastructure and further hindering economic 
growth. It will also leave our critical infrastructure less resilient to the effects of 
future terrorist attacks and natural disasters.20 
THINGS CHANGE – THE PROFESSION ADAPTS TO MEET NEW 
THREATS 
A decade ago, “homeland security” as a professional discipline or even as an 
operational mindset did not exist. Today it is a massive enterprise employing 
hundreds of thousands and costing our government billions of dollars annually. 
But “homeland security” is merely the latest iteration of the civil preparedness 
profession that had its genesis in the opening days of the Cold War.   
Discounting the dawn of our country and the security issues along our frontier, 
the first post-World War II phase of homeland security (1955-1985), “civil 
emergency preparedness” (or simply civil defense), was characterized by efforts 
to protect American citizens from the effects of nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union. Mass evacuation and sheltering of citizens to enable them to survive the 
consequences of large-scale radiological contamination was the overriding 
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priority of the U.S. government at the time. The second phase of homeland 
security (1986-2000) was “natural hazards,” when the threat of nuclear war 
vastly subsided with the demise of the Soviet Union and coincided with a 
significant increase in the scope and frequency of natural disasters in the U.S.  It 
was during this time that the profession of “emergency management” emerged 
with an emphasis at the federal level on recovery and mitigation programs. The 
third phase (2001-2005), “terrorism preparedness,” was ushered in with the 
attacks of 9/11 and the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. 
Recognizing the huge potential loss of life and negative economic impacts caused 
by catastrophic terrorist attacks, the profession once again changed focus to 
concentrate on terrorism preparedness while paying limited attention to the 
consequences of natural disasters. The fourth phase (2006-2010), “all-hazards,” 
was an acknowledgement that there is a commonality in the preparedness and 
response to mega-disasters and that the terrorism-centric focus of homeland 
security, at the expense of natural hazards preparedness, was oversold as the 
pendulum swung back towards the center, requiring homeland security 
professionals to concentrate on natural, technological, and terrorist hazards.21   
While the above phases are a very simplistic overview of a complicated 
progression, the point is that there has been a progression: as the threats to our 
country have changed, the institutions managing these threats have changed to 
meet them. From nuclear attack to floods and earthquakes to terrorism to all-
hazards, the civil preparedness and disaster management profession in the 
United States has periodically changed its priorities and operational direction to 
meet the latest and most pressing threats to the nation. Now as the possible 
senescence of American civilization in the coming decades is looming as a result 
of internally-generated economic, social, and environmental threats, it is time for 
the fifth phase of homeland security, “generational hazards,” to emerge as an 
operational component of the discipline. 
Beginning in the early years of the next decade, the data will become ever 
harder to ignore. America’s fiscal profligacy, the effects of climate change, failing 
infrastructure, loss of technological leadership brought about by inferior math 
and science education, and the further fracturing of civil governance will begin to 
emerge as hard realities, not just futuristic theories. It is at this time that 
homeland security officials will have to decide what to do: remain fixated on 
emergency-response related threats, or begin to broaden their discipline’s scope 
to encompass the “other” catastrophic threat-set – generational hazards. 
SOFT POWER AND THE BULLY PULPIT 
Unlike preparation for the traditional “all-hazards” threats of natural, 
technological, and terrorism disasters, with which the homeland security official 
is directly charged, the generational hazards outlined above are ultimately 
political problems requiring political solutions. Since most emergency 
management and homeland security officials are civil servants and not elected 
officials, what then can they realistically do to solve these generational hazards? 
While it is true that homeland security officials have no hard power to directly 
address generational hazards, they do wield considerable soft power to affect 
government policy. For instance, what if The Adjutants General (TAGs) of the 
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United States were to issue a signed declaration stating that America’s exorbitant 
and growing current-account and fiscal debt is a metaphysical threat to America’s 
long-term security every bit as real as the threat posed by al-Qaeda and 
terrorism? Would this solve America’s debt crisis?  No, but it would likely cause 
quite a stir and would help to ratchet up the pressure on our political leaders to 
start making the tough choices to get our financial house in order.  And what if 
the TAGs were to follow up this declaration with a concerted educational and 
media campaign? Lectures, television news interviews, newspaper editorials, 
congressional testimony; such an effort would add tremendously to the 
seriousness of the debate. 
Similar efforts to underscore the threats by any or all of the generational 
hazards could be undertaken by the National Emergency Management 
Association (NEMA) or the International Association of Emergency Managers 
(IAEM) or any of the professional disciplines associated with homeland security. 
Universities with emergency management or homeland security degree programs 
could include the discussion and study of generational hazards in their courses. 
Homeland security officials at all levels of government could discuss the threat 
posed by generational hazards when addressing community groups or as part of 
hazard education and outreach campaigns. They could also form partnerships 
with advocacy groups and non-governmental organizations that are busy trying 
to address gen-hazard threats. While none of these efforts would directly solve 
the problem of generational hazards, they would help in positioning these threats 
on a par equivalent to the Global War on Terrorism; that is, a multi-decade 
generational struggle for the very future of our civilization. Such positioning 
would help to serve as a catalyst for change not only at the governmental policy 
level, but also at the individual and family level. 
Many would argue that the use of the bully pulpit and the soft power of 
homeland security officials to call attention to our country’s mounting 
generational hazards is at best mission-creep and at worse mission-folly. After 
all, homeland security officials get paid to deal with terrorist and natural disaster 
threats, not budget deficits or carbon sequestration. Others may argue that the 
theory has merit, but that the current all-hazards homeland security duties of 
grants management, regional coordination, planning, training, and exercising is 
already overwhelming and leaves little time to focus on extravagant gen-hazard 
crises beyond their immediate control. Still others may acknowledge the looming 
threats posed by generational hazards, but are leery of the potential politicization 
of homeland security which entering the realm of generational hazards may 
tangentially entail. But what is the alternative? What if our image of a strong 
America is merely a thing of the past?  
If one is truly concerned with the long-term security of our country, can one 
simply ignore an entire category of mounting threats because it does not fit neatly 
into the current “all-hazards” box? Homeland security cannot be everything. But 
it can be, and it must be, more than it is. This is not to infer a diminution in our 
ability to protect against, prevent, and respond to acts of terrorism, but simply a 
recognition that the threat-matrix and “all-hazards” rule-set we are operating 
under must be expanded to include generational hazards. At stake is not merely 
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the continuance of our super-power status, but possibly the very survival of our 
Republic. 
LESSONS FROM THE WRONG WAR – THE IMPORTANCE OF 
UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE  
For decades leading up to the commencement of the Iraq War there was a vocal 
minority of military officers and analysts who were deeply concerned with the 
organizational focus of the United States military. Despite the population 
explosion in an increasingly urbanized third world, the rise of independent non-
state fighting forces, the ascendancy of religious-inspired terrorism, and the 
profusion of desperately poor, failed nation-states, the United States military 
remained obtusely focused on peer-to-peer conventional military operations – air 
superiority, naval dominance, tank battles in the countryside – while paying 
scant attention to counter-insurgency and nation-building/civil affairs 
operations. Why? How is it that so many intelligent, dedicated, professional 
people got it so wrong?22 
Perhaps it was the influence of military contractors; after all there is not much 
profit to be made in equipping a comparatively low-tech, land-centric military. 
Perhaps many military personnel just put counter-insurgency operations in the 
“too hard” box; it is easier to concentrate on what you know and do well than to 
re-invent yourself for a mission akin to Vietnam, a war the military would just as 
soon forget. Maybe others simply did not see it as their job to rebuild nations; 
someone else could worry about that. Or maybe it just was not sexy enough; 
fighter planes are cool, water purification systems not so much. Perhaps others 
were just so busy they did not have the time to stop, think, and truly re-assess the 
strategic situation. Maybe those strategists with the worst ideas simply had the 
better PowerPoint presentation. Or perhaps it was just simple bureaucratic 
inertia and the very human propensity to fight the last war. For whatever reason, 
despite the decades following the end of the Cold War, during which the 
American military could have reorganized itself to prepare for the new strategic 
situation, it instead found itself largely unprepared for the hard, sustained, meat-
grinder counter-insurgency and civil war in Iraq. 
Like the American military, could it be that homeland security officials, by 
focusing exclusively on natural and terrorist hazards, are similarly misaligned 
with the current strategic landscape? Could it be that we too are missing the 
larger historical arc? The reasons that some homeland security officials might 
give for not engaging in the generational hazards debate are the same reasons 
that many senior military leaders gave for not engaging in the counter-
insurgency/nation-building debate. It’s too hard! It’s not my job! I’m too busy! 
Simply recognizing the strategic landscape and the challenges inherent within 
that landscape is not the end state. We must be committed to taking action. The 
fact is the military must do conventional warfare and counter-insurgency/nation-
building. To simply focus on one and ignore the other is a recipe for failure. 
Similarly, the homeland security official must focus on the conventional threats 
of terrorism and natural disasters and the slow-moving catastrophes of 
generational hazards. To focus on the former while ignoring the latter will 
likewise carry dire consequences for our nation’s security. 
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THE BOWL IS FILLING WITH WATER 
Admiral Thad Allen, remarking on the chief cause of the federal government’s 
lackluster response to Hurricane Katrina, said that “we failed to recognize the 
tipping point when the levees failed and the New Orleans bowl began to fill with 
water.”23 Up to that stage, Hurricane Katrina was a manageable problem. But 
when the levees were breached, a manageable problem quickly became a social 
and economic catastrophe.   
Bio-defense, nuclear materials detection, border and port security, intelligence 
analysis, emergency preparedness and response, and all the disciplines to protect 
against, prevent, respond to, and recover from natural and terrorist disasters are 
all incredibly important. These are the bread-and-butter issues of the homeland 
security official – and they matter. But looming on the horizon are other threats 
to our country; threats that we have created ourselves. While not as obvious as 
hurricanes or radiological terrorism, the generational hazards our nation faces in 
the coming decades pose a mortal threat to the stability and security of our nation 
every bit as lethal, if not more so, than religiously-inspired terrorism or the next 
big quake.  
Like a mega-disaster event, warring armies, or a compromised ecosystem, the 
cumulative impacts of multiple stressors upon any system, if not acknowledged 
and fastidiously addressed, will ultimately result in a tipping point at which the 
system suddenly degenerates into a chaotic state and from which it is unable to 
recover. America’s social stability is not guaranteed by divine providence. Like 
Rome in the third century A.D., the United States may face a point in 2030 or 
2050 when the cumulative stressors of internally-spawned generational hazards 
may reach a tipping point and overwhelm our society’s ability to cope with the 
stress.  
The goal, therefore, is to keep each of the generational hazards from reaching 
this tipping point in the first place. But in order to do this, we must first recognize 
that the “bowl is filling with water.” The levees holding back our national debt, 
greenhouse gas emissions, poor math/science training, and the other 
generational hazards have already been breached. Like responding to an incipient 
flood disaster, gaining a shared common operational picture of the threat posed 
by these generational hazards is the first step in crisis avoidance. The second step 
is to take action. This is where we, as homeland security officials, will need to 
make a choice: ignore the problem because it is not in our job description or step 
forward, take a risk, and help lead the response. The choice is ours. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Networks are essential components of our national infrastructure. However, those 
networks could be used by terrorists seeking to attack dense urban populations with 
weapons of mass destruction. In particular, large urban road networks provide many 
routes that terrorists could use to get close enough to a major city to make a harmful 
attack. One approach envisioned for protecting urban areas from such attack is to 
deploy (human-operated or fully automatic) sensors on the roads around cities to detect 
terrorists and their weapons so they can be stopped before they come within range of 
their targets. A key challenge to such an approach concerns how many sensors to buy 
and where to locate them. Indeed, the size and density of road networks would seem to 
make the cost of buying and operating these sensors prohibitive by requiring placement 
of sensors on hundreds if not thousands of road segments in order to protect any large 
city. 
This challenge led to the work reported here, which shows that, contrary to first 
appearances, the number of sensors required to cover every possible route into a city is 
not prohibitively large. We apply graph theory to find a minimum cut set for a road 
network; i.e., to find a smallest set of road segments on which sensors must be placed to 
ensure that a terrorist traveling across the road network must encounter at least one 
sensor. We applied this theory to the actual road network of the New York City 
metropolitan area, and found that the minimum cut set was about 104 times smaller 
than the number of road segments in the network—the road network had approximately 
one million road segments and it yielded a minimum cut set of eighty-nine road 
segments. Thus, the minimum cut set problem for large urban road networks can be 
solved. Furthermore, the solution shows that the size of the cut set alone does not make 
it impractical to deploy a system of sensors that would cover all of the routes into the 
city on the road network.1   
The work reported here specifically concerns finding optimal locations for sensors for 
detecting terrorists, weapons, or other dangerous materials on roads leading into major 
cities. However, this work is generally applicable to finding minimum cut sets for any 
large network. It could be used to find optimal sensor locations on other transportation 
networks like railroads or subways. It could also be used to support offensive operations 
by locating a smallest set of segments in an adversary’s network that would have to be 
cut in order to completely stop the flow through the network. Thus, the methodology 
presented here could have utility in other homeland security and military analyses. 
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There is considerable literature on graph theory, network optimization, and the 
minimum cut set problem. The references at the end of this article specifically address 
the minimum cut set problem. The accomplishments of the work reported here were a) 
to find and implement a practical way of solving large networks for minimum cut sets 
and b) to discover that the minimum cut set for a large U.S. urban road network was 
much smaller than what might have been expected given the number of road segments 
in the network. 
ANALYTICAL PROBLEM 
Terrorists seeking to attack a large city might use the roads leading into that city to 
transport personnel, weapons, or other dangerous materials. One approach for 
preventing such attacks is to deploy sensors on those roads to detect the movement and 
allow the interdiction of these entities before the terrorists reach their destination. To 
evaluate the feasibility of this approach, we would like to know the smallest number of 
sensors that must be deployed to ensure that a terrorist traveling into a city would 
encounter a sensor, and, of course, where to locate those sensors. Thus, we sought a 
methodology that could find a minimum cut set in a city’s road network.2 
The particular question addressed is as follows. Suppose an adversary has personnel, 
weapons, or other dangerous material at some distance from an urban area, and that the 
adversary can transport these on the roads of that area to move them into the interior of 
that area. Suppose sensors can be placed along the side of any road segment in that area. 
Then what is the minimum number of sensors needed, and where should these sensors 
be placed, so that a vehicle using any of the roads in the road network of that urban area 
must pass at least one sensor in going from any exterior location to any interior 
location? This paper explains the methodology and presents some results of applying 
that methodology to the New York City metropolitan area. 
METHODOLOGY 
If the road networks involved had been small enough, there would have been no 
methodological problem to solve. Solving for a minimum cut set is a well-known 
network problem, and existing map data and network solvers could have been used to 
answer the question posed above (see the references for discussions of this network 
problem). However, the road networks around major urban areas are very large; for 
example, the road network around New York City contains over one million road 
segments. Several, otherwise appropriate, network solvers cannot solve a problem this 
large. 
New York is the largest and, perhaps, the most important city in the United States. It 
was attacked on September 11, 2001 and in 1993. Accordingly, a methodology that could 
not handle the New York region’s road network would not be of interest, while one that 
could make it there would (likely) make it anywhere. Therefore, it was important that 
the methodology could be successfully applied to the New York region. So it was decided 
to test this methodology by identifying potential sensor locations—minimum cut sets—
for the New York metropolitan area road network. 
To analyze the road network around New York, we obtained a geographic information 
system database that contained all of the road segments in the U.S., where a road 
segment is defined as the portion of a road between consecutive intersections with other 
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roads.  Thus, a road segment is a positive length of road rather than a point. (The length 
of these segments may provide some flexibility in locating sensors on a road network.) 
The database also includes some “false nodes” that are created when an otherwise 
straight road makes a turn that is not at an intersection. Such false nodes add to the size 
of the network but they do not affect the solution for the minimum cut set. 
The database contains information that characterizes each road segment, both 
geographically and functionally, and it includes residential streets, urban alleyways, and 
other paths that are navigable vehicular routes. It is derived from hundreds of sources 
and is maintained and updated on a frequent basis. Thus, the database is perishable and 
must be updated (or the minimum cut sets must be otherwise verified) to ensure that 
the analysis produces valid results. 
To obtain an accurate solution for a minimum cut set, one must have high quality data.  
Data that left out road segments, or contained errors regarding where the segments are 
connected, could give rise to false overall results. Assessing the quality of such a large 
database is difficult. The database that we used is a subset of the data from a 
commercially available product known as the “JServer” database. JServer data are 
normally accessed via custom applications to derive optimized trucking delivery routes 
and driver directions. 
For this application, we assessed the quality of the data by comparing JServer data for 
Washington, D.C. streets against some known anomalies. In these visual comparisons, 
the data correctly identified blocked alleyways and traffic-circle entries and exits, which 
were sources of errors in other database products that we examined. 
In addition, and more importantly, we subsequently evaluated our New York City cut 
sets visually and contextually against overhead images in Google Earth to see if there 
were any roads that bypassed the cut sets.3 This examination showed that our data and 
cut sets were remarkably consistent with the Google Earth overhead photographic raster 
imagery. Moreover, the compatibility of the database with the MapInfo Professional 
Geographic Information System allowed us to directly superimpose our minimum cut 
sets on the Google Earth imagery. This facilitated the manual examination and 
confirmation of the validity of the cut sets. 
When we performed the Google Earth overhead imagery analysis to confirm the 
validity of the cut sets, we also looked to see where an adversary might be able to avoid 
road segments with sensors by driving off-road (e.g., through parking lots). We found 
about half a dozen locations where this might be possible. Thus, off-road routes do not 
appear to be a major factor in determining the number of sensors required. However, 
finding and blocking such routes to prevent an adversary from bypassing the sensors (as 
well as confirming the validity of the minimum cut set) could be important when 
designing a real urban road network sensor system. 
The first step in this process of designing a sensor barrier is to determine where, in a 
general sense, the barrier is to be located. The methodology identifies a minimum cut 
set in the network, but one must first decide in what part of the network to put the 
minimum cut set. In our case, because we wanted a barrier surrounding the center of a 
city, we defined the barrier’s general location in terms of its distance from the center of 
the city. After determining the general area in which the barrier will be located, the 
second step is to apply the methodology to find a minimum cut set in that general 
location. 
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To determine where a minimum cut set was to be located, we drew two concentric 
circles around a central point in the urban area in question. The terrorists are assumed 
to start at an unknown (to us) location outside the outer circle, with the intention of 
reaching an unknown (to us) location inside the inner circle. The actual road network 
considered consists of those road segments that have at least one node (i.e., endpoint) 
between these two concentric circles.4 
For this demonstration, the outer circle was a forty-five-mile radius circle centered at 
Times Square and the inner circle was a concentric fifteen-mile radius circle. Thus, the 
network considered is essentially contained in a thirty-mile-wide ring around 
Manhattan. Sensors on a minimum cut set within such a ring would allow an attack to 
be detected and potentially interdicted at least fifteen miles from Times Square. A ring 
of such width encompasses a large road network and so gives the network solver the 
potential to find a small minimum cut set. Figures 1 and 2 below depict these fifteen- 
and forty-five-mile circular boundary lines and the road segments contained in the 
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The ring shown in Figure 2 contains 488,951 road segments, 414,640 of which are from 
two-way road segments (which we converted into two one-way segments) and the other 
74,311 are from one-way road segments. There are 722 road segments that cross the 






























Figure 2.  New York City region road segments between the forty-five- and fifteen-mile boundaries 
 
It is important to note that these boundaries can be selected in any reasonable manner 
desired and they can be of any reasonable size or shape. The choice to use circles here is 
not a restriction of the methodology but rather is a choice of convenience for this initial 
investigatory analysis. The boundaries we used in our example would be suitable for 
designing a sensor system to protect the high population density areas around New York 
City. However, one could use boundaries closer in (and of a conforming shape) to design 
a system to protect a smaller area, e.g., Manhattan, or boundaries farther out to protect 
a larger area, e.g., New York and Philadelphia. 
It is interesting to note (Figure 1) that the density of the road network decreases as one 
moves away from the cities. Thus, the minimum cut set for a larger region might be 
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smaller than the minimum cut set for a smaller region (despite the larger region’s longer 
perimeter) if the larger region extended into the low-density portion of the road 
network. Minimum cut sets that we have prepared for the New York region using 
fifteen-mile wide rings subsequent to the analysis reported here have demonstrated that 
property. The minimum cut set can also be smaller if the network boundaries are drawn 
so as to include areas where the road density is limited by the presence of natural 
barriers like rivers. For example, a minimum cut set for Manhattan Island would consist 
of the limited number of bridges and tunnels connecting the island to the surrounding 
areas. 
An interesting and somewhat counterintuitive property of these boundaries is that, as 
a ring is expanded (by increasing the outer radius, decreasing the inner radius, or both), 
the minimum cut set can get smaller but not larger.  To see this, imagine a narrower ring 
A whose inner and outer boundaries lie between the inner and outer boundaries of a 
wider ring B. Every cut set for ring A must also be a cut set for ring B, but not vice-versa.  
Thus, the minimum cut set for ring B can be no larger than the minimum cut set for ring 
A. It is also possible that a cut set for ring B will be smaller than a minimum cut set for 
ring A. Thus, a minimum cut set for ring B must be as small as, or smaller than, a 
minimum cut set for ring A. 
Figure 3 gives a less detailed map of the fifteen-mile-radius disk of Figure 1—but it 
shows relevant city names and major route numbers.  Figure 4 gives a less detailed map 
of the forty-five-mile disk—but it also shows relevant city names and major route 
numbers.  Figures 3 and 4 are not drawn to the same scale as each other or to the scale 
of Figures 1, 2, 5, and 6. 
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Figure 3.  A less detailed map of the fifteen-mile-radius disk given in Figure 1 
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Figure 4.  A less detailed map of the forty-five-mile-radius disk given on Figure 2 
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The second step in our process was to find a minimum cut set for the road network 
whose segments have one or both nodes between these boundary lines. This is a well-
known problem in graph theory, and it might be expected that there would be many 
solvers that could be used to obtain a solution to it. However, all but one of the solvers 
we considered could not find minimum cut sets in networks as large as the road network 
surrounding New York City. One, the GNET solver, could do so. Several solvers were 
Excel-based, and so were restricted by the size limitations of Excel. Others could only 
accept the problem in the form of a general linear program and their LP-interfaces were 
unable to handle the problem. As a result, it took significant effort for us to identify just 
one solver that could find minimum cut sets in networks as large as the road network 
surrounding New York City. That one was the GNET solver. 
GNET is a proprietary network solver that runs on an Intel-based PC under MS 
Windows.5  (See G.H. Bradley, et al. [1977] for a description of GNET’s theoretical 
basis.)  GNET generates a minimum cut set when given a mathematical description of a 
network, which was obtained from JServer. GNET is designed to handle very large 
networks, and our experience so far is that it can handle networks of over one million 
arcs. 
To let the max-flow algorithm find a minimal cut set, the following structure was used.  
Each of the segments with both nodes inside the ring was given a capacity of 1. An 
artificial “super-source” node was added outside the outer ring, and an artificial “super-
sink” node was added inside the inner ring. The outer node of each segment crossing the 
outer ring was changed to this super-source node and these segments were given an 
infinite capacity. Similarly, the inner node of each segment crossing the inner ring was 
changed to this super-sink node, and these segments were also given an infinite 
capacity. Finally, an artificial road segment going from the super-sink to the super-
source was added, also with an infinite capacity. 
Some network analyses are concerned with the different capacities of the individual 
arcs in the network because they seek to ascertain the effect of cutting sets of arcs on the 
network capacity or the flow through individual arcs in the network. In our case, while 
real roads have different traffic capacities, we assigned all real road segments a capacity 
of 1 because we sought to find the minimum cut set that would block (cover) all paths 
through the network. 
Finding a minimum cut set requires preparing the road network data in the manner 
described here.  This would be easy to do with ninety road segments, but is less so with 
900,000. To re-structure the network into nodes and one-way arcs, we converted each 
of the 414,640 two-way road segments between two nodes into two segments running in 
opposite directions between those two nodes. We also created one super-source node 
and one super-sink node. This yielded a total of 903,591 road segments with both of 
their nodes inside of the ring on Figure 2 plus 1,430 boundary-crossing road segments. 
Accounting for all of these road segments, plus the super-sink to super-source segment, 
produced a total of 905,022 road segments. 
We then solved this network for its maximum flow and, hence, for a minimum cut set.  
This minimum cut set gives the smallest number of sensors that must be deployed in 
order to ensure that any vehicle attempting to penetrate the inner (fifteen-mile) circle, 
starting on any road from outside of the outer (forty-five-mile) circle, will necessarily 
encounter at least one sensor. It should be noted that there could be more than one 
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minimum cut set, and if there is more than one, the cut sets may or may not include 
some of the same road segments. 
In other applications, one might not only be concerned about transportation into a 
city, but also about transportation from points within the city to points outside the city, 
and from points within the city to other points within the city. This methodology has the 
tested capability to find minimum cut sets for outward transportation as well as inward. 
It should be noted that neither the real New York City road network nor our 
representation of it, is symmetric.  One-way streets and highways can make the number 
of routes available to travel inward different from the number available to travel 
outward. Thus, there can be differences between the solution to the forward (outside-to-
inside) problem and the solution to the reverse (inside-to-outside) problem. We 
demonstrate a solution to the outward transportation problem below. 
RESULTS 
Figure 5 shows a minimum cut set for the network described above.  It contains eighty-
nine road segments.  Figure 5 is too coarse to identify the particular road segments that 
constitute this cut set. The precise identity of these road segments is contained in the 
output data files produced in the network analysis. 
We believe that the results of this analysis are quite surprising.  In particular, the result 
that only eighty-nine sensor locations are required to cover every possible vehicular 
route into the fifteen-mile disk around Times Square is unexpected and 
counterintuitive. That number is about one one-hundredth of one percent of the 
829,820 road segments in the network (not counting the notional source-connecting 
and sink-connecting segments). It is also about 10 percent of the number of road 
segments that cross the outer forty-five-mile radius boundary (722) or the inner fifteen-
mile radius boundary (708). Therefore, building a sensor barrier around New York City 
on a minimum cut set would be considerably more efficient than simply placing a sensor 
on each road segment that crossed the inner boundary or that crossed the outer 
boundary of the network. Thus, while building a road network sensor barrier around 
New York City might have initially appeared to be impractical, the eighty-nine-segment 
cut set shows that this is not necessarily so. 
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Figure 5.  New York region road segments between the forty-five- and fifteen-mile radii circles 
showing the eighty-nine minimum cut-set segments, and a twenty-five-mile intermediate radius 
circle. 
 
Another observation one can make about the road network surrounding New York City 
is that, as depicted in Figure 5, eighty-six of the eighty-nine cut set segments are outside 
a twenty-five-mile intermediate radius. Accordingly, if sensors were deployed on this cut 
set, and if the adversary were to choose a route at random such that encountering any 
sensor was equally as likely as encountering any other sensor, then it would be twenty-
eight times more likely for the encounter to occur more than twenty-five miles from 
Times Square than within twenty-five miles of Times Square. 
As stated above, our methodology is able to solve for outward as well as inward 
transportation. As a demonstration, we solved for a minimum cut set for the same area 
(the ring between fifteen and forty-five miles from Times Square) by assuming that the 
vehicle would begin inside the inner ring and move to a point outside the outer ring. 
Figure 6 depicts both the inward (blue) and outward (pink) minimum cuts sets that 
were generated in this test. 
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There are eighty-nine road segments in both the inbound and outbound minimum cut 
sets. If the road network were symmetric (which it is not), then an inbound minimum 
cut set would always be paired with a corresponding outbound minimum cut set.  
However, for asymmetric networks, there need not be any such relationship. 
 
 Figure 6. Forward and reverse flow minimum cut sets for forty-five to fifteen mile radii 
 
This paper demonstrates the ability to find a minimum cut set for a road network 
containing over one million segments. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that a 
minimum cut set around any single population center in United States can be found. 
However, it is possible that one might need to analyze larger networks to identify 
minimum cut sets that encompass multiple cities or regions. GNET’s developers think 
that GNET could handle networks as large as four million arcs. But beyond that size, 
more memory and computer CPU power will be required than is currently available on 
single core PCs (like those that were used here). Nevertheless, one might be able to 
analyze entire regions of the United States with our existing arrangement of hardware 
and software by judiciously selecting the network boundaries. 
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BARRIERS WITH FEWER SENSORS 
Until now, we have assumed that the number of sensors deployed would be equal to the 
number of road segments in a minimum cut set. However, one might wish to build a 
defensive system (barrier) with fewer sensors than cut set segments. If we have no 
knowledge of which route a terrorist may take in trying to traverse the barrier, and if the 
terrorist has no advance knowledge of where we will place our sensors, then the optimal 
approach is for us to deploy our sensors randomly (uniformly and independently) across 
the segments of a minimum cut set, with no more than one sensor per cut set segment. 
This would yield a probability of the terrorist encountering a sensor equal to the number 
of sensors divided by the number of segments in the minimum cut set. Such a system 
would provide some level of protection and might be sufficient to deter an attack. 
The assumptions underlying this result are important. If the terrorists knew the 
locations of our sensors ahead of time (and we had fewer sensors than cut set segments), 
then they would simply choose an undefended route and avoid all of the sensors. On the 
other hand, if we knew that the terrorists had preferences for taking certain routes over 
others, independent of our deployment of sensors, then we could place our sensors to 
cover those routes to maximize the probability of an encounter with a sensor. These 
possibilities suggest that we should consider concealing or frequently relocating our 
sensors so that terrorists will not know where they are. 
NEXT STEPS 
We found that a minimum cut set for New York City’s road network contains many 
fewer segments than the network as a whole, and fewer even than the number of 
segments that are intersected by large circles drawn around the city. But New York is 
hardly a typical city. It could be worthwhile to apply this methodology to other cities to 
see if their minimum cut sets exhibited similar characteristics. Different road network 
locations and layouts might cause minimum cut sets to be relatively larger or smaller 
than they are for New York City. 
Our results for New York City suggest that this methodology could be a useful tool for 
designing a system of terrorism countermeasures on an urban road network (or some 
other transportation network, e.g., rail or subway). However, solving for a minimum cut 
set is only one step in that process. After a cut set is found, it needs to be checked for 
ways that an adversary could bypass the cut segments (i.e., sensor locations) by driving 
off road or by using roads not shown on the map. When designing a real system, bypass 
possibilities and constraints on constructing, operating, and servicing equipment should 
be considered when selecting sensor locations. 
After identifying potential sensor locations, system-level cost-effectiveness analyses 
(with an appropriate cost model) or risk management analyses could determine how 
many sensors to acquire and deploy. Analyses could address the performance of the 
sensors in terms of the rates of false negatives and false positives for different entities 
(terrorists, weapons, materials) as well as the effect of false positives on urban area 
traffic. They might address the vulnerability of the sensor system to scouting and 
spoofing by the adversary. They might address the availability and capabilities of 
interdicting forces to stop vehicles that give positive responses without allowing 
terrorists to release their weapons. Analyses might consider the potential for an effective 
countermeasure system to deter an adversary from attacking the city in the first place. 
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IDA has addressed these issues in other research it has performed. Nevertheless, the 
methodology discussed in this article should be valuable for enabling the design of 
urban road network sensor systems by solving the urban road network minimum cut set 
problem. 
As a final note, this work has only addressed the location of sensors on roads. Research 
addressing the more general problem of protecting geographic areas from attack would 
also consider detecting and interdicting terrorists on alternative attack pathways 
employing air, water, or off-road land transportation as relevant. 
SUMMARY 
We have developed a methodology to help find optimal locations for sensors for 
detecting entities or materials transported on roadways around urban regions in the 
United States. The methodology uses graph theory to solve the maximum flow problem 
and identify a minimum cut set in networks containing over one million road segments. 
We applied the methodology to the road network of the New York City metropolitan 
area and found that, for a ring between fifteen and forty-five miles from Times Square, 
the minimum cut set contained only eighty-nine segments. This methodology and 
analysis is significant for two reasons. First, to our knowledge, networks as large as the 
road network around New York have not previously been analyzed for minimum cut 
sets.  Second, the minimum cut set we found is much smaller than what one might have 
expected from the number of road segments in the network. 
This methodology is potentially broadly applicable. It could be used to find optimal 
locations for sensors intended to detect, or defenses intended to interdict, any materials 
or entities on roads or on any other network. It could also be used to support offensive 
operations by locating the smallest set of segments in an adversary’s network to cut in 
order to completely stop flow through that network. Thus, this methodology could have 
utility in other homeland security and military analyses. 
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1  Guaranteeing an encounter with a sensor is only the first step in designing a system; it does not guarantee that the 
terrorist or his weapons would be detected or interdicted.  As we discuss briefly at the end of the article, in 
designing a sensor system to be deployed around a city, one would also consider the ability of sensors to detect, 
and response forces to interdict, the terrorists who encountered the sensors. 
2  An alternative to placing sensors would be to simply block roads (permanently or temporarily).  Placing a sensor 
or a roadblock on each of the minimum cut set road segments would ensure that an adversary would encounter 
either a sensor or a blocked road en route to the interior of the urban region.  To simplify the discussion, 
henceforth the article speaks in terms of placing sensors rather than roadblocks. 
3  The overhead imagery analysis was performed at IDA by Adam Mulliken and Robert Kraig. 
4 This assumes that there is no single road segment that has one node outside the outer boundary and one inside the 
inner boundary.  However, it would be easy to handle such road segments, if, in future cases, any were to exist. 
5 Insight, Inc., Manassas, VA, copyright 1975, 1982, 1999, and 2006. 
  
IDENTITY CRISIS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND FRAMING A 







The date is July 17, 1996.  Emergency services personnel from Suffolk County, NY and 
the United States Coast Guard respond to a report of a catastrophic explosion and the 
crash of a passenger airliner over the ocean off the southern coast of Long Island. The 
initial assumption is a nexus to terrorism. The East Moriches Coast Guard Station is 
designated as the operations command post, staging area, and evidence collection point. 
As the incident shifts from response to recovery, personnel from various response 
disciplines and levels of government stream into the station.  Among them is Lieutenant 
Colonel David Williams of the U.S. Army Reserve. LTC Williams, dressed in his U.S. 
Army Reserve flight suit, presents identification, enters the site, and assists in the 
operation by landing helicopters on the designated helipads. On the third day of his 
work, LTC Williams is questioned concerning his identity and affiliation. Following a 
brief investigation, LTC Williams is identified as an impostor, escorted from the 
property, and charged by the Suffolk County Police.1 
Identity is defined as the “the collective aspect of the set of characteristics by which a 
thing is definitively recognizable or known.”2 In the incident described above, the set of 
characteristics that assumed an identity consisted of a uniform, unverifiable paper 
credentials, and a demeanor consistent with a military officer. These characteristics 
allowed the impostor to pass a brief security inspection and work within a ‘secured’ site 
for several days. This incident, although a rare but serious example, highlights the limits 
of current methods for identifying response personnel. The infiltration of the Flight 800 
response and recovery operation evidences only one of several dimensions of a 
comprehensive identity management capability gap for response and recovery 
operations that can be traced through an examination of historical terrorism incident 
response in the United States. 
The current identity management system for first responders has left a nation-wide 
capability gap. The decentralized system has resulted in as many different forms of first 
responder identification as there are federal agencies and state and local governments. 
The lack of standardization and interoperability among forms of identification is 
problematic when confronting a large-scale, multi-jurisdictional response to a suspected 
incident of terrorism. In addition to the response to the crash of TWA Flight 800, this 
lack of capability is documented in the after-action reports of the response to every 
major domestic incident of terrorism, specifically the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing and 
the 9/11 responses to both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This article seeks 
to define the scope of the problem, identify the elements of a potential solution, and 
briefly evaluate two alternative approaches to solving the problem. First, the failures of 
identity management through the response to previous incidents of terrorism and other 
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catastrophic incidents will be traced. Once cataloged, these ‘failures’ form the necessary 
framework for potential solutions to the problem. Finally, two alternative approaches to 
the problem will be evaluated for potential to improve identity management for 
terrorism incident response. 
As will be revealed, the problem of identity management for terrorism incident 
response is multi-faceted. There are two main elements that contribute to the problem.  
The first element is related to the definition of identity presented in the second 
paragraph and introduced through the opening vignette – identity authentication. 
Identity authentication essentially answers two questions: first, simply, “who is this?” 
and second, “how certain are we that a person is who they say they are?” The second 
element is related to a second part of the definition of identity.  Identity is also defined 
as “the set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is 
recognizable as a member of a group.”3 Group identity as it relates to terrorism incident 
response is essentially the training credential of an individual. This aspect of identity 
answers the question “what tasks is this individual trained to perform?” 
Although the two elements of identity can be studied separately, for the purpose of 
this article they are examined together. The elements are bundled because successful 
terrorism incident response is dependent upon both aspects of identity. The purpose of 
this article is to begin the discussion of identity management for terrorism incident 
response; it is not intended to be an exhaustive study of the two elements of identity. 
The article is intended to examine the scope of the problem, frame the elements of 
potential solutions, and identify areas for additional research. 
DEFINING THE PROBLEM: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM TERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE 
The identity management capability gap for terrorism incident response is a pervasive 
but solvable problem. The post-9/11 focus on the development of capabilities related to 
incident response, including acquisition of CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, Explosive) detection equipment, response apparatus, and personal protective 
equipment have left out the essential component of identity management. Despite the 
glaring lack of capability, it has been all but ignored in homeland security preparedness 
efforts targeted at first response personnel. 
Discussion of identity management is also hampered by the absence of an extensive 
body of knowledge or current debate on the issue. This section begins to address this 
shortcoming by examining the question: Is first responder identity management really a 
problem? Current accessible information bulletins and the After-Action Reports (AAR) 
of the response to domestic incidents of terrorism will be examined to develop the 
answer to this essential question. 
The problem of identity management for terrorism incident response begins prior to 
the TWA Flight 800 disaster and has several dimensions beyond simple authentication 
of personal identity. The problem was identified in the response to the nation’s first 
major domestic terrorist incident requiring a large multi-jurisdictional response: the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. On April 19, 1995, 
Timothy McVeigh detonated 4,800 pounds of ammonium nitrate mixed with fuel oil 
loaded in a Ryder box truck outside the Murrah Federal building. The blast caused a 
catastrophic collapse of the building, resulting in the deaths of 168 people and injuries 
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to 500 others. The ensuing public safety response and recovery efforts revealed major 
gaps in identity management capabilities at all levels of government. 
Within two hours of the blast, the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) had 
established a controlled perimeter around the incident site.4 Identification of personnel 
immediately became an issue. Initially, the OCPD moved its permit and identification 
section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges. The operation lasted only 
a few hours as supplies were quickly exhausted.5 The OCPD continued to issue 
alternative forms of identification. Due to rain and lighting, the location of the identity 
station changed three times. When agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) arrived, they also began issuing identification, causing confusion for those 
manning the perimeter. FBI and OCPD finally consolidated their operations and issued 
one form of identification, operating from a vacant warehouse building. The building 
was large enough to hold the up to 100 people who were waiting for identification after 
filling out permit forms and completing necessary identification checks.  The combined 
identification operation issued approximately twenty thousand passes over a seventeen-
day period.6 In the publication Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned 
for Other Communities, an unnamed Oklahoma City law enforcement officer claimed: 
“Over 28,000 identity badges were issued during the Oklahoma City response and 
recovery effort. It took days to establish a central issuing agency. A predetermined ID 
system would have greatly reduced ID chaos.”7 Included among the lessons learned in 
the document is the important recommendation to “establish a Site ID 
System…Controlling access to the site is an immediate and on-going need.”8 
The need for a comprehensive identity management solution was also evident in the 
9/11 response to the Pentagon. Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing, the Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an 
identification system for incident scene security and accountability. The system 
consisted of 2,000 colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene. In the 
tremendous public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington 
County deployed its identity management system two days into the response. Once the 
system was utilized, the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.9 
The on-scene identity management efforts that followed included a system that took 
up to two hours to process and provide credentials to relief crews for entry into the site 
because of limited computers and lack of a central database.10 The lack of a 
comprehensive identity management system also led one Arlington County firefighter to 
observe, “A volunteer firefighter tee shirt was the only required identification.”11 At the 
request of the incident commander, the United States Secret Service instituted a more 
efficient credentialing system several days into the response. 
The identity management recommendations from the Pentagon AAR are similar to 
the lessons learned first reported in the Oklahoma City AAR. The Pentagon AAR 
concluded, “Arlington County should work with…emergency response and volunteer 
organizations to implement a uniform identification system. Such a system should be in 
place and used routinely.”12 These incidents indicate the need for a comprehensive 
identity management system that delivers the necessary capabilities to support incident 
response operations. 
The September 11, 2001 response to the World Trade Center terrorist attacks is not 
documented by an official after-action report and, as a result, there is limited 
documented information concerning identity management at the incident scene. The 
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McKinsey & Co. report prepared for the New York City Police Department, entitled 
Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response, does provide some 
information regarding the problems associated with identity management on the WTC 
incident scene. 
The report asserts that it took several days to secure the perimeter. It also details the 
problems caused by this delay. The report states that “due to inconsistent control of 
access and absence of an effective credentialing system, perimeter security [was] not 
adequately established, allowing large numbers of unnecessary personnel to enter 
site.”13 Although the report does not contain a sanctioned set of recommendations or 
lessons learned, the challenges faced during the response and recovery operation can be 
discerned from the content of the report. Based on the report, perimeter security and 
identity management proved to be significant challenges without an effective solution. 
The previous sections identify many of the gaps associated with past responses to 
domestic terrorism incidents. Knowing identity management is a problem, in the past 
and in the future, but avoiding steps to solve the problem, would once again 
demonstrate that the nation suffers from a “failure of imagination” as described in the 
9/11 Commission Report.14 If we reasonably know what is possible, it should be included 
in our planning and preparation. 
The vignette in the introduction of this article revealed the opportunity to exploit 
current identity documents for secure site infiltration. This security gap could be 
exploited to perpetrate a secondary attack.  Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness 
and Response points out that the “risk of secondary attack was not made a priority.”15 
The possibility of secondary attacks at incident scenes such as the WTC response must 
be considered. The May 2005 issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin identifies the 
two components of a secondary attack as follows: “The first one draws in emergency 
responders, regardless of the extent of deaths and injuries. In the second, the 
responders themselves become the target and include not only law enforcement, fire 
and rescue, and emergency medical personnel but civilian Good Samaritans as well.”16 
The exploitation of lax identity procedures to perpetrate a secondary attack is a 
plausible conclusion based on pervasive failures in previous incident response. The 
potential utilization of this gap for terrorist activity is also advanced by the Department 
of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation joint bulletin released in 
December 2004 titled Potential Terrorist Use of Public Safety or Service Industry 
Uniforms, Identification, or Vehicles.17 The bulletin warns of the potential exploitation 
of the unverifiable identity characteristics of the public safety and service industry 
(uniforms, paper identification, vehicles, etc.) for terrorist activity. Possible scenarios 
include the use of public safety and service industry uniforms or vehicles to perpetrate a 
secondary attack on first responders. The exploitation of these unverifiable identity 
characteristics could allow access to critical sites, such as staging areas, where a 
secondary attack would prevent rescue efforts and potentially cause mass casualties to 
first responders. Although a secondary attack can also come from a pre-placed device, 
the possibility exists for an attack precipitated by infiltration through the unverifiable 
flash identification, uniform, and vehicle paradigm. 
The after-action and related reports detailing the response to the three major 
domestic terrorist attacks reveal a common problem that to date has not been effectively 
resolved. The common element among the lessons learned from the responses to each 
incident reveals that identity management failure is endemic to terrorism incident 
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response. From Oklahoma City to Arlington to New York City, identity management is a 
glaring response capability gap. Despite AAR recommendations regarding 
improvements needed in identity management dating back to 1995, little has been 
accomplished in the recognition and development of a solution. Identity management is 
not simply a local, state, or regional problem, but a national problem that has been 
largely ignored. 
ELEMENTS OF AN IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SOLUTION 
The previous section served to define the scope of the identity management problem for 
incident response. In this section these common identity management failures are 
organized and explained as the elements of a potential solution. These elements are 
derived from the analysis of the response to previous incidents of terrorism and the 
consideration of future incident scenarios. In the paragraphs that follow the four 
elements of a potential identity management solution are defined. 
1. Identity Authentication 
In Identity Fraud: A Critical National and Global Threat, the key to identity 
authentication is described as “access to data to assist in the validation, verification, and 
authentication of personal identifiers.”18 Validation of the data is predicated on trust.  
The heart of identity management lies in the creation and maintenance of trust. Trust 
allows for a consumer to have a defined level of certainty in the authenticity of a 
credential based on the process by which it was issued and the security of the token.  
The trust model provides a level of certainty for the consumer in answer to the question, 
“Who is this?” Certainty and trust are measured through a two-pronged test of product 
and process. 
In order to provide certainty and trust in an identity credential, it must be sound in 
both product and process. The process must provide assurances that an individual has 
been vetted through an identity-proofing process. The process should include common 
criteria and assurances prior to enrollment and token issuance. The more stringent the 
criteria and assurances are, the higher the level of certainty and trust. Strong criteria 
may include elements such as background investigations, collection and verification of 
biometric information, and requirements for presentation of certain identity documents 
prior to issuance. 
The second prong of the test is the product, or identity token (document, card, or 
item that is used to establish identity) itself. Trust and certainty are developed through a 
product that is counterfeit resistant. The ability of the product to resist change and/or 
duplication develops certainty and trust. The stronger the product is to resist 
counterfeit, the higher the level of trust and certainty in the answer to the question, 
“Who is this?” 
Process and product come together to form a trust model. Both aspects must be 
sound to develop certainty. A stringent vetting process backed with a token that can be 
easily reproduced and altered does not create trust. Likewise an identity token that is 
strongly resistant to tampering, but was issued without criteria or assurances, also 
creates uncertainty and is not trusted. Identity authentication is marrying sound process 
and a tamper-resistant product to create certainty and trust. 
President Ronald Reagan often quoted the Russian proverb “doveryai no proveryai,” 
which translates to “trust, but verify,” to describe his foreign policy dealings with the 
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Soviet Union in the late 1980s.19 “Trust, but verify” is an appropriate mantra for first 
responder identity. The solution requires a framework that can provide verification.  
The infiltration of the response to the TWA Flight 800 disaster illustrated the 
vulnerability and limitation of trust in our current identity schema. Our visual (uniform, 
paper credential, vehicle) and behavior (acting in conformance with identified office) 
based identity management system must be replaced with identity authentication 
through verifiable credentials. If the TWA disaster had been a terrorist attack, the 
current system would not have mitigated the threat of secondary attack against first 
responders. 
2. Rapid In-Processing 
In-processing for incident response requires that identity and affiliation be verified, the 
responder be enrolled or logged into the scene, the level of site access determined, and 
accountability be maintained by tracking personnel on-scene. Rapid in-processing for 
identity management is the ability to perform these tasks efficiently with minimal 
impact on the completion of tactical objectives for incident response. The lack of rapid 
in-processing to incident scenes is documented as a failing of identity management for 
terrorism incident response. The AAR’s for both the Oklahoma City and Pentagon 
responses indicate that it took hours to provide credentials to personnel for entry into 
the scenes. Speed of processing, however, competes with identity authentication in an 
incident response setting. Perimeter personnel must weigh security against the 
immediate need for personnel at an incident scene. Due to the inadequacies of the 
current identity management system, perimeter personnel are forced to revert to 
unverifiable credentials and the uniform, emergency vehicle, and demeanor consistent 
with the identity construct. Any identity management solution must provide a level of 
security and speed that does not hinder, but enhances, incident response. The speed of 
processing should be consistent with the time required for perimeter personnel to check 
“flash” identification and ask follow-up questions. 
3. Interoperability 
The Department of Homeland Security SAFECOM program defines interoperability as 
“the ability of emergency responders to work seamlessly with other systems or products 
without any special effort.”20 An identity solution for terrorism incident response must 
have this important capability. The problems of radio interoperability are well 
documented. They are found among the lessons learned of every AAR and became a 
central focus of the 9/11 Commission Report. The same gaps would be found if 
technology had been broadly applied to identity management for first responders. The 
implementation of identity management technology for first responders is in its infancy.  
In its current state, it is the communication equivalent of smoke signals. This can be 
seen as a problem or an opportunity. Unlike communications, there is not a 
proliferation of proprietary technology that has been implemented for identity 
management. This presents an opportunity to create a standards-based interoperable 
system. Interoperability is a necessary element in authentication of responders from 
varied disciplines and levels of government who converge on incident scenes. 
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4. Data Storage / Retrieval and Promulgation Capability 
Data storage/retrieval and promulgation is the ability to store or link to data in a 
manner that it can be brought forward for utilization in other processes. An identity 
management system for improved terrorism incident response must include the 
capability to store or link data in a manner that can be distributed to and utilized by 
incident commanders.  Data storage/retrieval and promulgation addresses two aspects 
deficient in previous response to incidents of terrorism. The first deficit involves the 
matter of the training credential.   
The group affiliation, or training credential in this case, is essential information for 
incident commanders to adequately deploy and coordinate appropriate assets to achieve 
incident objectives. In Information, Technology, and Coordination: Lessons from the 
World Trade Center Response, the importance of information for deployment and 
coordination of responders is highlighted: “Effective deployment and coordination 
depend on many kinds of information from the roles and capabilities of response and 
support organizations to the identity of individual responders.”21 While the effective 
utilization of assets is a problem of incident management, providing the information 
concerning the characteristics, group affiliation, or training credential of assets is a 
function of identity management. 
The second deficiency in terrorism incident response that can be addressed through 
data storage/ retrieval and promulgation is accountability. In the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Staff Statement No. 14, the following 
outlines the deficiency in accountability: “Once units arrived at the WTC they were not 
accounted for comprehensively and coordinated.”22 Providing this information is a 
function of a comprehensive identity management system. Would the resources have 
been uncoordinated and unaccounted had an effective identity management system 
been in place? A properly structured and effective identity management system would 
provide real-time usable information to incident commanders concerning the number, 
location, and qualifications of assets at his/her disposal. With regards to personnel 
resources, the answers to questions such as: “Who is this?” and “What can they do for 
me?” are critical to incident commanders. An effective identity management system for 
incident response must provide incident commanders with the data to answer those 
critical questions. 
TWO APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION: INCIDENT RESPONSE RESOURCE 
OR COMPREHENSIVE NATIONWIDE PROGRAM 
The previous sections detail the problem of identity management for terrorism incident 
response as pervasive, but not without potential solution. The framework revealed by 
the analysis of the After-Action Reports of domestic incidents of terrorism identifies the 
elements of an identity management solution necessary to improve incident response.  
These elements can be achieved through two possible options: the on-scene resource or 
a nationwide comprehensive identity solution for first responders. In the following 
sections the two options will be developed and examined for their potential application 
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DEFINING AN INCIDENT RESPONSE RESOURCE: THE IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT TEAM 
The concept of identity management teams for incident response is not novel. A version 
of this solution has been implemented at every major incident of terrorism out of 
necessity, utilizing available materials and untrained personnel and resulting in 
repeated and unnecessary mistakes. The need to control access and positively identify 
personnel on terrorism incident scenes was recognized with our first domestic attack on 
the World Trade Center in 1993. The impetus in 1993 was the need to control access to 
the crime scene.23  The additional threat of secondary attack, as described previously in 
this article, increases the urgency for implementing effective incident scene control and 
credentialing. The failings of identity credentialing during the 1995 Oklahoma City 
Murrah Federal Building bombing, and the 2001 responses to the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, were pervasive and discussed earlier to illustrate and define the 
problem of identity management for terrorism incident response. In this section the 
Arlington County and Oklahoma City After-Action Reports will be revisited in greater 
detail. They are instructive because the failings of identity management early in the 
incidents were tempered with later success. The systems that were instituted over the 
course of the incidents, through trial and error, provide best practices and a concept of 
operations at the heart of what should comprise an on-scene identity management team 
for terrorism incident response.   
As established through the previous analysis of historical responses to incidents of 
terrorism, identity management is deficient for terrorism incident response. Despite this 
deficiency, there is currently no defined response asset under the FEMA National 
Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative to address this important function. 
The National Mutual Aid Resource Management Initiative “supports the National 
Incident Management System by establishing a comprehensive, integrated, national 
mutual aid and resource management system that provides the basis to type, order, and 
track all (federal, state, and local) response assets.”24 The resource definitions are typed 
so the level of capability of resources can be readily determined before an asset is 
requested. The problem is that there is no resource definition that performs the function 
of identity management for incident response.  Currently, if an incident commander 
needed assistance in managing access to the scene through a credentialing system, there 
are no typed assets to order through mutual aid or other process to perform this 
function, forcing ad-hoc solutions. The intent of this section is twofold: first, to develop 
a typed resource definition based on lessons learned from two selected case studies of 
previous incident response; second, to evaluate the definition across the previously 
developed framework for improved terrorism incident response. 
Identity Management Team Case Studies 
The development of the resource definition for identity management begins with the 
examination of the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing and the 2001 
response to the attack on the Pentagon. These incidents and after-action reports provide 
significant detail regarding the development of ad-hoc identity management capabilities 
as the incidents unfolded. Parallels will be drawn utilizing other published documents 
that highlight identity management efforts but do not provide enough significant detail 
for a case study. An analysis of these incidents reveals a baseline structure to construct a 
typed identity management resource. 
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1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building Bombing 
In the response to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing incident many lessons were learned 
concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, importance of site access 
control, and the need for dedicated identity management resources. The Oklahoma City 
incident provides the background for the first large-scale terrorist incident that required 
a robust capability for identity management and scene control. Through trial and error, 
and utilizing only available resources, an ad-hoc identity management capability was 
developed and sustained that allowed for the issuance of over 28,000 identity 
credentials over the course of the incident. 
The initial failure of identity management at the incident scene was due to the lack of 
any pre-planned credentialing option. This lesson learned is captured in the 
recommendations of the after-action report. Although the capability gap is clearly 
identified in the report, eleven years later there still remains no guidance or nationally 
defined resource to perform this critical function. This subsection seeks to close the gap 
first exposed in the Oklahoma City response by defining a response asset for this critical 
function.   
The development of on-scene identity credentialing first requires the establishment 
of a perimeter. In the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, establishing a controlled 
perimeter around the incident site occurred within two hours of the blast.25 Once the 
perimeter was established the Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) utilized its 
only available asset to issue identification by moving its Permit and Identification 
Section equipment to the scene to issue identification badges. The Permit and 
Identification Section was not a deployable asset; however, it was the only available 
option for credentialing. Once established, the operations of the Permits and 
Identification Section lasted only a few hours as identity supplies were quickly 
exhausted.26 
The OCPD continued to issue alternative forms of identification: “different colored 
passes were issued for each day after April 20th to discourage people from returning to 
the site when they had no current assignment.”27 Due to rain and lighting conditions, 
the location of the identity station changed three times. When agents from the FBI 
arrived, they also began issuing identification, causing confusion for those manning the 
perimeter. The FBI and OCPD finally consolidated their operations and issued one form 
of identification, operating from a vacant warehouse building. This is an important 
concept of operation in the employment of an identity management resource: it must be 
integrated and maintain a permanent location throughout the incident. 
In Oklahoma City – Seven Years Later: Lessons Learned for Other Communities, it 
is reported that early in the response “the ID process was a major issue due to lack of 
controls and systems in place. No one had been designated to issue ID's and the system 
was hit and miss.”28 This is instructive in defining an identity asset as it must include 
controls and systems, and be specifically designated to perform the function with a 
direct link to on-scene unified command.  
The after-action report also details the process utilized for credentialing volunteers 
and rescue workers. 
The process was as follows: volunteers appeared at the Permits and ID location 
and filled out a permit form with their name, agency, and destination. This permit 
form was submitted along with a photo ID. The Investigator would inquire as to 
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reasons for accessing the scene. The permit would be approved or denied based on 
the reason and destination. The Investigator entered the information into a 
logbook, signed the permit, and sent the volunteer to the FBI photo section for 
their photo ID. If there were questions about the admittance of a person, the FBI 
made the final determination.29 
The excerpt from the after-action report gives detail on the process for issuing on-scene 
identity credential documents. This process included examination of identity 
documents, affiliation and destination, collection of a photograph, and recording of the 
issued document.  These elements form the basis of a minimum inspection necessary for 
entrance to a terrorism incident scene. Another essential element of the identity 
management function is communications equipment. Credentialing staff utilized “a 
cellular phone and a police radio…when trying to check on whether a volunteer should 
gain access to the scene.”30 Communications equipment and the aforementioned direct 
contact with on-scene incident command are essential elements in a response asset for 
identity management. 
The process was not without criticism. “Due to the number of persons requesting 
entry, the limited resources for processing permits, and lack of guidelines, this process 
generated complaints. Complaints came from rescue workers and volunteers about the 
length of time to obtain a permit and the restrictions on the permit.”31 The identity 
process undertaken during the Murrah Federal Building bomb response was completed 
by hand, not utilizing computerized processes. The after-action report advises “The 
entire process would probably have gone more smoothly had investigators been able to 
utilize lap top computers to enter the necessary data on the volunteers.”32 The defined 
response resource must include computerized processes that allow data and biometric 
information to be quickly captured and stored to allow access at later times to facilitate 
processing for re-entry into the scene. 
The Oklahoma City bombing response provides baseline information on the 
development of a defined resource to improve identity management for terrorism 
incident response. The lessons learned from that response suggest seven elements for 
the concept of operations and necessary equipment for an identity management asset 
for incident response. The elements related to the concept of operations of a defined 
resource include a pre-planned solution, an established perimeter, a defined location for 
distribution, and systems and controls (including a defined issuance process and 
tracking of issued credentials). The lessons learned also revealed the equipment and 
identity supplies needed for identity management: mechanisms for receiving 
replenishment, communications equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and 
database access), and computer equipment for identity document production (digital 
cameras, computers, identification printers). The lessons learned from, and ad hoc 
developments during, the response to the Oklahoma City bombing form the basis of a 
defined resource for identity management for incident response. 
2001 Pentagon Response 
The response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 also offers 
many lessons learned concerning the structure, function, concept of operations, 
importance of site access control, and the need for dedicated identity management 
resources. The Pentagon attack provides additional background for large-scale terrorist 
incident response that requires a robust capability for identity management and scene 
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control. As with the Oklahoma City bombing, credentialing at the Pentagon developed 
through trial and error, utilizing available resources. The Pentagon response also tested 
the boundaries of a limited credentialing solution developed by the Arlington County 
Police Department in the wake of the identity failures in the Oklahoma City response. 
The development of the credentialing function at the Pentagon incident site is also 
instructive as its evolution informs the development of a resource definition for an 
identity management team for improved terrorism incident response. 
Understanding the lessons learned from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the 
Arlington County Police Department pre-planned an identification system for incident 
scene security and accountability. The system consisted of 2,000 red, yellow, blue, and 
green colored wristbands to be used for entry to an incident scene. In the tremendous 
public safety response to the terrorist attack at the Pentagon, Arlington County deployed 
its identity management system two days into the response. Once the system was 
utilized, the wristband supply was exhausted within two hours.33 This failure is 
instructive in that it took two days to implement an access control system and 
demonstrated that identity supplies must be significant to support issuance to 
thousands of responders. This critical failure further enhances the argument that a 
defined deployable identity management resource, staffed by trained personnel who 
possess the appropriate equipment and supplies, is essential for improved terrorism 
incident response. 
On the third day of the response, the Defense Protective Service (DPS), using a tactic 
similar to that employed by Oklahoma City Police in 1995, utilized its available badging 
equipment to produce identity credentials. The DPS system is described in the after-
action report as “burdensome”34 and “inadequate for a task of this magnitude.”35    In 
addition, the badging process “took too long, delaying shift changes inordinately.”36 The 
AAR also claims that “because of the limited computers to create badges and lack of a 
single database, processing added an additional burden to crew relief.”37 A defined 
identity management resource must have adequate computer stations and utilize a 
single database. This also emphasizes the need for a defined asset. Ad-hoc solutions 
waste valuable time as lessons are learned in identity management for incident response 
time and again, at the cost of safety, force protection, and lost on-scene work hours. 
At the request of DPS and the FBI, the identity system was bolstered by the addition 
of United States Secret Service (USSS) identity assets. The AAR describes that the USSS 
trained members of the Army Band to operate its five portable badge-making 
workstations.38 After the incorporation of the USSS equipment the system was 
described as “effective.”39 The addition of more appropriate equipment and trained 
personnel resulted in a system that was more effective. This is instructive in the 
development of a defined resource, as the number of workstations must permit 
sufficient throughput not to hamper on-scene operations. 
The 9/11 Pentagon response provides further validation of the baseline information 
provided by the study of the Oklahoma City bombing for the development of a defined 
resource to improve identity management for terrorism incident response. In addition 
to the lessons learned from the response to the Oklahoma City incident, the Pentagon 
response provides information for the construction of a defined identity management 
resource. Lessons learned indicate the need for adequate supplies, sufficient 
workstations to provide reasonable throughput, and the need for a central database. 
These additional factors, when combined with the elements revealed in the response to 
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the Oklahoma City incident, provide the baseline for a defined resource for identity 
management functions on incident scenes. 
Identity Management Team Typed Resource 
The lessons learned and basic necessary elements of an identity management team were 
revealed through examination of the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building 
bombing and the 2001 response to the Pentagon. The elements related to the concept of 
operations of a defined asset include a pre-planned solution, an established perimeter, a 
defined distribution location, a direct link to on-scene incident command, and systems 
and controls (including a consistent issuance process and tracking of issued 
credentials). The lessons learned also revealed necessary equipment, including: a 
significant amount of identity supplies and mechanisms to acquire additional materials, 
communications equipment (interoperable radios, internet, and database access), 
computer equipment sufficient for significant throughput for identity document 
production (digital cameras, computers, identification printers), and a single centralized 
database. The following resource definition (Table 1) and concept of operations (Figure 
1) were developed utilizing these lessons learned and basic elements, 
 
RESOURCE: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM (IDMT) 




TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV OTHER 
Equipment Computer 
Equipment 
5 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(5 Computers, 5 Digital 
Cameras, 5 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 
3 Identity Issuance 
Stations 
(3 Computers, 3 Digital 
Cameras, 3 ID Printers, 
Multi-Technology 
Readers) 






radios, extra batteries, 





radios, extra batteries, 
battery charger, cellular 
phones) 




Access, external LE 
database access 
Wireless Internet 
Access, external LE 
database access 
   
Equipment Software Database accessible by 
Incident Command 
Database accessible by 
Incident Command 












Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
5,000 interoperable 
Identity Tokens 
Extra printer cartridges 
Mechanism to obtain 
additional  supplies 
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RESOURCE: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM (IDMT) 




TYPE I TYPE II TYPE III TYPE IV OTHER 
Equipment Generator Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
Able to work at location 
without land line 
electricity 
   
Personnel Training Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment and 
perform identity 
functions 
Team Trained to 
Operate Equipment 
and perform identity 
functions 
   




1 Supervisor or OIC 
4 Officers 
   
Vehicles  Integrated in mobile 
asset or deployable to a 
fixed location 
Integrated in Mobile 
Asset / or deployable to 
fixed location 
   
COMMENTS: Type I – A pre-designated team consisting of one OIC, one supervisor and six officers in an integrated mobile 
response asset. The team has the ability to manage identity management functions for large-scale incidents. The 
team engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
Type II – A pre-designated team consisting of one supervisor or OIC and four  officers in an integrated mobile 
response unit or deployable to a fixed location.  The team has the ability to manage identity functions for small to 
mid-sized events. Team engages in routine training to maintain advanced skill level. 
TABLE 1:  IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM RESOURCE DEFINITION 
 
The function of the IDMT is to provide identity authentication and accountability 
support to incident command through the implementation of a comprehensive on-scene 
credentialing system. The IDMT function is dependent upon the establishment of a 
strong perimeter, as evidenced by the analysis of the Oklahoma City and Pentagon 
Incidents. The concept of operations also must include deferment of un-requested assets 
to a secondary staging area. The FEMA report Responding to Incidents of National 
Consequence: Recommendations for America’s Fire and Emergency Services Based on 
The Events of September 11, 2001, and Other Similar Incidents recommends “There 
should be a separate marshalling area at the incident base for unrequested/unverified 
resources. This ‘corral’ concept was used in Oklahoma City. For added security, law 
enforcement should manage the perimeter of these areas.”40 This recommendation is 
incorporated into the IDMT concept of operations outlined in Figure 1. 
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FIGURE 1:  IDENTITY MANAGEMENT TEAM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
The study of the Oklahoma City bombing and the Pentagon attack also revealed the 
need for a consistent system of identity issuance. The Oklahoma City AAR detailed the 
process that was utilized to issue credentials; however, the Pentagon AAR does not 
provide sufficient detail that describes the mechanisms of the issuance process. The 
paper-based system that was developed out of necessity and availability of materials can 
be greatly enhanced with the advent of readily available technologies that can transfer 
data from existing identity credentials, such as readers for 2D barcodes or magnetic 
stripes that have been incorporated into many state drivers’ licenses. In addition, the 
need to maintain connectivity to law enforcement and other databases allows for further 
inspection of identity as outlined in the resource definition (Table 1). This allows for 
verification of identity through other sources, should inspection and electronic 
implementation of available credentials require additional investigation. 
Utilizing exploitable features of existing identity credentials, coupled with agency 
issued credentials, can greatly enhance the ability to examine documents and rapidly 
populate data into a database for a smooth and rapid process for credential issuance. In 
some jurisdictions it may also be possible to pre-populate the database with responder 
information/ biometrics that can be utilized in emergency response situations requiring 
tight scene controls. Individual jurisdictions or regions may choose to issue responder 
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credentials with exploitable technology that can further improve the on-scene 
credentialing process. 
The Department of Defense program Defense Cross Credentialing Identification 
System (DCCIS) has developed a web-base option for identity verification for non-
government personnel requiring access to government resources.41 The Federation for 
Identity and Cross-Credentialing Systems (FiXS) maintains the ability to authenticate 
identity through the maintenance of a system that allows companies to keep their 
employee data in their own system that is only accessed when a credential is presented 
for authentication. The structure of the system alleviates privacy concerns as data is not 
maintained in a single accessible database. This model is not a strong option for 
applicability to identity management for incident response; communications have 
traditionally failed during response to incidents of terrorism. The dependence on a web-
based system would require assurances of continued access throughout the evolution of 
an event. This is not a dependable option based on previous response experience. 
The implementation of an interoperable or technology-based solution at the local or 
state level will continue to require a dedicated resource to manage identity. A 
technological solution does not eliminate the need for the function to be managed and 
maintained on-scene. In addition, not all responders will be issued the same credential, 
particularly across private-sector agencies that are critical to the success of response and 
recovery operations. Those not issued credentials pre-event will require the on-scene 
identity issuance capability of a defined identity management team. 
COMPREHENSIVE NATIONWIDE IDENTITY SOLUTION FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS 
It would be reasonable to believe that the identity management problem – detailed in 
the after-action reports on every major incident of domestic terrorism – must have been 
resolved, considering the many reports of the many panels and commissions 
investigating terrorism response following 9/11. This is not the case. Although the gap 
has been identified and documented, these reports barely make mention of it. An 
implementable solution to the identity management gap for terrorism incident response 
has been mentioned in the reports, but is not included by any panel among its final 
recommendations. The following represents a summary of the identify management 
concepts outlined in post-9/11 homeland security reports. Many of the suggested 
solutions are limited to technological possibilities such as biometric identifiers, bar-
codes, RFID, and smart cards, but fall short of providing concrete implementable 
solutions. 
The concept of addressing identity through a comprehensive enterprise solution first 
appeared as a “standardized emergency responder identification and accounting 
system” to be coordinated by FEMA. This was first proposed in the National Emergency 
Management Association’s October 2001 White Paper on Domestic Preparedness.42 The 
explanation was limited to a bulleted point that provided no suggestion for the scope or 
methodology of the program. A “universal identification card” for positive identification 
of response personnel also appeared as an “area for future research and analysis, and 
subsequent conclusions and policy recommendations” in the third report of the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) published in December 2001.43 
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The explanation was also limited to a bulleted point that did not provide further 
description of the proposed program.  
In the fourth Gilmore Commission report a “nation-wide law enforcement/first 
responder identification system” is proposed as a solution to the problem of inadequate 
authentication of identities for personnel operating systems and working in critical 
facilities.44 In addition, the report suggests that “smart card” technology be included in a 
system that “must be able to be effectively used during mutual aid operations and other 
cooperative efforts between different levels of government and between different 
government entities at the same governmental level.”45 The proposed identity system 
solution is located in an appendix to the document and is not listed among the key 
recommendations of the panel. The placement in an appendix, lack of substantive 
explanation, and relative unimportance given to this solution in the report is perplexing. 
Additionally, the nexus between a system for the identification of law enforcement/first 
responders and the stated problem of authentication of the identity of personnel 
operating systems and working in critical facilities is unclear. This solution, identified in 
“Appendix L: Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against Terrorist Attacks” of the fourth 
Gilmore Commission, serves as a critical response capability, and should have been 
further developed and included among the key recommendations of the panel. 
The necessity for standardized response identification is also cited in the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) Universal Task List (UTL). The UTL is one component of 
the DHS planning “tool-box” for its capabilities-based preparedness planning process. 
The UTL is a comprehensive list of seventeen hundred tasks and sub-tasks required to 
respond to the fifteen event scenarios outlined in the national planning scenarios. The 
UTL common task: Communication and Information Management contains the task 
“Establish role of operation area satellite system (OASIS) at the EOC.”46 As a sub-task 
“Establish a national authentication and security identification certification system for 
emergency responders, Federal, State, local and tribal personnel and other non-
government personnel requiring access to affected areas” is listed.47 The placement of 
the identity management concept is once again perplexing as it is listed as a sub-task to 
a disconnected overarching task regarding satellite systems. There is a pattern in the 
development of the first responder identity concept: although considered critical, it has 
been obscured under irrelevant and unrelated tasks and objectives. The importance of 
the concept warrants its direct recognition and inclusion as an overarching task. 
The UTL serves to inform the companion planning document in the capabilities 
based planning process the Target Capabilities List (TCL).48 The TCL is comprised of 
those three hundred tasks listed in the UTL that are deemed “critical” and grouped into 
thirty-six target capabilities.49 The identified sub-task concerning emergency responder 
identification certification was not included among the three hundred UTL tasks that 
were deemed as critical and migrated into thirty-six critical capabilities in the TCL. The 
need for identity management at incident scenes is an essential response capability, a 
documented capability gap, and should be included as target capabilities, or at a 
minimum to be included as a sub-task.50   
The identity management for first responder concept is also included in the RAND 
Corporation publication Protecting Emergency Responders Volume 3: Safety 
Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response. The publication outlines the 
recommendation to “develop personnel identification and credentialing systems better 
suited to major disaster response operations.”51 The document outlines several options 
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for achievement of the recommendation. Traditional solutions including color-coded 
event badges, armbands, and/or vests as identification are recognized as deficient 
because they offer only visual recognition and do not provide additional capabilities for 
accountability and training credentials.52 Any identification and credentialing system 
must be part of pre-event preparedness and should include “their certifications, training 
levels, and other information on their general skills relevant to operating in a hazardous 
environment.”53 Technology options to achieve the recommendation include smart 
cards, bar-code identifiers, RFID, and biometric systems. The report contains the most 
comprehensive explanation of any of the listed programs; however, it falls short of 
providing a specific framework for implementation. 
The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, in Project 
Responder: National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic 
Terrorism, proposes a responder identity solution related to training and credentialing. 
The report calls for “a digital smart card/chip ‘electronic transcript’ system that securely 
verifies identification, levels of training/certification, and currency, for the multitude of 
responders that converge on the scene of a high-visibility CBRNE event.”54 The report 
recommends research, development, and piloting of a GPS-enabled “smart card” tested 
through multi-jurisdictional response exercises. The overarching goal is to provide the 
on-scene commander with technology that could broadcast “a rapid, accurate, and 
verifiable picture of resource and skill availability, and ensure the qualifications of each 
responder at the scene.”55 The report outlines a four-year process that includes research, 
implementation in three jurisdictions, evaluation, and standards development. While it 
seems comprehensive, the report does not provide specific information concerning 
implementation. 
The literature related to identity management for incident response shows it as a 
clear and protracted problem. The AAR reports also show a clear capability gap for 
terrorism incident response. The post-9/11 panel and commission reports present a 
limited range of solutions that neglect specifics for implementation. The challenge 
presented by incident response identity management has only been included as a 
secondary or tertiary recommendation in numerous reports, and has not been the 
primary subject of investigation or research for incident response application. The 
solutions presented in the literature include standardized or universal identification for 
first responders that may include the use of technology such as biometric identifiers, 
bar-codes, RFID, and smart cards. 
Opportunity Knocks: Federal Implementation of Smart Card Technology 
The federal government is shifting its identity paradigm under Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 
Government Employees and Contractors (HSPD-12). The goal of HSPD-12 is “to 
enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect 
personal privacy by establishing a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and 
reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and 
contractors.”56 HSPD-12 further clarifies secure and reliable identity as consisting of the 
following criteria. 
Secure and reliable forms of identification for purposes of this directive means 
identification that (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual 
employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, 
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counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated 
electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been 
established by an official accreditation process. The Standard will include 
graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, to ensure flexibility in 
selecting the appropriate level of security for each application.57 
The program being developed under HSPD-12 seeks to create a government-wide trust 
model. Ensuring that identification issued by any federal agency meets the same 
minimum standard in both process and product.   
The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST), released the HSPD-12 directed government-wide standard on 
February 25, 2005. Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 201: 
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors (FIPS-201) 
outlines a two stage process to meet the listed criteria for a “secure and reliable form of 
identification.” The stated goal of FIPS-201 is “to achieve appropriate security assurance 
for multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals 
seeking physical access to federally controlled government facilities and electronic 
access to government information systems.”58 
The initial implementation stage, Personal Identity Verification One (PIV-I), includes 
the description of required processes to meet security and control mandates for identify 
proofing of individuals for issuance of federal identification cards under HSPD-12. The 
federal PIV card will only be issued by accredited agencies and will utilize a process 
consisting of three necessary components.59  First, the applicant will personally appear.  
Second, the applicant will present two forms of identity source documents as certified by 
the Office of Management and Budget60 (with at least one being issued by a state or 
federal authority) and submit to necessary biometric screening.61 Finally, the applicant 
will be screened through a National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI), Office 
of Personnel Management (OPM), or National Security community background 
investigation including fingerprint identification.62 
The second stage of implementation outlined by FIPS-201, Personal Identity 
Verification Two (PIV-II), includes the physical and technical elements to support 
interoperability aspects of HSPD-12. The federal PIV card bases identity authentication 
on a three-tiered system: the real-time comparison of biometrics (fingerprint and/or 
photographic), “something you are;” combined with the card itself, “something you 
have;” and a PIN numerical, “something you know.”63 The tiers backed by the 
distribution and identity-proofing standards outlined by PIV-I provide a secure identity 
solution that meets the requirements mandated by HSPD-12. The addition of PKI 
enabled digital certificate remote network verification architecture provides an 
additional level of security for both physical and logical access, as the status can be 
revoked without requiring the physical collection of the PIV card. 
The PIV card mandated by FIPS-201 consists of common physical characteristics and 
appearance elements with allowances for slight variation for specific agency purposes.  
In an effort to standardize, the physical make-up of the card is consistent with 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) requirements. FIPS-201 contains five slightly varied approved 
models for card fronts and three variations for the back of approved PIV cards. In 
addition to the Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) standardization aspects, the models allow 
flexibility for the inclusion of magnetic stripe and/or bar code technology for agency-
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specific applications. Certain fields are mandated on the front of the PIV card, such as 
name, photograph, affiliation, agency, and expiration date. Required elements on the 
back of the card include card serial number and agency issuer identification 
FIPS-201 (PIV-II) also describes the technical requirements for PIV interoperability, 
with further detail provided in a series of related NIST and industry technical 
publications. There are five basic technical requirements governing the federal PIV card.  
FIPS-201 provides standardization requirements for the card ICC, a Card Holder 
Unique Identifier (CHUID), PIV Card Activation, the PIV authentication data (one 
asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate), and biometric data. FIPS-201 
requires that the PIV card contain both contact and contactless ICC interfaces. The ICC 
interfaces are mandated to be consistent with ISO/IEC and FIPS 140-2: Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules Standards which, when coupled with card 
reader standardization required by FIPS-201, achieves government-wide 
interoperability.64 
The required CHUID must include an expiration date, asymmetric signature field, 
and Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) that uniquely identifies and 
tracks each card. The CHUID must be readable from both contact and contactless 
interfaces. FIPS-201 mandates that the specific technical requirements outlined by NIST 
SP800-73: Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification for the CHUID and FASC-N be 
incorporated into PIV cards. The requirements for the asymmetric signature field must 
be encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as outlined in the Internet 
Engineering Task Force report RFC 3852 and NIST SP 800-78: Cryptographic 
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. 
The PIV card is required to include personal identification number (PIN) based 
cardholder activation. The PIN must be accepted by the card before it will activate for 
release of biometric and asymmetric key information. The PIN must meet the standards 
outlined in FIPS PUB 140-2. The inclusion of a PIN activated system allows for greater 
card security as the information is not transmitted until contact interface is successful 
and the correct PIN has been entered. 
The PIV card authentication data must, at minimum, consist of one asymmetric 
private key and a corresponding X.509 public key certificate stored on the card. 65 All 
keys are accessed only through the contact ICC interface and must not be exportable 
from the card. The card may also contain additional keys and PKI certificates based on 
specific agency needs.  The X.509 PKI certificate allows for remote network verification 
through Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) and the Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) that must in routine situations be updated by agencies at least every eighteen 
hours. The inclusion of authentication data allows for the card certificate status to be 
verified through a secure remote network adding a strong layer of security. 
The final technical requirement of FIPS-201 is the inclusion of biometric data on the 
PIV card. The following biometric information is collected during the card issuance 
process: full-set of fingerprints, electronic facial image, and two electronic fingerprints.  
The full set of fingerprints is not electronically stored and is utilized only for law 
enforcement background checks. An electronic facial image is printed on the card face 
and may, but is not required to be, stored on the card. Two electronic fingerprints (right 
and left index finger) are required to be included on the card for biometric 
authentication. The technical specification mandates for collection and inclusion of 
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biometric data on the PIV card are located in NIST SP-800-76: Biometric Data 
Specification for Personal Identity Verification. 
The federal Personal Identity Verification project mandated by HSPD-12 and 
described by FIPS-201 provides the basis for a secure identity program far surpassing 
any current efforts to provide identity management solutions to government employees.  
The federal program is being implemented in two stages. Under PIV-I the process for 
identity proofing including background investigations, document requirements, and 
agency accreditation is administered. The second stage, PIV-2, outlines the technical 
and interoperability requirements for the federal smart PIV card. The reliance on 
interoperable smart card technological capabilities such as inclusion of biometric 
identifiers and encrypted PKI certificates provides identity verification at levels far 
beyond currently employed solutions (Figure 2). The PIV project and its inherent 
flexibility provide a secure identity model that could be replicated and applied to first 




FIGURE 2: PIV CARD SYSTEM COMPONENT MODEL66 
 
Local Implementation of HSPD-12 programs: The National Capital Region 
The unique multi-jurisdictional nature of the National Capital Region (NCR) has made 
it the first region to recognize the need to develop a comprehensive project to 
implement an HSPD-12/FIPS-201-based identity smart card for first response 
personnel. The NCR consists of the District of Columbia and bordering counties from 
Maryland and Virginia.  HSPD-12 has required federal agencies to implement FIPS-201; 
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implementation of the standard has not been mandated for state and local governments. 
The NCR is the first entity to attempt to replicate the federal program on the state and 
local level.  The blurred lines of federal, state, and local responsibility that are unique to 
the region make a common identity standard capable of electronic authentication a 
necessity. The multi-jurisdictional nature of incident response in the region necessitates 
a common interoperable platform to authenticate identity and affiliation across levels of 
government. The NCR project, titled the First Responder Authentication Card (FRAC), 
utilizes the standards outlined in FIPS-201 PIV-II to develop a platform capable of 
interoperability with federally issued smart identity cards. 
The NCR FRAC is based entirely on the standards outlined by FIPS-201 PIV-II. One 
of the major impediments to the implementation of a pure FIPS-201 PIV-I and PIV-II 
compliant identity card for state and local first responders is the background check 
requirement. As described in previous sections, FIPS-201 requires a fingerprint check 
and National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) for all personnel to be issued 
a federal identity credential. The heart of an identity trust model is the security of both 
the issuance process and the product (token). If the model is vulnerable to infiltration 
during the issuance process, or the finished product is subject to counterfeit, there is no 
trust and authentication will be suspect. At the state and local level the cost of 
conducting FIPS-201-compliant background investigations on all first responders would 
be exorbitant. 
In many communities only the background investigations conducted on law 
enforcement officers may meet the standard outlined by FIPS-201. The pre-employment 
identity verification procedures of other response disciplines, including fire, EMS, 
public works, public health, and clinical care, would not meet the standard. In order to 
meet PIV-I enrollment standards, additional investigation of employees would be 
required.  This raises numerous concerns ranging from personal privacy to the 
significant additional and associated costs. The NCR FRAC has addressed this problem 
by delineating levels of authentication based on the scope of enrollment procedures.  
This allows for a graduated trust model where four increasing levels of authentication 
are defined based upon the depth of procedures prior to credential issuance. It does not 
preclude agencies with minimal procedures from inclusion in the program; however, 
when the card is electronically authenticated the level of authentication is displayed 
allowing the user to determine if additional scrutiny is necessary. The graduated model 
ensures maximum participation among local governments (due to limited additional 
financial commitments) while maintaining a level of trust. 
The NCR was ground-zero on 9/11. The response to the terrorist attack on the 
Pentagon revealed a pervasive identity gap, as documented in previous sections of this 
article. In addition, the NCR also has the unique and frequent need for identity 
authentication of first responders from dozens of agencies across all levels of 
government for daily operations. The FRAC is a necessary element in the NCR for both 
daily operations and response to critical incidents such as those created by terrorist 
attacks. 
The NCR FRAC program is moving through the research and evaluation stage.  In 
February 2006, interoperability was tested through a limited enrollment and multi-
jurisdictional exercise dubbed “Winter Fox.” The interoperability and authentication 
capability was targeted by the exercise that took place in four locations including the 
Pentagon, Port of Baltimore, Virginia Department of Transportation, and Frederick 
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County, MD. The exercise sought to examine the ability to electronically validate PKI 
certificates of FIPS 201 standardized smart cards through four different back-end 
architectures. The cards used in the exercise included the NCR FRAC, Maryland FRAC, 
Transportation Security Administration Transportation Worker Identity Credential 
(TSA TWIC), and the Department of Defense Common Access Card (DoD CAC). Each of 
the identified cards is maintained through different back-end infrastructures. The 
exercise sought to test the capability to validate personnel identity across the disparate 
infrastructures. 
The exercise utilized hand-held readers that received satellite downloads of certificate 
revocation lists every twenty-four hours. The readers were utilized to read and validate 
PKI-enabled FIPS-201 smart cards. The Winter Fox exercise resulted in 285 scans of the 
smart cards with disparate back-end architectures. Of the scans, seventy-nine resulted 
in PIN verification failures.67 This means that 28% of the attempts were unable to be 
validated by the back-end architecture because of incorrect PIN entry, or more simply 
cardholder error. The 206 scans where the user did not err in PIN entry resulted in 
100% validation. This provides strong evidence of the interoperable capability of FIPS 
smart cards. The hand-held reader also has the ability to read, but not validate, 2D 
barcodes contained on most driver licenses. Several driver licenses were read, but were 
not validated as part of the exercise.   
Opportunity Knocks: Personnel Certification and Credentialing under the 
National Incident Management System 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) also describes the need for 
personnel certification and credentialing.  NIMS describes personnel certification and 
credentialing as: 
Personnel certification entails authoritatively attesting that individuals meet 
professional standards for the training, experience, and performance required for 
key incident management functions. Credentialing involves providing 
documentation that can authenticate and verify the certification and identity of 
designated incident managers and emergency responders.68 
The NIMS Integration Center (NIC) is working toward solutions for part of the identity 
management problem for incident response identified earlier in this article.  The NIC 
has formed working groups to develop standards for training, experience, and currency 
for specific positions within each response discipline. When developed, these standards 
will ensure standardization across jurisdictions and provide common terminology for 
determining personnel qualified to assist in the accomplishment of objectives on 
incident scenes. 
The program to date has fallen short on prescribing a method to verify identity. The 
lack of an identity-authentication solution to couple with training standards limits the 
effectiveness of the program. Without verification the program fails to develop trust.  
The current direction of the program is strengthening only the vetting process and fails 
to back that more stringent process with a trusted identity token. The NIC efforts to 
implement personnel certification standards, backed by an identity token than can be 
authenticated and is strongly resistant to counterfeit, would vastly improve identity 
management for terrorism incident response      
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The previous sections detail the pervasive failures of identity management in the 
response to incidents of domestic terrorism. The failures are significant and potentially 
high-consequence for future responses, but not so insurmountable nor without solution 
that they need be repeated again. The first step in solving the problem is recognition and 
comprehension of the problem. This article serves as a first step in recognizing and 
defining the problem of identity management for terrorism incident response. The 
analysis of incident after-action reports and other related documentation reveals a 
pattern of identity management failure in the response to large-scale incidents of 
terrorism that, when analyzed, provides a framework for a solution. It must be 
recognized that examining response in the past does not provide a complete solution for 
the future; the possible hazards of the future must also be considered. The consideration 
of plausible scenarios, such as the threat of secondary attack, serves to inform a 
proposed solution to potential threats in the future. 
The success or failure of the federal government and the National Capital Region in 
the implementation of HSPD-12 and the NCR FRAC will impact the future of identity 
management at the state and local level. Although the HSPD-12 program was developed 
for the purpose of security, efficiency, fraud protection, and privacy, the program could 
potentially mitigate the previous failures of terrorism incident response if broadly 
applied to the first-response community across levels of government. The exercise and 
evaluation of the NCR FRAC program is critical in determining the potential of the 
program for mitigating identity management problems endemic to the historical 
incident response to terrorism.  
Although the focus of this article was limited specifically to terrorism incident 
response, secure verifiable identity has benefits beyond this limited scope. Identity 
management for the full spectrum of the homeland security mission is in desperate need 
of attention and creative problem solving. A potential solution must incorporate the 
identity management issues of other homeland security mission areas in order for it to 
be comprehensive.69 Incident response is just one dimension of need as it relates to 
identity management for overall homeland security. A comprehensive solution can also 
bolster terrorism prevention and protection mission capabilities.   
For example, the HSPD-12/NCR FRAC smart card program can provide additional 
benefits through the ability to improve physical access control at government facilities 
nationwide. The United States General Accounting Office report Security: Breaches at 
Federal Agencies and Airports details the success of undercover agents in penetrating 
nineteen federal buildings and two commercial airports without screening, through the 
use of fraudulent law enforcement credentials. “At the 21 sites that our undercover 
agents successfully penetrated, they could have carried in weapons, listening devices, 
explosives, chemical/biological agents, devices, and/or other such items/materials.”70 
The report details another dimension of the identity management capability gap that 
can be addressed by the broad application of credentials capable of electronic 
authentication. This is possible through the implementation of PKI-enabled smart card 
technology for the protection of critical infrastructures. A comprehensive identity 
management program utilizing HSPD-12/NCR FRAC framework would prevent those 
agents or terrorists of the future from penetrating secure sites through unverifiable 
fraudulent credentials. 
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The HSPD-12/NCR FRAC program also provides the ability to improve information 
system security by incorporating card readers into computer access. Incorporated 
physical access control provides two layers of security for logical systems. The first 
hurdle for a potential assailant is entering the physical location; the computer card 
reader option provides a second level of security. An incorporated smart card option 
decreases the potential for cyber attack through on-site infiltration with this two-layer 
process. 
The FIPS-201/NCR FRAC program can also benefit other government operations.   
According to the CIO/ PKI Smart Card Project: Approach for Business Case Analysis of 
Using PKI on Smart Cards for Government-wide Applications, implementing smart 
card technology with digital forms improves efficiency because it “reduces paperwork, 
eliminates redundant data entry, and improves data accuracy as transcribing and data 
entry errors are eliminated”71 A smart card-based system implemented with e-
government initiatives creates public value and cost savings in other areas of 
government processes. The many additional benefits of the implementation of smart 
card technology can help address some of the concerns of cost relative to the public 
value it creates. 
There are several impediments to the nationwide implementation of a comprehensive 
HSPD-12/NCR FRAC model identity solution. The first impediment is problem 
recognition. This article has explored the problem of identity management for terrorism 
incident response for the purpose of increasing awareness. If the success of the NCR 
FRAC program continues, the solution will likely develop awareness about the problem 
it solves before the problem itself is broadly recognized. An NCR FRAC type program 
may appear to those unaware to be a solution searching for a problem.   
The second impediment is cost. One problem the NCR FRAC program has been 
unable to mitigate is the continuing cost of program maintenance. The program is 
dependent upon back-end infrastructure (PKI certificates) provided by private sector 
certificate authorities. Each digital certificate requires an enrollment fee and a yearly 
maintenance fee for the three-year life of the certificate. The cost of the card and digital 
certificate for the three year life of the card is approximately $125-$150.72 The 
continuing cost associated with the program is a major impediment to broad 
implementation by local governments.   
The State of Illinois provides an example for reducing the costs of private sector 
management of digital identity certificates. Illinois has established itself as a certificate 
authority to lower the long-term costs associated with management of digital identity.  
The program was originally established for financial transactions with the state, but has 
application to first responder identity. The state is currently developing a project to 
credential its first responders with PKI enabled smart cards. The Illinois example, of 
states serving as certificate authorities, could potentially drive down the continuing 
costs for broad local implementation of smart card technology for first responder 
identity.  The success or failure of implementation in Illinois could also have far-
reaching implications for first responder identity management. 
The efforts of the NIMS Integration Center (NIC) program to define personnel 
certification for incident response must be joined with efforts to provide secure 
verifiable identity. Personnel position definitions without a method for identity 
verification provide only minimal incremental improvement for incident response. The 
efforts of the NIC must be joined with interoperable identity initiatives.        
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The past failures of identity management in the response to incidents of terrorism 
must be recognized and brought to the forefront of homeland security policy and 
planning at the state and local level.  Creating a mechanism to positively answer the 
critical the questions “who is this?” and “what can they do for me?” can have benefits far 
beyond incident response to terrorism. A comprehensive solution could potentially be 
incorporated into the hardening of physical and logical facilities bolstering terrorism 
prevention and protection capabilities. The cost of continued ignorance could 
potentially be catastrophic. 
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THE USE OF EMS PERSONNEL AS INTELLIGENCE SENSORS: 





The use of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel1 as intelligence sensors or 
information collectors to provide information to Terrorism Early Warning Groups 
(TEWGs) and other local and state government intelligence fusion centers is 
recommended by numerous academic papers, professional articles and presentations, 
and U.S. Department of Homeland Security best-practice documents. These documents 
identify EMS personnel as valuable intelligence sensors, in part because they have 
access to locations not routinely available to law enforcement or intelligence 
communities that may contain indicators of terrorism.2    
In spite of these recommendations, exceptionally few TEWGs have incorporated EMS 
personnel into their information collection systems. While many TEWGs are interested 
in integrating EMS collection assets, they have not developed this capability because 
they are confounded by the complex legal, operational, professional, cultural, and 
societal challenges of using EMS personnel in this capacity. Conversely, at least one 
intelligence fusion center developed an EMS-based information collection system, but 
overlooked federal and state medical confidentiality laws and other strategic issues.3   
There has been no significant debate among federal, state, and local intelligence, 
EMS, law enforcement, homeland security, and medical communities regarding the best 
practices and strategic consequences of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors.4 
Absent an such an interdisciplinary debate leading to the development of model EMS 
information collection practice standards and the articulation of clearly defined public 
benefit, elected officials, the leadership of the EMS and medical communities, and other 
policymakers will not sanction the use of EMS personnel in this capacity, resulting in 
the inability to use EMS personnel as information collectors to prevent terrorism. 
Best practices for using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors must be developed  
because: (1) numerous TEWGs want to integrate EMS personnel as information 
collectors; (2) in the absence of peer-reviewed best practices, some TEWGs are 
instituting information collection practices that breach federal or state medical 
confidentiality laws, which may result in the unlawful disclosure, reception, and use of 
protected health information; (3) there are material civil, administrative, and criminal 
penalties for the improper disclosure, reception, or use of protected health information; 
and (4) ad hoc collection practices that breach the public’s trust and expectation of 
medical confidentiality may result in the loss of this valuable collection asset or the 
creation of inordinately risk-averse TEWG oversight mechanisms.   
In addition to discussing the strategic and legal issues and recommending practices 
for the use of EMS personnel as information collectors to support intelligence fusion 
centers, this article aims to stimulate debate among the intelligence, EMS, homeland 
security, law enforcement, and medical communities regarding the role of EMS 
personnel in supporting intelligence fusions centers.  
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THE VALUE OF EMS PERSONNEL AS INTELLIGENCE SENSORS  
EMS personnel can function as high quality intelligence sensors. They respond to 
emergencies in residences and businesses owned, rented, or operated by all 
demographic groups in all geographic areas on short notice, usually arriving within 
eight minutes of the request for service. In many instances, the reporting party does not 
have time to “clean” the scene; thus indicators of terrorist ideology, planning, or 
operations may be visible when emergency responders arrive. Additionally, most people 
do not react defensively to EMS personnel and may not perceive a need to clean the 
scene. Patients seeking medical care may be unable to disguise suspicious injuries 
associated with the logistics of terrorism, such as burns or other trauma from chemical 
agents or explosives. EMS personnel carrying discreet chemical or radiological detection 
devices could provide the ability to check sites throughout a jurisdiction for potential 
precursors to terrorism that would otherwise be difficult to assess.  
The use of EMS personnel as information collectors would markedly increase the 
number of intelligence sensors in the community and the number of contacts capable of 
yielding information. In one major west coast city, with a population of approximately 
780,000, there are more than 2,000 fire department and ambulance personnel who 
respond to more than 80,000 EMS calls annually.5 While the range of calls varies 
greatly by jurisdiction, a rough estimate is an annual average of 800 to 1,000 EMS calls 
per 10,000 population.  
EMS personnel are well versed at determining the veracity of statements and patient 
histories, especially in situations when the stated history is inconsistent with the signs 
and symptoms or physical evidence. EMS personnel are skilled at recognizing dangerous 
or suspicious environments, and often have a good sense of community concerns due to 
their frequent interaction with the public. 
Because EMS personnel often respond to calls in residences or businesses, they have 
access to the three traditional types of terrorism indicators: trait-based indicators, 
behavior-based indicators, and incident or site-based indicators. Trait indicators are 
based on an individual’s or community’s characteristics, such as race, religion, ethnicity, 
or national origin.6 The use of these indicators has numerous limitations, including high 
rates of false positives and false negatives, engendering distrust between government 
and target communities, and a perception of racially, religiously, or ethnically-based 
persecution. Behavioral indicators are based upon persons’ or communities’ activities, 
conduct, or behaviors, rather than their characteristics.7 Incident or site indicators are 
based upon what can be observed, heard, or otherwise sensed. Incident-based indicators 
are particularly valuable because they can identify evidence of terrorist ideology, 
planning, and operations. Ideological indicators include pictures, flags, or literature 
representing terrorists or terrorist organizations.  Planning indicators include 
photographs or plans of critical infrastructure and detailed information about high-
value sites. Operations indicators include weapons, explosives, chemicals, or timing 
devices. For EMS personnel, incident-based indicators do not include the patient’s 
complaint, history, signs, or symptoms. These are considered medically-based 
indicators, which EMS personnel identify as part of their patient assessment. 
Despite the potential benefit of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors, a 
number of strategic questions must be considered. Will EMS personnel want to function 
as intelligence sensors? Will using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors conflict with 
society’s expectations of medical professionals? Will using EMS personnel to collect 
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terrorism information reduce the total terrorism information received or reduce the 
number of calls for EMS service? Will using EMS personnel as information collectors 
violate medical confidentially laws? 
EMS PERSONNEL ISSUES 
Pre-hospital personnel will have varied reactions to serving as intelligence sensors to 
support intelligence fusion centers. Some EMS personnel will embrace this 
responsibility, believing it supports a safer community and nation. Others will avoid this 
responsibility because they believe it creates new risks and may interfere with their 
primary emergency medical care mission. These strategic issues deserve careful 
evaluation.  
Serving as an information collector to support an intelligence fusion center is not 
without risk to individuals, their coworkers, organizations participating in the program, 
and the EMS discipline generally. Individual responders may place themselves and their 
coworkers at risk of physical harm, if terrorists or criminal organizations perceive that 
responders are providing information to law enforcement or intelligence fusion centers. 
EMS personnel commonly do not report contraband, illicit items, or violations of the 
law to law enforcement, unless there is an imminent threat to the rescuer; they do not 
want to be considered law enforcement informants, a perception that could leave them 
vulnerable to reprisals on future emergency responses.8 Criminal informants, if 
identified, often need protection and their careers may end.9 Emergency response 
personnel who are perceived as informants could be summoned to an ambush or other 
form of reprisal with a phone call.  
Even if only a few EMS personnel participate in a collection program, a risk could be 
created for all personnel in that organization, as the public or targets will not necessarily 
differentiate between those who are participating and those who are not.  However, the 
risk of reprisals against EMS personnel can be minimized if they collect and report only 
indicators of terrorism, not indicators of criminal activity. Even if terrorists suspect that 
EMS personnel are intelligence sensors, clandestine terrorist organizations planning or 
supporting an attack in America are unlikely to threaten or assail a paramedic, because 
to do so would attract the scrutiny of law enforcement. Many jurisdictions will 
determine that this possible risk to EMS personnel is outweighed by the opportunity to 
identify a terrorist’s planning or operations by using EMS personnel as intelligence 
collectors. While that determination may be appropriate, the potential risk to EMS 
personnel must be carefully considered.   
Intelligence gathering by pre-hospital personnel may interfere with traditional 
medical and health care missions. Two foundational principles of medical care are that 
clinicians will provide care without moral judgment and hold sacrosanct information 
provided by a patient. Medical confidentiality seeks to maximize patient communication 
with medical professionals, so that fear of disclosure will not deter people from seeking 
medical help and securing a diagnosis and adequate treatment. Medical confidentiality 
also seeks to encourage medical professionals to be candid in recording information in 
patient medical records, and to protect patients' privacy against disclosure of sensitive 
personal information.10 Many clinicians believe that because of these principles, patients 
seek care they would otherwise decline if the circumstances of the care were disclosed. 11 
Some EMS personnel consider that reporting patient information (provided to them 
with an expectation of privacy) to TEWGs violates these health care principles and 
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refuse to provide that information – even if that information prevents or preempts a 
potential terrorist attack. Disaffected EMS personnel may refuse to participate in a 
collection program, provide disinformation to fusion centers, or become “whistle 
blowers.” (During the author’s presentation on this subject, to approximately 100 pre-
hospital personnel, most were interested in participating in an information collection 
program. However, about twenty-five attendees stated they would not, under any 
circumstances, participate in such a program.)12 
SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS OF EMS PERSONNEL  
The American public expects privacy from their medical practitioners and feels strongly 
that health information and medical records are confidential and must not be released 
to others without the patient’s permission.13  Citing a Louis Harris poll, Beth Givens, 
director of the Privacy Rights Council noted that “In 1995, 82% of those polled, or four 
out of five, said they are somewhat or very concerned about threats to their personal 
privacy. This is up from 64% in 1978”. Mainstream privacy groups identify secondary 
use of medical information without the patient’s permission by unrelated third parties, 
including law enforcement, as “privacy abuse.”14 Absent compelling research to the 
contrary, we can presume that the public’s expectation of privacy extends to EMS 
professionals. This expectation is certainly legitimate, as EMS personnel are included in 
the federal and exemplar state medical confidentiality laws. 
If EMS participation in information collection and reporting programs is publicly 
known, members of the public, especially within marginalized communities, may believe 
they are being spied upon by pre-hospital personnel. This will breach the public’s 
expectation of medical confidentiality and exacerbate distrust of the government, which 
may result in members of those communities refusing to use emergency services. 
Preventable morbidity and mortality would result if segments of the public stopped 
using emergency medical services or other health services. This is an utterly 
unacceptable consequence, which would require termination of the EMS collection and 
reporting program.  
The use of EMS personnel as information collectors also involves issues similar to the 
community-based policing versus proactive or intelligence policing dichotomy. 
Advocates of community-based or crime-response and prevention policing believe 
intelligence gathering by police will interfere with their traditional crime-fighting and 
social-services mission.15 This argument asserts, in part, that using police for 
intelligence purposes may alienate those communities that are the target of the 
intelligence operations, which may result in the alienated communities becoming less 
likely to report criminal activity or cooperate with police investigations, which correlates 
with higher rates of crime.16 When applied to using EMS personnel as information 
collectors, this issue considers whether the government’s use of individuals who are 
expected to maintain medical confidentiality as intelligence sensors is strategically 
counterproductive. The use of EMS personnel as intelligence sensors may be interpreted 
by certain communities as evidence that they are under constant surveillance and not 
trusted. This could engender community distrust, causing potential leads – that might 
otherwise be reported – to not be reported, resulting in a decrease of terrorist-related 
information from those communities. 
Finally, another risk of using any non-law enforcement information sources, 
including EMS personnel, as information collectors is that alienated communities will 
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request redress from government policymakers. Municipal, county, or state 
policymakers may refuse to support the use of non-law enforcement personnel as 
information collectors, prohibiting those personnel from performing intelligence 
collection functions, or sanctioning those organizations through legislative or budgetary 
controls. 
LEGAL ISSUES  
Because TEWGs and other fusion centers have historically not used medical personnel 
as collection assets, the federal and state medical confidentiality laws and state 
mandatory reporting laws that relate to EMS personnel have not been relevant to their 
operations. However, it is critical that EMS personnel, EMS employers, and TEWGs that 
utilize EMS collection assets understand these laws, because they define the 
circumstances under which confidential medical information may be disclosed, 
received, or used.  
Within the United States, a patient’s17 health information is protected from 
unauthorized disclosure, reception, or use through a rubric of federal and state laws. 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s (HIPAA) Privacy Rule 
prescribes the federal requirements to protect the privacy of patients’ health 
information and defines specific exemptions for disclosure of that information. In 
addition to the federal protections afforded by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, each state has a 
confidentially of medical information law that provides specific protections for medical 
and health information. Finally, each state has laws that compel health care providers 
and others to report to governmental agencies acts or conditions that identify abuse, 
crimes, or threats to public health and safety.  
This article examines the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the confidentiality and mandatory 
reporting laws from the State of California for two reasons: California has a number of 
established intelligence fusion centers and the author is familiar with EMS operations in 
California. Not all the laws reviewed in the context of this article will apply to all states 
or agencies.18  
The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) mandated the 
development of standards to protect the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associates in any 
form, including electronic, paper, or oral.19 These standards are contained in the 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, commonly called 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule or Privacy Rule.20 The purpose of the Privacy Rule is to prevent 
the unauthorized disclosure of a patient’s protected health information and define the 
specific circumstances when protected health information may be disclosed or used, 
with or without authorization. The Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which 
generally includes health plans and health care providers that transmit health 
information electronically for claims or billing, benefit eligibility inquiries, or referral 
authorization requests.21 Nearly all public and private sector ambulance providers and 
first response agencies that bill government sponsored or other health plans for services 
are considered covered entities.  
The Privacy Rule mandates that a covered entity must disclose protected health 
information in two situations: to patients or their representatives when they request 
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access to that information or to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
when it is conducting an investigation or taking enforcement action. The Privacy Rule 
also permits, but does not compel, the covered entity to use or disclose protected health 
information without the patient’s authorization in five categories of situations. One of 
these categories of situations – specific public interest and benefit activities – contains 
two lawful disclosure uses that authorize health care providers, including EMS 
personnel, to release protected health care information to law enforcement.22 These 
lawful disclosure uses are (1) supporting specific law enforcement purposes and (2) to 
prevent or lesson the threat to serious health or safety.23  
Covered health care providers providing emergency care at the scene of a medical 
emergency that is not on the provider’s premises may disclose protected health 
information to law enforcement to alert law enforcement to the commission or nature of 
a crime, the location of a crime and its victims, or to report the identity, description, or 
location of the perpetrator of the crime.24 This provision relates directly to EMS 
personnel; they are the only health care providers who routinely provide emergency 
medical care at locations other than their own premises.25 
Covered health care entities, consistent with law and ethical conduct, may also use or 
disclose protected health information when the health care provider believes the use or 
disclosure “is necessary to lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety 
of a person or the public” and the disclosure is made to a person able to prevent or 
lessen that threat.26 This disclosure is presumed to be made in good faith if the health 
care provider relied on assertions made by a person who could credibly have knowledge 
of a threat to public health and safety.27 This authorization supports EMS personnel 
informing law enforcement or TEWGs about potential terrorist threats, based upon a 
patient’s history or statement, or signs and symptoms, provided the EMS personnel 
believe the patient’s actions pose a serious and imminent threat to public health and 
safety and the law enforcement officer or TEWG is able to prevent or lessen the threat. 
In the situation of a terrorist being injured while manufacturing an improvised explosive 
device or chemical agent, reporting protected health information to law enforcement is 
justified – the person has already created a serious and imminent threat, has caused an 
injury to him/herself, has placed on-scene public safety personnel at risk, and may be 
creating a serious and imminent threat to the public.28  
The Privacy Rule also allows the disclosure and use of protected health information 
for specialized governmental functions, including national security and intelligence 
activities. Pursuant to this exemption, a covered entity may disclose protected health 
information to authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counterintelligence, 
and other national security activities.29  Disclosures made to authorized federal officials 
for national security or intelligence purposes are also exempted from a Privacy Rule 
requirement that covered entities identify all disclosures of protected health information 
made during the past six years, including disclosures to non-federal law enforcement 
agencies, upon the request of the patient.30 These disclosure and reporting exemptions 
provide a method for FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and similar organizations using 
federal officials, to confidentially access protected medical information that may contain 
indicators of terrorism, after receiving an initial lead from a TEWG or other source.31  
HIPAA provides criminal and civil penalties for failure to comply with the Privacy 
Rule. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services may fine covered entities up 
to one hundred dollars per occurrence for failing to comply with the Privacy Rule, and 
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up to a maximum of $25,000 annually for repeated violations of the same requirement. 
A person who knowingly discloses or uses individually identifiable health information 
may be criminally fined up to $50,000 and imprisoned for up to one year. If the illegal 
conduct involves false pretenses, the maximum fine increases to $100,000, and possible 
imprisonment increases up to five years. If a person unlawfully sells, transfers, or uses 
individually identifiable health information for commercial gain, the maximum fine is 
$250,000 and the maximum imprisonment is ten years. Criminal sanctions to enforce 
the Privacy Rule can only be applied by the U.S. Department of Justice.32  
State Confidentiality of Medical Information Laws  
In addition to understanding the requirements of the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule, EMS 
personnel, their employers, and TEWGs that use EMS personnel as intelligence sensors 
must understand the requirements of their state’s medical confidentiality laws and 
mandatory reporting laws to comprehend what information may be legally reported to 
TEWGs. The content of these laws varies greatly by state, but generally identifies who is 
covered by the law; prohibits the release, sharing, or disclosure of medical information 
without the patient’s permission; and identifies specific exemptions when information 
must or may be disclosed without the patient’s authorization. 33 
In California, the primary medical privacy law is the California Confidentiality of 
Medical Information Act.34 This law applies to all licensed or certified health care 
professionals, including physicians, nurses, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and 
paramedics. The law also applies to organizations that store medical information, and 
organizations that employ health care personnel, such as EMS first responder agencies 
and ambulance providers.35  
The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act states, “No provider of 
health care, health care service plan or contractor shall disclose medical information 
regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or subscriber of a health 
care services plan without first obtaining an authorization.”36 The Act broadly construes 
medical information to include any element of information that allows identification of 
the individual, alone or when matched with other publicly available information.37 Thus, 
except for defined exemptions, the Act comprehensively prohibits the release of a 
patient’s medical information, including information which could be correlated with 
dispatch records or other public information to allow identification of the patient, 
without the patient’s authorization.  
The Act contains nine exemptions that compel covered entities to release information 
without a patient’s authorization. These exemptions are limited to actions taken 
pursuant to court orders, subpoenas, investigations by agencies with regulatory 
oversight, search warrants, requests by a coroner under specific conditions, and when 
required by law.38 The Act also contains eighteen exemptions when health care 
providers or others may disclose patient information. These conditions include 
furthering the treatment of patients among medical providers in emergencies, 
facilitating the payment of medical bills when the patient is unable to give authorization, 
allowing review and oversight by licensing and accrediting bodies, facilitating clinical 
research, supporting coroners’ investigations, evaluating insurance plan coverage, 
determining the need for conservatorship, and supporting post-death organ transplant. 
Additionally, demographic information may be provided to a disaster relief organization 
to respond to welfare inquiries. Medical information may also be disclosed to a local 
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health department to assist in the prevention or control of diseases, and to support 
public health surveillance, investigations, and interventions.  
None of these compulsory or permissive disclosure provisions allow EMS providers to 
release a patient’s medical information to law enforcement or to a TEWG, even if that 
medical record suggests activities consistent with terrorist ideologies, planning, or 
operations. While EMS personnel could disclose medical information to EMS regulatory 
agencies, such as local EMS agencies,39 these agencies are prohibited from disclosing 
that information to parties that are not otherwise authorized to receive or use that 
information.40 
   The California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act provides criminal and civil 
penalties, including compensatory and punitive damages, for unauthorized disclosure of 
medical information in violation of the Act.41 (Other state laws provide additional 
remedies.) The civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for violating the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act are severe. In the context of EMS personnel 
releasing medical information to law enforcement or TEWGs in violation of the Act, the 
penalties could be applied against the person unlawfully disclosing the information, 
against the employing agency, and against the TEWG for unlawfully receiving or using 
the information. For EMS personnel, a criminal conviction under this act will probably 
cause the revocation of their license, termination of their employment, and end their 
careers.42 For the TEWG organization, a criminal conviction under this act would result 
in scrutiny that would threaten the viability of the organization and the local and state 
intelligence fusion center concept.  
State Mandatory Reporting Laws 
Like other states, California has laws that require health care providers to report certain 
acts of violence to local law enforcement and certain diseases to the public health officer. 
While pre-hospital personnel are not required to report under either of these laws, they 
are relevant because many EMS personnel erroneously believe these laws allow them to 
report otherwise confidential information to law enforcement.  
California Penal Code Section 11160 provides that health practitioners employed in 
certain facilities, or employed by a local or state public health department, must report 
to a law enforcement agency any patient who presents with injuries that are self 
inflicted, inflicted by another with a firearm, or that appear to be the result of actual or 
attempted assault or abusive conduct. (Assault or abusive conduct includes any of 
twenty-three crimes, including manslaughter, torture, battery, incest, rape, throwing 
any caustic chemical with intent to injure, child abuse or endangerment, abuse of 
spouse, lewd acts with a child, and elder abuse.) The content of the report made by the 
health practitioner to law enforcement is not limited, and could reasonably include the 
patient’s medical record, which would otherwise be confidential.43 This law applies only 
to the specific health care providers identified within the law, which does not include 
EMTs and paramedics (EMS personnel). Thus, EMS personnel in California may not 
release confidential medical information directly to law enforcement or a TEWG. 
However, hospital-based physicians and nurses are compulsory reporters under this 
law. Information reported by EMS personnel to hospital personnel is reportable by 
hospital personnel to law enforcement as part of this law’s compulsory reporting 
requirements, making the interpretation of this law relevant to how EMS personnel 
could report medical information that may indicate terrorist planning and operations. 
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California Code of Regulations, Title 17, Section 2500 requires certain health care 
providers, including physicians, mid-level practitioners, nurses, infection control 
personnel, but not EMS personnel, to report to the local health officer in which the 
patient resides, any of eighty-eight diseases or conditions. These diseases include the 
Category A Bioterrorism Agents and diseases on the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s list of Bioterrorism Agents and Diseases.44 When no health care providers 
are present, any person aware of an individual suspected to be suffering from any of the 
covered diseases may notify the health officer.45 While EMS personnel are not 
mandatory reporters, they may permissively report a patient suspected of these diseases 
to local health authorities in the absence of a compulsory reporter. This law does not 
allow EMS personnel to report this information to TEWGs or law enforcement. 
Other California laws and regulations compel reporting of confidential medical 
information to law enforcement, public health, and environmental health authorities. 
Emergency medical technicians and paramedics must report child abuse and dependent 
elder abuse.46 However, within the performance of their pre-hospital duties, this 
reporting, while essential to protect public safety, does not provide a mechanism to 
report medical information or signs and symptoms that could indicate planning or other 
preparation for terrorism.  
Evaluating the Legal Rubric 
To determine how medical confidentiality and disclosure laws affect the ability of EMS 
personnel to provide information to intelligence fusion centers, the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
and state confidentiality and disclosure laws must be jointly analyzed. Except for 
specific exemptions, the HIPAA Privacy Rule preempts contrary portions of state law.47 
The Privacy Rule provides two principle exceptions to the general rule of federal 
preemption. These exceptions apply if the state law: (1) more stringently protects health 
information or grants the patient greater access to his or her health information; or (2) 
provides for the reporting of  certain diseases or injury, child abuse, or public health 
surveillance, investigation or intervention.48 This preemption test creates a floor or 
minimum standard for protection of medical information. If a state law provides a 
higher level of medical privacy, the level created by the state law applies. State laws for 
reporting disease, criminally-caused injury, or public health investigations are not 
preempted. 49 There are other exceptions to preemption, which are not relevant to this 
discussion. 
Section 164.512(f) (6) of the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows EMS providers, in response 
to a medical emergency that is not on the EMS provider’s premises, to disclose protected 
health information to law enforcement, if that disclosure is necessary to alert law 
enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location of the crime or its 
victims, or the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.50 Section 164.512 (j) of the 
Privacy Rule allows EMS providers to use or disclose protected health information when 
the health care provider believes the disclosure is necessary to lessen a serious and 
imminent threat to the health and safety of a person or the public and the disclosure is 
made to a person able to prevent or lessen that threat.51 Section 164.512(k)(2) of the 
Privacy Rule permits EMS personnel to disclose protected health information to 
authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counter intelligence, and other 
national security activities.52 
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None of these provisions preempt the California Confidentiality of Medical 
Information Act’s prohibition against unauthorized use or disclosure of a patient’s 
health information because the state law more stringently protects that information. 
Thus, EMS personnel in California may not report confidential medical information to 
law enforcement or a TEWG to alert law enforcement about the commission and nature 
of a crime, the location of the crime or its victims, or the identity of the perpetrator of 
the crime, or to lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health and safety of a person 
or the public. Nor may EMS personnel report confidential medical information to 
authorized federal officials to support intelligence, counter intelligence, and other 
national security activities.53  
California law is generally more severe than the Privacy Rule regarding sanctions for 
unlawfully disclosing health information, and is not preempted by HIPAA. For some 
specific violations, such as unlawful disclosure of protected health information under 
false pretenses, the Privacy Rule’s penalties are harsher. In these situations, the harsher 
penalty would be applied. For a case to be made under the Privacy Rule there must be 
specific intent to violate the law. For a case to be made under California law, only 
negligent disclosure is necessary. Under the Privacy Rule, an action must be brought by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or the U.S. Department of Justice; 
however, under the California Confidentiality of Medical Information act, an individual 
patient or numerous governmental attorneys may initiate legal action.54  
In summary, the exercise of the three lawful disclosure provisions in the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule that allow EMS personnel to disclose protected health information to law 
enforcement are prohibited by the more stringent requirements of the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. Furthermore, in California there are no 
mandatory reporting laws that allow EMTs and paramedics (EMS personnel) to report 
medical indicators of terrorism to law enforcement or a TEWG. Disclosure of protected 
medical information carries heavy penalties; the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the California 
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act provide material sanctions for those who use 
or disclose protected health information without authorization.  
Therefore, EMS personnel are not allowed to report confidential medical information 
to law enforcement or a TEWG, even if that information suggests terrorist planning or 
operations. The inability to report confidential medical information creates ethical and 
moral challenges for the paramedic who discovers medically-based indicators of 
terrorism that she believes should be reported to law enforcement. These professional, 
societal, and operational issues are examined in the balance of this article.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the use of EMS personnel as information collectors may be controversial, 
there is a realistic probability that an EMS responder at the scene of a medical 
emergency may provide information to prevent, preempt, or interdict a terrorist attack. 
Based on the evaluation of each issue identified in this article, the use of EMS personnel 
in this capacity is both ethical and legitimate, given certain constraints. 
EMS personnel should only collect and report incident-based indicators and non-
medical behavior-based indicators of terrorism to TEWGs. This information, which does 
not include protected health information, is high-value information. Incident-based 
indicators have low rates of false-positive and false-negative leads, because collectors 
can clearly articulate what they observe and why it is suspicious. In response to a call for 
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medical assistance, a paramedic enters a residence and observes a case of Casio watches, 
soldering irons, wiring, and numerous suitcases. A paramedic who has received 
terrorism awareness training would understand that the wiring and the number of 
watches are suspicious and potentially related to terrorism because they can be used to 
construct time- or altitude-triggered detonators. Furthermore, when considered with 
the watches and wiring, the suitcases are suspicious because they could be used to 
covertly deploy explosive devices on planes or aircraft.  
Behavior-based indicators of terrorism may also be valuable, but are often less 
specific than incident-based indicators of terrorism. A paramedic responds to a 
residence for a middle age male complaining of severe chest pain and shortness of 
breath—a potential heart attack. The paramedic notes that two men try to delay his 
access to the patient, while two other men speak quickly in hushed voices to the patient, 
and then rapidly and anxiously leave the residence. A paramedic who has received 
terrorism awareness training might report this behavior to the local TEWG, especially if 
incident-based indicators of terrorism were also present. However, it would be difficult 
to determine whether this behavior, which could be considered suspicious, has any link 
to terrorism.  
Incident-based and non-medical behavior-based information can be fused with 
publicly available information, such as dispatch records, to create valuable intelligence. 
This practice will result in EMS personnel providing a manageable quantity of high-
quality information inputs into the intelligence collection, fusion, and analysis process.  
The release of confidential medical information by EMS personnel to TEWGs adds 
little value to the intelligence fusion process. A suspicious injury (such as burns to both 
arms) and an implausible history not consistent with the injury only indicate the patient 
burned his arms other than described, not that the burns were specifically related to 
terrorist activities. While medically-based indicators such as injuries with inconsistent 
histories may indicate terrorist-related activities, it routinely indicates a patient’s 
attempt to cloak the ridiculus and embarrassing – yet lawful – circumstances of an 
injury. Reporting every inconsistent physical presentation and history that might 
suggest terrorism would generate many false-positive leads, which would exhaust 
analysts’ time and cloud the database with misleading data, reducing the acuity of the 
analysis. Similarly, depending on pre-hospital personnel to report clinically-based 
information from the pre-hospital setting would generate false-negative or missed leads, 
because EMS personnel cannot reliably differentiate diseases associated with 
bioterrorism from other routine diseases or ascribe the etiology of many injuries. 
Even when supported by state and federal law, EMS personnel should not disclose 
protected health and medical information to law enforcement or TEWGs, at least until 
such time as there has been a dialogue on the role of EMS personnel serving as 
information collectors. The release of a patient’s protected medical information is 
contrary to the societal expectations of privacy and the medical profession’s 
fundamental ethical principle of patient privacy.55 Absent a national interdisciplinary 
dialogue, medical professionals and the public will consider the release of patients’ 
confidential medical information, by EMS personnel to TEWGs, a serious ethical 
breach.  
Further, reporting clinical information from the pre-hospital setting is not necessary, 
because it is available elsewhere. State mandatory reporting laws require hospital-based 
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personnel to report many clinical indicators of terrorism, including injuries that suggest 
violence against a person, to law enforcement.  
Recommendation 1: Develop Stakeholder Support and Identify Standards 
and Best Practices 
If programs using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors to support intelligence fusions 
centers are implemented nationally, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human services should convene medical intelligence 
working groups to develop collection standards and to clarify regulation. These groups 
should advocate the collection and sharing of information that could identify terrorist 
planning or operations, while protecting the health and medical privacy rights of all 
patients. Working groups need to include representative organizations from the state 
and local intelligence, law enforcement, EMS, legal, and medical communities, 
specifically including medical ethicists. While this type of collaborative process may 
appear unnecessary or counterproductive to representatives from established 
intelligence fusion centers, EMS or medically-based information collection programs 
developed surreptitiously or without the support of stakeholder communities are likely 
to fail amid political scandal. Print and electronic media records are replete with reports 
of local and state governments involved in non-criminal intelligence or surveillance 
operations.56 Common themes of these reports are allegations of “spying on the public,” 
improper use of personnel, public demands for an investigation, replacement of high-
level staff, and increased oversight. It is unlikely that the EMS profession or other 
medical professions, which are expected to protect patient confidentiality, would expose 
themselves to those potential charges, absent a national consensus.    
Recommendation 2: Parameters for Program Development 
Terrorism Early Warning Groups or EMS organizations wishing to develop an EMS-
based information collection program to support intelligence fusion and analysis should 
approach this issue methodically. The following steps are recommended: 
1. Consult with the agency’s legal counsel to review the HIPAA Privacy Rule, state 
confidentiality of medical information laws, state mandatory reporting laws, 
and related local laws or ordinances. Determine how these laws will affect the 
EMS provider’s information collection and reporting efforts.  
2. Identify and train at least one EMS agency Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO). 
The EMS agency’s TLO will be the primary point of contact between the EMS 
organization and the TEWG. This person will assume responsibility for program 
development and operations, including initial and recurring staff training, vetting 
and reporting information to the TEWG, serving as the key point of contact for 
the EMS organization, and receiving intelligence products generated by the 
TEWG that the EMS agency has a right and need to know.  
3. Based on the advice of legal counsel, develop a proposed collection and 
reporting protocol. This protocol should be cooperatively developed by the EMS 
organization and the TEWG. The protocol should be reviewed by the EMS 
regulatory authority to assure its use is authorized and employees’ licenses or 
certifications will not be jeopardized by participation in the program. Employee 
labor organizations should review and comment on the protocol to address 
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labor’s concerns and to garner support for the program. In organizations without 
organized labor representation, employee review can be accomplished through 
vertically- and horizontally-structured employee groups that include formal and 
informal organizational leaders.  
4. Secure the support of appropriate policy makers. Based on local norms and the 
direction of executive personnel, the program may be reviewed by elected 
officials or community leaders. Organizational leaders must determine whether 
the public disclosure or dialogue about the use of EMS personnel as intelligence 
sensors increases the probably of the program’s long term success.  
5. Develop the EMS organization’s information collection program. The EMS 
collection program must include structures and processes for the effective and 
timely transfer of EMS field personnel’s observations to the TEWG. In addition to 
training staff, this will include developing policies to report information, 
standardizing paper reporting forms or database reporting templates, and 
reviewing processes. These systems should be developed leveraging the expertise 
of the EMS organization, the TLO, and the TEWG. While outside the scope of this 
article, well-designed reporting forms can fully mitigate the inability to access 
medically-based indicators of terrorism that EMS personnel may not lawfully 
disclose to TEWGs.   
6. Allow employees to confidentially opt into the information collection program. 
Requiring employees to opt into the program reinforces that participation is 
voluntary. While employees may identify participants and non-participants 
through attendance at trainings or while reporting, the goal is to allow employees 
to participate or not participate without experiencing overt or indirect pressure 
from peers or management, which may result in attempts to sabotage the 
program.  
7. Train participating EMS personnel as information collectors. Field-level EMS 
personnel should be trained to collect information, through an EMS-specific 
program. The training curriculum must provide learners with competencies to: 
(a) understand the role and responsibilities of EMS personnel in information 
collection to support intelligence fusion and analysis; (b) identify the benefits, 
limitations and issues of different types of indictors of terrorism, such as trait-
based indicators, behavior-based indicators, site- or incident-based indicators, 
and medical-based indicators; (c) recognize incident- or site-based indicators of 
terrorism planning and operations; (d) articulate the legal and ethical issues 
associated with medical confidentiality and protected health information; (e) 
understand the history, cultures, and beliefs of various terrorist organizations; 
and f) be aware of local terrorism issues.  
8. Develop a comprehensive public information plan that explains why EMS 
personnel are being used in this capacity. This should be a joint effort, between 
the TEWG or fusion center and the EMS agency. While a public information plan 
may seem counterproductive to a fusion center’s goals, information about the 
collection program will become public. Charges of domestic spying and the 
associated negative public relations can be minimized if the collection program’s 
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goals, legitimate rationale, and respect for privacy and medical confidentiality 
laws are disclosed in advance of the program.  
Recommendation 3: Summary EMS Information Collection Protocol  
Before beginning an EMS information collection program, every organization should 
develop a protocol to prescribe practices for information collection and the 
organization’s review and referral of that information. While presenting an EMS 
organization’s comprehensive information collecting and reporting protocol is beyond 
the scope of this article (it must incorporate a specific organization’s legal analysis and 
operational structures and processes), such a protocol should minimally consider the 
following elements:  
Awareness 
• EMS personnel should be alert to incident-based indicators of terrorism on every 
call, including vehicle accidents and calls to residences, businesses, and public 
spaces. 
• EMS personnel should be alert to the behavior of those on scene, including family 
and friends of the patient. 
Information Collection  
• EMS personnel should only collect and report scene- or incident-based indicators 
of terrorism. 
• EMS personnel should continue to report or not report indicators of non-
terrorism related crime, as determined by agency or personal practice.  
• Confidential medical information should not be released or disclosed to law 
enforcement or TEWGs, unless compelled by mandatory reporting laws or legal 
order. (Confidential medical information includes the patient’s signs, symptoms, 
current and past medical history, and communication with the patient, whether 
in written, oral, or other form.) 
Reporting 
• If indicators of terrorism are observed and responder safety is at risk, EMS 
personnel should call local law enforcement immediately or as soon as is safe. 
• If indicators of terrorism indicate an attack is imminent, EMS personnel should 
call local law enforcement or the local 24/7 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF) immediately or as soon as is safe. 
• Other indicators of terrorism should be routed through the EMS organization’s 
TLO to the TEWG, as per protocol, using the organization’s information 
reporting forms.  
Confidentiality Verification and Process and Quality Improvement 
At least quarterly, the TLO should examine the terrorism information reporting inputs, 
processes, and outputs to determine whether: 
• There was any breach in patient privacy; 
• Information was reviewed in a timely manner by the TLO and provided to the 
TEWG; 
• Areas for improvement or successes were identified by information collectors; 
• Any changes in the program are required. 
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Recommendation 4: Reform State Laws to Provide Consistent Mandatory 
Reporting Requirements for Medical Professionals  
States should review their laws and mandated reporting requirements to assure 
consistency and, if possible, compatibility with HIPAA.  For example, California’s 
fragmented and incongruent compulsory reporting laws have disparate definitions of 
health care providers, resulting in a confusing arrangement of compulsory reporters for 
various injuries, diseases, and conditions. The variances in mandatory reporters 
contained within these laws are not rational. A paramedic employed by a local 
department of health has different reporting requirements than a paramedic employed 
by a fire department or private ambulance company.57 A common definition of 
healthcare provider across these statutes and regulations would result in more uniform 
reporting and improved safety for the victims of crime and abuse.  
CONCLUSION 
EMS personnel can be valuable information collectors to support terrorism intelligence 
fusions centers. They can provide important information inputs that would not 
otherwise be available to fusion centers. However, every intelligence fusion center and 
EMS organization considering such a program must carefully analyze the legal, ethical, 
societal, and organizational issues unique to that EMS organization. Each EMS 
organization must use a methodical information collection implementation process, 
which includes legal analysis, developing a collection protocol, designating a terrorism 
liaison officer, designing a collection program, garnering employee support, training 
field employees, and assuring patient privacy. 
In the longer term, the success and acceptance of the use of EMS personnel as 
information collectors to support terrorism intelligence fusion centers depends on 
significant dialogue among civilian intelligence, EMS, law enforcement, homeland 
security, and medical communities regarding the considerations, practices, and strategic 
consequences of using EMS personnel as intelligence sensors. Without this dialogue, the 
use of EMS personnel as intelligence sensors will not be sanctioned by the medical 
community or the public, most EMS systems and personnel will decline to serve as 
intelligence sensors, and important collection assets will be lost.  The failure to deploy 
EMS personnel as information collection assets would be unfortunate, because there is a 
very real possibility that EMS personnel could provide critical clues to prevent, preempt, 
or interdict a terrorist attack in the United States, as they did to prevent the car bombing 
attacks in London on June 29, 2007.  
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This is an important book. Based on an in-depth analysis of four especially 
vulnerable components of U.S. infrastructure, Charles Perrow (author of the 
sociological classic Normal Accidents) proposes “target reduction” as a means to 
help the nation better survive the catastrophes to come. Understanding what the 
author means by target shrinkage requires the reader to do a bit of digging, 
especially since Perrow features a number of policy recommendations only 
loosely related to target size. Perrow also recognizes that his proposals will 
generate powerful political opposition because of the regulatory activism they 
would require and their potential conflict with market incentives that continue to 
foster target vulnerabilities. To limit political influence exerted by the corporate 
owners of critical infrastructure, and thereby facilitate regulatory change, Perrow 
suggests far-reaching structural reforms of the U.S. electoral system. Those 
reforms are unlikely to occur anytime soon. Interestingly, however, Congress is 
already pushing ahead with some of the regulatory measures endorsed by The 
Next Catastrophe. The process by which that effort is going forward raises 
broader questions for homeland security policymaking, and makes Perrow’s book 
all the more timely.  
The Next Catastrophe goes beyond the existing literature on critical 
infrastructure protection.1 As in Stephen Flynn’s America the Vulnerable (2002) 
and The Edge of Disaster (2007), Perrow makes a persuasive case that the United 
States should invest more heavily in reducing infrastructure vulnerability, rather 
than strengthening prevention and response capabilities alone. As in Ted Lewis’ 
Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security (2006), Perrow 
examines infrastructure sectors as functional networks, enabling him to identify 
vulnerabilities and propose solutions beyond those derived from more traditional 
approaches to infrastructure protection. Perrow carries this analysis into realms 
that have yet to receive adequate attention in the homeland security literature, 
including the Internet. Rather than following the more common emphasis on 
terrorism and natural hazards, Perrow also pays unprecedented attention to the 
problems of industrial accidents, and brings his path-breaking theory of “normal 
accidents” to bear on what is – more than any other book in the field – a truly all-
hazards analysis of homeland security.  
The first section of this review examines why Perrow’s proposals are so 
potentially valuable for reducing the damage caused by terrorist attacks, natural 
hazards, and industrial accidents, and analyzes his broader argument on behalf of 
target reduction. The second section explores how, despite the lack of electoral 
reform Perrow considers so necessary, legislators have recently enacted 
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infrastructure regulations opposed by industry. In particular, I will examine how 
legislators are seeking to politically advantage their regulatory initiatives by 
framing them as essential for U.S. security, and thereby advance broader public 
safety objectives that would otherwise be more difficult to achieve. As those 
regulatory efforts go forward, The Next Catastrophe will offer a roadmap for 
protecting the United States that is both innovative and enormously valuable. 
“SHRINK THE TARGETS”  
The Next Catastrophe addresses a wide range of problems in homeland security, 
including an insightful analysis of the unintended consequences of centralizing so 
many disparate programs and organizations in the Department of Homeland 
Security. I will focus on one especially important theme of the book: the need for 
target reduction. Perrow urges that “instead of focusing on preventing disasters 
and coping with their aftermath – which we must continue to do – we should 
reduce the size of vulnerable targets” (emphasis in the original).2 What exactly 
does Perrow mean by target shrinkage, and how would his approach differ from 
those already envisioned in the U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Plan and 
its seventeen sector-specific plans?3   
Some of Perrow’s recommendations clearly illustrate what target shrinkage 
would entail and why it offers such potentially significant benefits for 
vulnerability reduction. For example, Perrow would reduce (and to the extent 
possible, reverse) the growth of population centers in flood plains, coastal areas, 
and other regions vulnerable to catastrophic storms and other natural hazards, 
and by doing so reduce the number of people and structures at risk to such 
catastrophes. (pp. 9, 14-40)   
Perrow would also shrink the concentration of chemical plants and hazardous 
materials storage facilities, and minimize the shipment of hazardous materials on 
rail lines that transit major urban areas. He makes a compelling case as to the 
potential threat that chemical facilities and the shipment of hazardous materials 
pose. Perrow argues that  
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) already litter our landscape; 
terrorists need not sneak them in, and they are more likely to be triggered 
by natural and industrial disasters than terrorists. Ninety-ton tank cars of 
chlorine gas are WMDs that travel daily through our cities; dispersing the 
deadly gas via a tornado or hurricane, an industrial accident, or a terrorist’s 
suitcase bomb would endanger up to seven million people. (p. 2)  
Target reduction would help limit the potential destructiveness of the chemical 
industry. “By reducing the size of the concentrations of hazardous materials, and 
reduce their toxicity and potential for fires and explosions,” Perrow argues, 
“terrorist acts would have less effect,” as would industrial accidents and incidents 
by natural hazards. (pp. 176-77) 
The Next Catastrophe extends this analysis to three other infrastructure 
sectors: nuclear power plants, the national electric power grid, and the Internet.  
Each of these case studies is rich in detail, engagingly written, and tied to specific 
policy recommendations. But what is really new here? Plenty, if we compare 
Perrow’s proposals with the critical infrastructure plans and accompanying 
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annexes issued by the Department of Homeland Security and other federal 
departments.   
Rail transportation offers a case in point. The Next Catastrophe offers an array 
of specific proposals to reduce the casualties that might be caused by rail 
transportation of chlorine and other toxic chemicals, including keeping trains 
that carry such chemicals away from major urban areas, and reducing the volume 
of chemicals carried in individual shipments. None of those proposals are 
included in the Freight Rail Modal Annex of the Transportation Systems Sector-
Specific Plan issued by the Department of Homeland Security.4 The Rail Annex 
Plan notes that industrial accidents or terrorist attacks on chemicals freight cars 
could cause “devastating and lethal consequences.”5 The plan offers a handful of 
proposals to reduce that potential devastation, including the establishment of 
secure storage areas for rail cars carrying toxic materials, expediting their 
movement, and minimizing the number of unattended, loaded tank cars holding 
such materials. (p. 6) These recommendations fall far short of those proposed by 
Perrow, however, and would be less costly in the near term and less disruptive to 
the rail industry’s ongoing operations.6 
I cannot compare Perrow’s proposals for nuclear power plant and power grid 
infrastructure sectors with their counterpart U.S. sector-specific plans, because 
those plans (along with an additional eight of seventeen total plans and annexes) 
are classified “For Official Use Only.” Only one other unclassified plan covers an 
infrastructure sector that The Next Catastrophe examines as a case study: the 
Information Technology Sector-Specific Plan. Here, the gap between Perrow’s 
recommendations and those endorsed by the federal government are even wider 
than in rail security. Most notably, The Next Catastrophe proposes to reduce the 
dominance and “monopoly power” of the Microsoft Windows operating system, 
which he argues constitutes the key source of vulnerability for the Internet. No 
such recommendation is included in the Information Technology Sector-Specific 
Plan.7   
That is hardly surprising. In the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the 
Bush Administration has emphasized the need for the federal government to 
partner with industry in developing sector-specific plans.8 The Information 
Technology Plan notes that Microsoft Corporation will help federal officials build 
collaborative policies, strategies, and security efforts to advance information 
security.9 The Rail Annex Plan states that federal officials will continue to build 
“strong partnerships” with the private sector to “address the common vision of 
security in the Freight Rail Sector.” The Plan specifies that DHS and the 
Department of Transportation will coordinate with sixteen major railroad 
corporations and industry lobbyists such as the Association of American 
Railroads.10   
Of course, is difficult to imagine how effective, practical plans to secure rail 
transportation could be devised without the active participation of the railroad 
companies themselves (or, indeed, the owners of chemical plants and other 
privately-held critical infrastructure). Moreover, as Perrow notes, industry has 
spent considerable money to lessen its vulnerability. The American Chemistry 
Council, for example, has played an active role in promoting safety among its 
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members, and reports that its members have spent two billion dollars on safety in 
recent years. (p. 190) 
The Next Catastrophe argues that despite such spending, industry-led efforts 
to reduce infrastructure vulnerability will remain inadequate. Because spending 
on security hurts the bottom line of industry, at least from the near-term 
perspective of shareholders and many corporate executives, and because market 
forces continue to encourage dangerous concentration in the chemical industry 
and many others, Perrow argues that the private sector cannot be relied upon to 
remedy the vulnerabilities that he has identified. (pp. 32-33) “It will take tough 
legislation to capture the attention of the chemical industry,” he argues, and 
Congress will need to impose much more stringent regulations on such industries 
to reduce the dangers they pose.” (p. 200) Therein lies the problem. Perrow 
emphasizes that the chemical industry “is so well situated with their massive 
campaign financing [of congressional candidates] that it will be difficult to get 
Congress to act.” (p. 200)   
ELECTORAL INCENTIVES AND VULNERABILITY REDUCTION 
The influence that industry exerts over Congress lies at the heart of a larger 
critique The Next Catastrophe offers, of the U.S. electoral system and the effects 
of that system on efforts to reduce infrastructure vulnerability. In each of the 
sectors that Perrow examines, he finds that industry has effectively lobbied 
Congress to weaken the regulations imposed on those sectors and head off the 
vulnerability-reduction efforts that he recommends.11 According to Perrow, the 
source of that lobbying influence lies in the need for legislators to raise vast 
amounts of funding for media advertising and the ability of industry to provide 
for that funding. The result of congressional dependence on such campaign 
contributions: “Every attempt to reduce our vulnerabilities will be compromised 
by our flawed electoral system.” (p. 315) 
To remedy this root cause of failure, The Next Catastrophe calls for structural 
change in the U.S. electoral system. In particular, Perrow advocates legislation to 
reduce the reliance of congressional candidates on industry campaign 
contributions; this would weaken the stranglehold that he views industry as 
exerting over vulnerability-reduction issues. Perrow argues that “Full public 
financing of campaigns or at lease serious spending limits, is probably the most 
important reform that could lead to the changes needed to reduce our 
vulnerability that I have been advocating.” (p. 316) 
Despite the absence of such far-reaching electoral reform, however, Congress 
has recently enacted regulatory changes in the face of initial industry and Bush 
Administration opposition. Regulatory efforts in the chemical sector have been 
especially notable and contentious. Perrow notes that for the five years preceding 
the publication of his book, Congress repeatedly enacted legislation to limit or 
strip the ability of states to impose regulations on industry stricter than those 
adopted by the federal government. The resulting federal preemption of state 
standards helped industry ward off tighter regulation, especially as the Bush 
Administration and Congress weakened federal-level standards. Perrow writes 
that "the federal floor, below which states cannot fall,” has been replaced by “a 
federal ceiling, below which they must operate.” (pp. 317-18) State leaders in New 
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Jersey and other states with heavy concentrations of chemical plants and toxic 
materials storage sites decried such federal preemption and demanded the right 
to enact regulations that would protect their own citizens’ health and safety. DHS 
rejected their demands and issued draft regulations in December 2005 that gave 
the Department the authority to pre-empt state laws.12  
The House and Senate have now voted to overturn that authority. In the 
summer of 2007, months after publication of The Next Catastrophe, both the 
House and Senate adopted provisions to prevent the federal government from 
preempting stricter chemical industry regulations adopted by states. The Bush 
Administration and chemical industry lobbyists were strongly opposed to the 
initial congressional effort to bar federal preemption in the chemical sector. As 
Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) crowed when the Senate approved legislation 
permitting stronger state standards, “We fought the chemical industry lobbyists 
and won.” 13  
How did that happen? Part of the explanation lies in the 2006 shift of control 
of Congress from Republicans to Democrats, and the attendant shift in control 
over the committees (and in the House, a broader legislative agenda) critical to 
advancing regulatory legislation. In the Senate, however, the margin of 
Democratic control is razor thin. My hypothesis is that Lautenberg and his allies 
prevailed not by making partisan appeals to his colleagues, but by framing 
chemical industry regulation as an issue critical to national security. Lautenberg 
gained lobbying support for his legislative effort from interest groups far beyond 
those associated with national security. Environmental groups such as the 
National Environmental Trust and workers’ safety associations such as the New 
Jersey Work Environment Council, avidly backed Lautenberg’s effort.14 In his 
remarks to his Senate colleagues, however, Lautenberg stressed the importance 
of tighter chemical industry regulations as essential for national security and 
(after the Senate approved his initiative) declared that legislators had “put 
national security ahead of special interests.”15 
The battle over federal preemption is not over. As this review goes to press, the 
House and Senate have yet to hammer out the differences in their proposed 
language, and President Bush may still veto the final bill sent for his signature. 
Further research is also needed before accepting the hypothesis that framing 
preemption as a security issue was critical to the success of Lautenberg and his 
allies. Already, ample evidence exists that the administration and its Republican 
allies have successfully “securitized” issues (that is, framed them as essential to 
national security) across a broad range of policy realms and helped accomplish 
policy objectives that they had failed to achieve prior to 9/11.16  Federal 
preemption in chemical industry regulation suggests that securitization has 
become a bipartisan, two-way street. Democrats, as well as Republicans, can 
wrap their favored issues in the mantle of homeland security to accomplish 
objectives that were heretofore out of reach. The vulnerability-reduction 
proposals that Charles Perrow so effectively advocates may well benefit in the 
process, as traditional health and safety concerns become part of an all-hazards 
approach to protecting the United States.   
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